UK case law

A Local Authority v YL & Anor

[2026] EWFC B 23 · Family Court (B - district and circuit judges) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. This is my judgment and reasons in the application of the Applicant for care orders in respect of the Second Respondent, whose mother is the First Respondent. In this judgment I will refer to the parties respectively as the Local Authority, the mother and the child. The social worker is Ms J who I refer to as the social worker. The Guardian is Ms Bedu, who I refer to as the Guardian. Any references to page numbers are to pages in the Core Bundle unless otherwise stated.

2. Names and geographic details have been removed from this written judgment in order to preserve the anonymity of the child.

3. The mother has been unrepresented at the final hearing before me. Throughout this hearing a key concern has been to ensure the case has been dealt with justly having regard to the welfare issues involved. In particular, my focus has been on fairness on the mother who has come to the hearing without legal representation. However, the purpose of the hearing is to make decisions about the child. The court is only required to make such decisions if the threshold for doing so is crossed. I therefore set out my judgment in the following structure: (a) First, I explain the procedure that led to and was followed in the final hearing. (b) Second, I summarise the evidence before me. (c) Third, I explain the legal framework. (d) Fourth, I consider whether threshold for making public law orders has been crossed, which for the reasons I explain later in this judgment I do. (e) Fifth, I consider the welfare of the child to determine what orders to make. Procedure

4. This case had an interim care order hearing on 17 January 2025, case management hearing on 5 February 2025 and issues resolution hearing on 12 June 2025. At each of these hearings the mother was represented by Hazelhurst Solicitors and counsel. She had specifically chosen the services of Natalia Baura at that firm who is a Russian speaking family law practitioner. At those hearings directions were made for: (a) Dr Claire Buky-Webster to provide a cognitive assessment of the mother and global psychological assessment of mother and child (b) the mother to undergo alcohol and drug testing (c) Ms Ieva Dirzyte, an independent social worker (ISW), to provide a parenting assessment of the mother

5. In addition, while the mother had legal representation the following were provided on her behalf: (a) a statement dated 11 February 2025 in Russian and English where the mother said she had no family or friends in the UK or elsewhere who are in a position to provide alternative care for the child (beginning at C34) (b) a 1 st statement in Russian and English dated 13 February 2025 (beginning at C38) (c) responses to final threshold which begin at A50 (d) a final statement dated 28 May 2025 which begins at C83. This statement is not signed by the mother but contains an “Affidavit of Translation” from Ms Baura saying that document was provided by the mother to her. That Russian statement begins at page C83 of the Russian bundle and has a signature from the mother at C93 along with a Dropbox Sign Audit Trail at C94.

6. The case was listed for a final hearing to take place before HHJ Goodrum on three days from Monday 29 September 2025. On 19 September 2025 Ms Baura gave notice to the court that the mother was representing herself. She repeated this in a C2 application on Friday 26 September 2025 saying: The Mother has refused to continue with legal representation and wishes to act as a litigant in person. We previously filed and served a Form FP8, but the Court record still shows us as acting on her behalf. The Mother has ceased all communication with us and has refused to provide any instructions. Legal Aid funding will not cover any work related to this matter after the client’s refusal of representation. Accordingly, we apply to be removed from the Court’s record as solicitors on the Mother’s behalf. If the Court requires our attendance on the first day of hearing, we respectfully request permission to attend remotely for the purpose of addressing removal from the record. The reason why I am unable to attend in person is due to childcare duties. Otherwise, we ask that our attendance be excused and that the Court deals with this application on paper.

7. Primarily as a result of this, the final hearing was adjourned because some key documents needed to be translated into Russian. I was told at the hearing before me that there was significant discussion of what documents needed to be translated, with some translations already having been made by the mother’s former solicitors and provided to the other parties in order to save cost on duplicating translations. The order from the adjourned hearing specifically said: C. The Mother stated she is considering obtaining further legal advice and the Court encouraged her to do so but indicated that it is very unlikely any future adjournment application would be granted owing to a lack of representation.

8. The final hearing was listed to take place on three days from 8 December 2025. That was subsequently changed to 8, 9 and 12 December 2025.

9. Prior to the hearing an application was made to witness summons Ms Dirzyte. HHJ Jones made such a summons. Upon Ms Dirzyte’s request, I agreed for her to attend by video. However she ultimately refused to attend the hearing by video saying she was unwell, overseas and the hearing clashed with a medical appointment. I return to this when considering her evidence. The Hearing

10. Hearing began on the first day with a written application to adjourn from the mother. She had been assisted in making this application by Victoria Koyer. She is a solicitor who does not specialise in family law and was not representing the mother. I heard detailed submissions on the application to adjourn and provided an oral judgment at the hearing. I do not repeat that judgment here. However, in this judgment I want to make clear the consequent measures that I took in order to allow fair participation of the mother as a litigant in person.

11. It should be noted that in the adjournment application it was suggested that the mother was going to obtain new representation from Reeds LLP. The solicitor from that firm said in the morning of the second day that she could not take on the instruction.

12. After refusing the adjournment, I discussed with the parties the timetable and procedure for the hearing. This was a difficult discussion which took a considerable time. Ultimately it was impossible to agree the timetable before the end of the first day because of frequent and lengthy interventions by the mother, often going into narratives on the merits of the case rather than focussing on procedure. While this was understandable due to her status without representation, I therefore decided that the best approach was to provide a written proposed timetable overnight which could form a basis for going forwards and be discussed with the mother. That discussion happened on the second day.

13. The mother also brought a friend, KV to the first day of the hearing. I permitted her to enter. The mother wanted her to be a witness. I said she needed to provide a statement. She did so overnight after the first day.

14. On the second day, the advocates said they did not seek to cross examine KV. In addition I was told that the updated final threshold dated 20 June 2025 had not been translated into Russian. What had been translated was an earlier version (dated 14 May 2025) which the mother had responded to. The Local Authority provided a copy of a translation into Russian, but this had been done by artificial intelligence and nobody could attest to its accuracy. The court interpreter therefore, on oath, reviewed this document and provided some corrections to the language on the second day. She made these as manuscript amendments with the full document then being provided to the mother.

15. The Local Authority proposed that the mother could consider this document after the social worker gave evidence. I determined this would be unfair and instead gave the mother time to consider the document before she would cross examine the social worker. I also explained to the mother the purpose of the social worker’s evidence, namely that she would be giving evidence about: (a) the reason why the child was at risk from the mother; and (b) the care plan for the child, being long term foster care in her current placement.

16. In addition, Ms Jeremiah offered the mother an opportunity to speak to a solicitor who could come to court at meet her on the second day of the hearing and she explained the process for transferring funding to her. The mother, going against her position from the day before, said she did not want a lawyer and wanted to go ahead with the hearing and without representation. I checked this with her and told me this was what she wanted to do. I note that the mother is entitled to represent herself in care proceedings. There is a presumption of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 . She had been subject to a psychological assessment which did not suggest she lacked capacity. In the circumstances there was no basis on which I could force her to take legal representation against her will.

17. I then heard evidence from the social worker. The mother’s cross examination involved the mother giving lengthy narratives containing compound questions to the social worker. I managed this cross examination to ensure any questions the mother did asked were answered. However the number of questions was few as the mother took most of the time talking rather than listening or asking. The mother’s questions related primarily to the situation of the child in foster care rather than the alleged harm the mother had done.

18. Ms Jeremiah also cross examined the social worker

19. Following this I had timetabled for the mother to provide any clarification to her statements as she had said she in her adjournment application that she was not properly represented by her solicitors and she was pressed to sign statements without reading them. After a break to correct her statements, the mother told the court that she had a copy of the Russian bundle at home where she had marked up the inaccuracies in her statements. I therefore explained in detail what she would need to do on the third day, namely that she would explain any changes to the statements in the bundle, and then she would have 10 minutes to explain any other points. She would then be asked questions. The mother confirmed she understood and we concluded the second day.

20. Things did not go according to plan on the third day. The reason for this was unexpected. On the morning of the third day the mother brought the Russian bundle that she had been provided with and said there was a mistake in the translations. She was right. The Russian bundle did not in fact contain a translation of the final threshold dated 14 May 2025 with the mother’s responses dated 27 May 2025 (A50 to A56). Her having this had been the premise on which we had been able to proceed with the hearing despite the updated final threshold not having been translated earlier. Rather the Russian bundle contained a translation of the interim threshold with the mother’s responses beginning on A25. The parties and I agreed that it was unfair on the mother to proceed with the hearing without her having the translated final threshold and responses.

21. The Guardian’s position when this came to light was for the final hearing to be abandoned and be relisted with directions for sorting the documents. The mother and the Local Authority wanted the hearing to be adjourned part heard so time could be given to sort the documents and then for it to resume before me. I determined that it was in the interests of justice for the hearing to continue before me because it would require less time for the parties and court overall. I gave a short judgment on this during the hearing which I do not repeat here.

22. The third day was therefore largely spent with the parties checking if any other key documents were missing from the Russian bundle. We then adjourned to 9 January 2026 with directions for the missing documents to be provided to the mother along with a translation into Russian of my order which included a timetable for the resumed hearing.

23. The resumed hearing was significantly more manageable than the hearing that had taken place before Christmas. I am grateful to the mother and the advocates for their cooperation and focus in making this work. At the resumed hearing the social worker was recalled for cross-examination from the mother about threshold. I then heard oral evidence from the mother. On the second day I heard oral evidence from the Guardian followed by closing submissions from Ms Hyde, the mother and then Ms Jeremiah.

24. In her closing submissions the mother made an adjournment application so she could get legal representation. I refused this application explaining that I had already heard the evidence and the time had now come for me to make a final decision in this case. This is the decision I now give.

25. However before I do so I must mention that the mother emailed my clerk from the hearing days in December at 23.29 on 14 January 2026. She sent that email to me this morning. It makes a number of points alleging unfairness in the procedure and failure of the Local Authority to provide integration services to the mother as a refugee, thereby breaching in the Equality Act 2010 , Human Right Act 1998 , 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

26. For the reasons explained above, the procedure has been fair. For the reasons explained below, I have found that the threshold for making care orders is crossed and I should make such an order in accordance with the law. Evidence

27. The evidence I have considered in this case is: (a) the core bundle totalling 763 pages (noting there was also a master bundle to which I was not taken during the hearing) which, in particular, contains: (i) initial statement of the previously allocated social worker, Ms M. (ii) the current social worker’s statement (iii) the Local Authority threshold documents (iv) the Guardian’s three analyses (v) the parenting assessment and addendum parenting assessment of the Ms Dirzyte (vi) the global psychological assessment and addendum psychological report from Dr Buky-Webster (vii) police reports and case notes from 2024 (viii) the mother’s statements and response to threshold (b) the contact notes bundle of 37 pages (c) the statement KV. (d) the oral evidence from (i) the social worker (ii) the mother (iii) the Guardian

28. I also have had the Russian bundle of 417 pages to assist with cross references.

29. The mother and the Local Authority asked me to treat the mother’s written statements with caution, albeit for slightly different reasons. In the mother’s case this is because she said that she did not sign them or approve them or being made to sign the statements quickly when they contained untruths that would “support this case”. When the mother was asked specifically to provide her corrections to her statements, however, she did not identify any significant untruths except in relation to the child’s religion being Russian Orthodox Christian rather than Jewish. Rather what she said was points she wanted to expand on from what was said in the statements.

30. The Local Authority asks me to treat the statements with caution because they do not appear to be written in the mother’s own words. The Local Authority treads a difficult path between putting to the mother that she did in fact sign statements (as is shown in the face) and suggesting limited weight can be placed upon the statements because of their actual content.

31. I have had the benefit of hearing from the mother extensively during the hearing and I take all the evidence into account when reaching conclusions about her care of the child.

32. The other piece of written evidence that requires specific consideration is the report and addendum report from Ms Dirzyte. The Local Authority and Guardian asked me to place little weight on her evidence because she lacked professional curiosity and challenge, failed to take account of the evidence provided to her, and refused to submit to cross examination. I deal with the criticisms of the substance of her report when dealing with threshold and welfare. The court said to her by email on the morning of 8 December: The Judge notes that your latest sick note shows you being unfit to work until 5 January 2026 due to lower back pain. Delaying until you are fully recovered may not be in the interests of justice or of the child. The most straightforward way to avoid delay would be to hear your evidence remotely by video. The timing of this can be agreed to accommodate any appointments or tests that you have today. If you are unwilling or unable to give evidence in this way the court will consider proceeding without your oral evidence. The court may publish its judgment on why this has been necessary. The Judge hopes to be able to discuss with you the best way forward at 11am.

33. She replied at 10:49: Hello thank you for the email and response. I am writing to inform the Court and honourable Judge that I am currently experiencing significant pain due to my medical condition. In addition, the medication prescribed to me causes drowsiness and affects my ability to concentrate and provide oral evidence effectively today. I appologise [sic] for any inconvenience caused to proceeding, however I am unable to attend even remotely at this stage due to poor health. Thank you for understanding and sincere apologies for this inconvenience. Kind regards, Ieva Dirzyte

34. Her refusal to join the hearing is a contempt of court. No party seeks any orders in relation to her. All parties agreed to proceed without her. But her refusal to follow orders so that her oral evidence could be accommodated does damage the weight I can give to her written evidence.

35. It is customary in the family court to comment on the impression the witnesses gave.

36. The social worker’s evidence appeared to be open and honest. During her evidence in December, when she was primarily asked about the child’s situation and mother’s allegations of harm coming to her in foster care, the social worker was very careful to explain the circumstances of the child and reassure the mother about her well-being. The social worker took responsibility for this case in February 2025, which is after the key events relied upon in the threshold document. She is therefore primarily reliant upon police reports and assessment by the previous social worker to explain the harm that the child is alleged to have suffered because of the mother’s care.

37. The mother’s evidence has three elements which stick out.

38. First is her concern for the child’s welfare. The mother repeatedly expresses beliefs that the child has suffered problems in foster care such as having bruises, exacerbation of her tooth decay and bedwetting. She also reports that when she saw her daughter, her daughter said she did not want to stay with his foster carer but rather wanted to return to her care. The mother appears fixated on these issues despite the wide range of evidence that the child is doing well in foster care. The two other areas in relation to the child’s welfare that the mother has expressed views relate to language and religion. In relation to language it is common ground that the child is not speaking Russian now. The mother claims that she was speaking Russian before going into care. The mother does not speak English and it is understandable that the loss of a common language is a real cause for concern. In relation to religion the mother took the social worker and Guardian by surprise when she said in December that the child is not Jewish but is rather Russian Orthodox Christian. The mother expressed in January that religion was the most important aspect of the child’s upbringing. The mother’s actions in court to demonstrate religious points have involved pulling out holy books and necklaces with a Star of David around her own neck and a crucifix which she says was removed from the child’s neck. The mother’s emotional response to religious issues demonstrates further fixation. I recognise that religion is important but can be complex. I do not seek to peer into the mother’s soul, and caution against anybody seeking to claim the soul of a child. But I am concerned that assumptions may have been made about religion early in the interactions with the mother based on what is easy and familiar rather than what the mother had really experienced. Her reaction to this is consequently, in my view, understandable.

39. Connected to this, however, is the second element that sticks out. This is evasion. The mother is extremely evasive about her family, who are also the child’s family. During cross examination she described being in touch with people such as her mother, who she then said she did not have contact details for. Her account of her time moving around between 2022 and 2024 (which I returned to when discussing threshold) has varied. She described herself as having land in Russia but could or would not provide the full address. She has never provided the full address where she lived in Ukraine, apparently with her mother, who she now claims has moved to Switzerland or Germany. It is notable that the mother was frequently on her phone during these proceedings presumably in touch with other people. I fully recognise two points in relation to this. First the mother does not speak English and consequently understandably seeks support from other people to navigate the English-speaking world in which she lives. Second there is likely to be stigma associated with her child going into care. It is quite possible that the mother does not want to disclose this to her family. But whatever the reason, I find the mother has been deliberately concealing the identities of her family members and evading providing information about them.

40. Third, is lack of insight. When the elements of the Local Authority threshold were put to the mother, she did not seriously dispute the events, but sought to explain them away. She appeared unable to see how her actions had caused the child harm. This has carried on during these proceedings when the mother has not attempted to maintain indirect contact with the child. She claimed at the hearing she did not know she could do so. Ms Hyde and Ms Jeremiah reported that at the advocates meeting in December where the mother had an interpreter she had told the mother she could provide a card or letter for the child. I have no reason to doubt this being true. The mother either ignored this or failed to take it in because of her habitual focus on whatever is on her mind rather than the issues concerning her child which are the subject of this case.

41. The Guardian gave her evidence thoughtfully and openly. She particularly emphasised how unusual it is for a child not to want contact with her birth mother. In answer to my question, she told me that the reason she sought for the final hearing to be abandoned on day three before Christmas was not so further assessments could be undertaken, but simply because she was concerned about fairness of the hearing. She confirmed that she had not seen the child since writing her final analysis, but had been in contact with the foster carer, social work team and was present at the Looked After Children reviews. Law

42. Threshold is set out in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 as: (2) A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied— (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b)that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.

43. I am mindful of what Baroness Hale said about threshold in in Re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35 :

20. Taking a child away from her family is a momentous step, not only for her, but for her whole family, and for the Local Authority which does so. In a totalitarian society, uniformity and conformity are valued. Hence the totalitarian state tries to separate the child from her family and mould her to its own design. Families in all their subversive variety are the breeding ground of diversity and individuality. In a free and democratic society we value diversity and individuality... 21... "Only where their children are put at unacceptable risk should it be possible compulsorily to intervene. Once such a risk of harm has been shown, however, [the child's] interests must clearly predominate"

44. She went on to explain that the burden of proof is on the Local Authority, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and the court may draw inferences about future risk of harm from harm that is proven to have been suffered in the past. The date on which threshold has to be shown is the date of institution of protective arrangements, which was 24 September 2024.

45. The crossing of the threshold is not by itself sufficient to justify the making of a public law order as sought by an Local Authority or making orders against the parent whom the finding(s) are made. The threshold is a necessary component to make an order but it is not sufficient without further justification to make orders. It merely opens the door to such an order but the features set out below govern the ultimate decision.

46. In deciding whether to make an order I must consider the welfare of the child which is the court’s paramount consideration. The court approaches this question having regard to all the circumstances of the case and with particular regard to the welfare checklist found in s1(3) of the Children Act. This says contains: (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); (b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; (c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; (d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; (e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; (g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question

47. The Court also has regard to the Article 8 rights to respect for their private and family life. It means that any interference with this right has to be justified as proportionate, necessary, reasonable, and lawful. If the court can identify an interference set at a lower level, then it must take that option to avoid disproportionate action.

48. Delay is generally prejudicial to welfare. The court should only make an order where is it is better for the child than making no order. Threshold

49. The pleaded threshold of the Local Authority is as follows:

5. The mother has unaddressed mental health difficulties due to trauma from the war in Ukraine, which has impacted on the parenting she has provided [the child] putting her at risk of physical and emotional harm, or causing her actual physical and emotional harm. In particular: a. On 13 September 2024, the mother was struggling to manage [the child] putting her at risk of physical and emotional harm. (H50) b. On 13 September 2024, the mother lost [the child]. Upon being reunified with the mother she did not comfort [the child], causing her emotional harm. (H14) c. On 13 September 2024 when returned home following the above incident [the child] ran out onto the road, and mother was unable to control her putting her at risk of physical harm. (H14) d. On 24 September 2024, [the child] ran attempted to run away from the mother. [the child] was observed as dishevelled with bags under her eyes, black fingernails, black feet and a cut on her left big toe. [the child] was wearing no shoes and suffered lacerations on her feet. Mother was arrested on suspicion of assault/ill treatment to cause unnecessary suffering to a child, and [the child] was taken into police protection. This neglect caused [the child] physical and emotional harm. (H28-H32) (H49-H50) e. On 27 September 2024 [the child] bit her mother’s leg during the Child Protection Medical [the child] presented with inappropriate and violent behaviours towards others including biting, kicking, lashing out. When initially coming into the care of the Local Authority, [the child] screamed, shouted and growled at professionals when any attempt was made to interact with her. The foster carer stated that when [the child] first came to the family she was “like a feral child”. (F7) (E37)

6. [The child] has suffered neglect and emotional harm due to the mother’s chaotic lifestyle. [The child] has experienced at least 7 international moves and 7 local moves between May 2022 and 24 September 2024, with 3 periods that mother and [the child] have been homeless. (C4-5) (C11-12) (C25) (F21) (F24)(F55)(H20)(H32)

7. The mother has failed to ensure [the child]’s medical needs are met, not registering her with a GP or dentist despite [the child] having significant dental issues. This has caused [the child] significant physical and emotional harm and put her at risk of the same. (C3)(C5)(C7)

8. Despite being eligible for schooling, the mother failed to enrol [the child] at a primary school. [The child] was not socialising and had no interaction with children her age causing [the child] significant emotional harm. (F17) (F22)

9. The mother has failed to engage meaningfully with interventions which would have enabled [the child] to return home to the mother’s care. In particular: a. On 20 November 2024, the mother failed to make herself available or a meeting with [Local Authority housing department] to erect safety railings on the balcony to prevent [the child] from falling or getting injured. (C8) (C11)(C12)(C15)(C17) b. Mother had her rent arrears waived. However she has again during proceedings accrued further rent arrears. this inability to manage her limited finances risks a further period of homelessness which would cause [the child] significant harm, particularly in light of the history of this family. The Mother has been unable to meaningfully engage with the welfare rights team to assist her with finances and rent arrears. (C66-67)(C76) c. The mother failed to attend increased contact as part of the reunification plan which will have caused [the child] emotional harm. (C8) (C14-C18)

50. I consider these allegations chronologically, looking first at the neglect and emotional harm due to chaotic lifestyle in paragraph 6, then at the failure to address dental issues at paragraph 7, then at the failure to enrol at school in paragraph 8, then at the incidents in September 2024 from paragraph 5 and finally at the failure to engage in paragraph 9. Neglect and emotional harm due to chaotic lifestyle

51. As I have already mentioned in this decision, the mother is evasive about her family. She has not given a clear or consistent account of her time between 2022 and 2024. Nevertheless looking at all of the evidence in the round the following.

52. The child was born on 28 February 2018. On 27 April 2022 she was granted entry clearance by way of a vignette on a form under the “Ukraine Scheme” to accompany the mother. The UK immigration officer in Brussels (presumably for Eurostar) stamped this entry clearance on 9 May 2022 showing that the child entered the UK on this date. The mother told me in oral evidence that her friend made the application for her and the child. I take judicial note that such applications needed to be sponsored by somebody in the UK. The mother explained, and I accept, that the sponsor was a Jewish family in North London.

53. The chronology provided on 13 January 2025 by Ms M says: [The mother] was asked to leave this property due to complaints from the host on 7 July 2022. The details of the host are not known. [The Mother] said [the child] became ill while living at this address and she was having to do hand washing daily.

54. The Local Authority then provided accommodation. KV described the mother telling her that it did not feel safe or comfortable. She says that the mother asked in September 2022 to help buy a ticket to Moldova where she felt it would be easier because Russian is widely spoken there. It is common ground that the mother did go to Moldova in October 2022.

55. Ms M reports that they went from Moldova to Latvia and then Germany under Ukrainian protection schemes. She says that they ended up staying with a Jewish family who eventually help them return to the UK. She says that the mother could not recall how she came back to the UK but it was by train. However the next entry in the same chronology says they arrived at Victoria Coach Station on 22 December 2023 and ultimately presented themselves as homeless. The Home Office provided hotel accommodation initially and then they were provided with temporary accommodation in Aylesbury from January to March 2024. In the chronology it is said that the mother returned to the UK because the child wanted to come. KV said the mother returned to the UK hoping that life here would be better for her and the child. There appear to have been no problems in Aylesbury except that the child did not attend school (which is a separate aspect of threshold).

56. In March 2024 the mother purportedly returned to Ukraine because the maternal grandmother was ill. The mother did not inform social services. As a result she lost her council house in Aylesbury. The chronology from Ms M says that they returned on 11 July 2024. KV says it was June 2024. The mother’s written evidence also says July 2024. The exact date is immaterial.

57. The Local Authority’s housing department consequently provided accommodation to the child and mother in another area of London. The mother’s written evidence, which she elaborated on in oral evidence, was that the accommodation provided by the Local Authority was unsatisfactory because of infestation by bedbugs, rodents and cockroaches as well as having no light or hot water and intermittent electricity. Ultimately she was provided with suitable accommodation in a different area in late September 2024, albeit that accommodation did require some improvement in anticipation of return to of the child to the mother’s care in November 2024.

58. It is notable that at paragraphs 6.08 to 6.17 of her report, Dr Buky-Webster gives the account that the mother provided to her of her time between 2022 and 2024. Dr Buky Webster notes at paragraph 7.06 that this was different to what was contained in the bundle. The detailed description at 6.08 to 6.17 appears not be chronological but the summary at 7.06 says: Before [the child] and [the mother] came to the UK they lived in Ukraine. [The mother] provided me with an account of their movements, although this was different to what was contained in the bundle. [the mother] reported that there was shelling occurring near to their home, although they grew somewhat accustomed to this over time. When it became more dangerous, they left their home. They initially escaped to Germany, living in a school classroom with several other families. [The mother] reported that it was very noisy and both she and [the child] found this hard to live with. [The mother] described significant instability over the past three years. Moving from Germany to the UK, then back to Ukraine when [the child]’s grandmother became ill. They then came back to the UK in 2024. [The mother] described further instability in the UK, living in temporary accommodation which had problems with rats. I note that the bundle states there has been potentially

59. Notably, there is no mention of the move to Moldova and subsequent stay outside the UK from October 2022 until December 2023.

60. The final piece of the jigsaw which is particularly relevant is that nowhere in the written evidence is it consistently explained exactly why the mother chose to come to the UK rather than remaining in one of the other countries where she was safe. It is notable that the mother says her own sister is in Germany and the mother speaks almost no English making her situation in the UK very very difficult. When I asked her about this at the hearing she told me that her reason for coming to the UK was that she thought she would be able to get better maxillofacial surgery here than in Germany. Ukraine is a country at war and the mother is from the east of the country where the war has been particularly acute. However identifying her as a refugee has resulted in a lack of curiosity about the international element of this case. Just because she is a refugee does not mean that she has been forced to live in the United Kingdom. She has shown this by her decisions to leave the UK twice, one of these times being for 14 months. Looking at the evidence in the round I find that she has chosen the UK as her home amongst other options available to her. Furthermore, her voluntary return to Ukraine when she had a stable situation in Aylesbury, shows she was not at that time technically a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because she was willing to avail herself of the protection of her country of nationality. That of course does not diminish the actual risks the civilian population face in Ukraine.

61. On balance I find that the travels of the mother with the child have been as follows: (a) coming to the UK in May 2022 to live with the sponsoring family (b) being asked to leave the sponsoring family due to complaints from the host in July 2022 and moving to accommodation provided by the Local Authority (c) voluntarily leaving the UK for Moldova in October 2022 (d) between October 2022 and December 2023 moving between countries, the identify of which I do not have credible evidence (e) voluntarily returning to the UK in December 2023 (f) voluntarily returning to the Ukraine in March 2024 (g) voluntarily returning to the UK in July 2024 (h) changing accommodation in the UK in September 2023

62. There is no credible evidence about what was happening to the child during these moves. I count at least six international moves and five changes of accommodation within the UK. I find that in July 2022, December 2023 and July 2024 the mother presented herself as homeless in the UK. On balance I find this to have been a chaotic lifestyle during which the child suffered neglect and emotional harm. Failure to address dental issues

63. It was clarified by the social worker that although the threshold refers to registering with the GP, the issue in relation to this aspect of threshold as pleaded is failing to provide for the child’s medical needs by getting her dental treatment required because of tooth decay. The child is otherwise healthy.

64. The mother accepted during oral evidence that when the child came into Local Authority care she already had seven cavities. Ms Dirzyte also refers to this at 2.6 of her report saying treatment was delayed due to the war. The Child Protection Medical Examination (CPME) at page F4 says the mother reported that the child last went to the dentist in Moldova / Germany in 2022. That suggests the cavities and need for treatment had been identified in 2022. Ms Dirzyte’s report mentions the child’s diet as: pasta, bananas, oranges, soups, sweets, porridge, and vegetable soup

65. I note these are all soft foods and may reflect the mother’s diet due to her own dental problems.

66. There is a dental deport dated 2 April 2025 from Dr Zareena Chaudhry which explains that the doctor had recently seen the child for an assessment. She was experiencing dental pain from both sides of her mouth. She had: • Dental decay in at least 15 teeth (8 baby molar teeth, 5 baby incisor / canine teeth, 2 adult lower molar teeth) • History of Pain on left and right sides when eating

67. The report does not comment on when these problems began. I am unable to identify evidence that the child had pain in her teeth at the relevant date. The initial statement of Ms McLean does not mention this and neither do the police reports from September 2024. The CPME did not identify this issue. It is not an allegation relied on an interim threshold. Dr Buky-Webster says at 7.08 of her report that when she met the child on 31 March 2025 she could see a visible and large area of tooth decay on one of the child’s incisors and the foster carer reported ongoing concerns about your teeth. Dr Buky-Webster also reported that the mother would give the child free access to sweets in her care.

68. Looking at the evidence and the round I find that the child’s tooth decay began while in the care of the mother and was contributed to by free access to sweets. I am not satisfied she was experiencing pain necessitating surgery on 24 September 2024. However she did require such surgery by April 2025. It is quite possible that the pain became apparent when the child was exposed to a wider range of food in foster care but I cannot say this was necessarily the cause without some evidence of this. The mother refused to agree to the treatment when it was identified as being necessary thereby exacerbating the physical and emotional harm of the tooth decay. Failure to enrol at school

69. The child was born in February 2018 so would have started in reception in England in September 2022. However shortly after this she in fact left the UK and did not return until December 2023. There is no evidence of her being enrolled in school in whatever countries she was in during this period. I do not have evidence regarding the mandatory school ages of these countries anyway.

70. I note that the mother attributes her difficulties entirely to difficulty with English and Ms Dirzyte notes the difficulties with difference of customs and culture as well (E98). However it is common ground that the child was enrolled in school at some point between January and March 2024. It appears from the evidence that the child actually attended, at most, for one hour per day over five days. It is report that she exhibited having special educational needs. I note that the clear evidence is that the child has no such needs. Looking at the evidence in the round, and bearing in mind the chaotic lifestyle the child endured from May 2022 to July 2024, I find it probable that she was undersocialised with other children, resulting in her not learning appropriate behaviour for attending school. This was the reason for her presentation during any brief enrolment between January and March 2024. Furthermore, as she was in fact enrolled in school, it is clear that the mother was aware of the need for this to happen.

71. The child suffered emotional harm as a result. Incidents in September 2024

72. The details of the incidents in September 2024 are set out in police records and CPME. These documents show the incidents on 13 September 2024, 24 September 2024 and 27 September 2024 taking place as pleaded, which for ease of reference are: a. On 13 September 2024, the mother was struggling to manage [the child] putting her at risk of physical and emotional harm. (H50) b. On 13 September 2024, the mother lost [the child]. Upon being reunified with the mother she did not comfort [the child], causing her emotional harm. (H14) c. On 13 September 2024 when returned home following the above incident [the child] ran out onto the road, and mother was unable to control her putting her at risk of physical harm. (H14) d. On 24 September 2024, [the child] ran attempted to run away from the mother. [the child] was observed as dishevelled with bags under her eyes, black fingernails, black feet and a cut on her left big toe. [the child] was wearing no shoes and suffered lacerations on her feet. Mother was arrested on suspicion of assault/ill treatment to cause unnecessary suffering to a child, and [the child] was taken into police protection. This neglect caused [the child] physical and emotional harm. (H28-H32) (H49-H50) e. On 27 September 2024 [the child] bit her mother’s leg during the Child Protection Medical [the child] presented with inappropriate and violent behaviours towards others including biting, kicking, lashing out. When initially coming into the care of the Local Authority, [the child] screamed, shouted and growled at professionals when any attempt was made to interact with her. The foster carer stated that when [the child] first came to the family she was “like a feral child”. (F7) (E37)

73. The mother told me at the hearing that on 13 September the child was not in fact lost. It is unclear to me how the circumstances arose if the mother knew where the child was the whole time. Had that been the case, the mother chose to leave the child, who was then aged 6, alone. Either way it is a problem.

74. The mother did address in written evidence her not comforting the child. She explained that she was concerned about her shopping because it was very important as it was the food they needed to survive and was important for them. While I have no reason to reject this, the overall issue is clear. This is that the child was out of control on 13 September 2024 and was at risk as a result.

75. The incident on 24 September 2024 is similar. The mother does not contest that it happened.

76. The more core issues to these are the reason why they happened. Here the evidence is mixed. The Local Authority pleads, in reliance on the evidence of Dr Duky-Webster, that the mother “has unaddressed mental health difficulties due to trauma from the war in Ukraine, which has impacted on the parenting she has provided”. The mother denies experiencing trauma in the war. Her accounts of her view of the reasons for the child’s behaviour have apparently changed over time.

77. The police report at H50 says in relation to 13 September: [The mother] is from UKRAINE and her mother told Police That she has witnessed the war which has led to an impact on her mental health leading to distress. The aftermath of the war between has resulted in the child behaving in a hyper active nature and experiencing PTSD though it has not been diagnosed.

78. At the CPME it is reported: [the mother] describes [the child] has having ‘special needs’. When asked to expand she says that [the child] is hyperactive, doesn’t listen and gets very angry if she doesn’t get her own way. [the mother] also said that [the child] often takes her shoes off if she is anxious or stressed. However, [the child] does have good eye contact, likes comfort and had lots of friends in Ukraine. [the child] also has speech delay. Her mother isn’t sure if there is an underlying problem or that it is all due from the stress of moving countries so many times in the last 2 years.

79. The mother has subsequently attributed the child’s behaviour variously to: (a) Drinking hot chocolate (b) A fear of the police after witnessing an arrest (c) Not being given the mother’s phone (d) On 13 th not being bought something which the mother could not afford (e) On 24 th , not wanting to return to their old property having visited their new property.

80. The child’s own presentation was also observed at the CPME on 27 th . I have considered that report in full and note the child’s complete disengagement with professionals, growling at them, and spending the whole meeting on her mother’s phone.

81. When looking at threshold the question is whether the child is suffering significant harm attributable to the care given to the child not being what would be reasonable to give. The incidents in September 2024 demonstrate the harm that the child had already suffered in her mother’s care. I am not able to say whether that is due to trauma or mental health difficulties of the mother, excessive international moves denying the child social development, trauma experienced by the child, other events about which the mother has not told us or a combination of factors. This is because, although Dr Buky-Webster attributes the mother’s presentation to trauma, the mother herself denies experiencing trauma. The cause of the mother’s behaviour does not matter. What matters is the cause of the harm to the child. What is undisputed is that the child was in the mother’s care before these incidents and the child’s behaviour manifested itself. The serious harm is attributable to the mother, whatever the cause of the mother’s parenting. That is clear because once the child was able to settle, in the care of a foster carer, these behaviours stopped. Failure to engage

82. There are three aspects to this allegation.

83. The first is the failure to attend the meeting with the Local Authority’s housing department to fit a safety railing on 20 November 2024. The mother has accepted she missed that meeting. In her written response to threshold it was said on her behalf that she did not hear the contractors. In oral evidence she questioned why she was singled out for needing such a railing when other flats with children do not have this. Ms M’s statement explains that it was the child’s behaviour that made this “imperative”.

84. I look second at the failure to attend increased contact at around the same time as part of the exploration pre-proceedings process of the possibility of returning the child to the mother’s care. The increased contact was to be on 18, 20 and 22 November, though other dates are mentioned in social work records, with a view to the child returning to her mother’s care on 25 November 2024. Ms M says the mother forgot about contact. The mother’s written response to threshold accepted missing contact, albeit those pleaded then were a larger number of sessions and did not include 20 November. Missing these sessions was attributed to “limited support network, language barriers, and confusion regarding arrangements”. The mother’s oral evidence mentioned two different issues. One was an appointment clash with the job centre and another was having had a fall and having inflammation in her face.

85. I accept the evidence from the Local Authority that they had a considered return to the mother’s care and the mother failed to engage with this properly. I do, however, also accept the mother’s evidence that she had some difficulty understanding it, both due to language difficulties and her general difficulties understanding official processes. Her obvious distrust of professionals contributes to this. The result of the mother’s failure to engage was reassessment of whether the child could return to the mother’s care.

86. The third part is rent arrears. The mother’s rent arrears now exceed £3000 and she provided documents at the hearing that show a court date is expected on 12 February 2026 where she may face eviction. Her housing situation has been chronically unstable. Attributing this to inadequate support is wrong because for the reasons I have already explained, it is she who has voluntarily left stable accommodation in the UK twice in order to go to other countries. This behaviour is unreasonable and has caused the child serious harm. Conclusion on Threshold

87. I consequently find the Local Authority’s pleaded threshold to be proven on the balance of probabilities with the exception of: (a) The cause of the harm to the child in September 2024 being mother’s unaddressed mental health difficulties due to trauma from the war in Ukraine. I do not know the cause, but the harm has been caused by the mother’s parenting. (b) The exact number of domestic and international moves.

88. Having opened the door to making public law orders, I must now consider what order to make for the child’s welfare. Welfare

89. The Local Authority seeks final care orders with a care plan for the child to remain in long term foster care in her current foster placement. They intend for her to have direct contact with her mother six times per year. However, since May 2025 the child has refused to have any direct contact with her mother. It will therefore be necessary for the mother to help reestablish contact gradually, through gifts, letters, and video messages initially.

90. The mother’s primary position appears to have been that threshold was not met. In closing submissions she actually said she wanted contact to continue with her daughter rather than seeking return of her daughter to her care. However I am also conscious that the mother has earlier expressed her position wanting return of her child to her care with better a support package. This was the view of Ms Dirzyte. It was also the realistic alternative on which Ms Hyde made her submissions. I therefore consider these two options as the realistic alternatives and analyse them against the factors in the welfare checklist. Wishes and feelings

91. The mother’s view is that when the child first entered foster care she wanted to return to her mother’s care. It is clear that, whether or not that was true at the time, the child’s view has changed. Her clear wish is to remain in the care of her current foster carer. She has refused to have direct contact with her mother since 29 May 2025. This is described by the social worker and Guardian is very unusual for a child of her age. It is indicative of her strong preference to remain with the foster carer.

92. Therefore if the child were to return to the mother’s care, this would be against her current wishes and feelings.

93. The mother suggested that the child’s views of her had been influenced by her foster carer. The contact notes and foster care logs do not support this. Rather they show encouragement of contact. I recognise that a language barrier is growing between the mother and her child which cannot have helped their relationship since separation. I am also conscious that even a seven year old will likely be aware of perceptions of Russia in the UK (even though the mother is a Russian speaking Ukrainian). But for the reasons explained in relation to threshold I also find that the child has been harmed in the care of her mother and that is likely to have had a far more significant impact on her perception of her mother. The foster care logs also show that the child attributed her wish not to see her mother through her mother inspecting her body for bruises. The mother repeated her claim at the hearing that her daughter had unexplained injuries which she found during contact. This is unsupported by evidence. On balance it is the mother’s actions which have caused the child’s view of her and the wishes and feelings she has as a result. Physical, emotional and educational needs

94. The child has no special needs. However she is young and still requires the care of adults to survive and thrive. For the reasons explained in relation to threshold I have found that the mother failed to meet the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs. She attributed this to the child having special needs rather than the truth, which was that the child has normal needs which she failed to meet.

95. This factor therefore weighs in favour of the child remaining in foster care rather than returning to the care of her mother. Effect of change

96. The child experienced turbulence through multiple international moves between 2022 and 2024. She suffered harm as a result. Change has been bad for her. The change that was good for her was the move to foster care, where the harm she suffered began to be mitigated. She is now healthy and thriving at school.

97. Remaining in foster care is not a change for her. However there is one change which is proposed in the care plan. This is for the child to move to a local school to the foster carer if the care plan is authorised. She is settled at school but also at an age where she can adapt to a change of school and will benefit from this change by having classmates who live locally to her. On the other hand, that would also be the case if the child returned to living with her mother. This element of change is therefore neutral.

98. Returning to her mother’s care is a change. It is a change the child does not want. The mother has not maintained indirect contact with the child. At the hearing she attributed this to not understanding that she could. Belatedly she provided two drawings and toys for her daughter and, thoughtfully, the other children in the foster family. However, the failure to maintain a relationship means that any return to the mother’s care would be very difficult for the child. Overall this factor weighs in favour of the child remaining in foster care. Age, sex, background and any characteristics

99. The child a seven year old girl. These characteristics have little weight either way.

100. Her background is more interesting. There are two parts to this.

101. The first is being Ukrainian from eastern Ukraine who grew up speaking Russian. Returning to the mother’s care would allow the child more opportunity to continue in that linguistic and cultural setting. It is obviously very difficult for a foster carer who does not speak Russian to realistically maintain such language skills. The Guardian was frank in her regret about the child losing her Russian language skills.

102. The second aspect is religion. The written evidence consistently says that the mother’s father was Jewish. It does not mention her mother having been Jewish. It does not mention the child’s father having been Jewish. It does mention the mother describing herself as Jewish. She has continued to do so. However she also says now that the child was baptised Russian (not Ukrainian) Orthodox Church. The professionals involved in this hearing were shocked by this claim. I have found it less shocking. Identities are complex and if a child has parents or wider family who follow different faiths, they can grow up healthily experiencing all of these.

103. The care plan, which was prepared before the possibility of Christianity was mentioned, was looking at the possibility of long term fostering with a Jewish family. That has now fallen away and it would appear the plan is for the child to remain with her current foster family.

104. The reality is that the child is only seven years old. She was six when she left her mother’s care. She has not yet formed her own religious view and will adapt to the culture in which she finds herself. It is possible that her mother and wider family could provide a rich tapestry of heritage. However the mother has not provided details about any other family members so as to enable such work. I have found the mother’s explanation of her own religion and that of the child confusing.

105. Therefore overall these factors weigh slightly in favour of return of child to the mother. But they do not weigh heavily because the child’s identity is still malleable and being formed. Furthermore, the child could retain a link to her mother’s cultural, linguistic and religious heritage with contact with her mother as the Local Authority’s care plan envisages. Harm

106. I have discussed harm in detail in relation to threshold. In summary the child experienced harm in the care of her mother and has thrived in foster care. There is a further point that needs to be noted here. At the hearing the mother said that she would like to take the child back to Russia, where she claims to have land, or Ukraine if accommodation is available. She is unsure whether the apartment she lived in with her own mother is still available. She also said that any such move would be after the war is over.

107. The child experienced multiple international moves, including a return to the Ukraine, during the war from 2022. I have no confidence that the mother would not expose the child to further harm because of such moves if the child were returned to her care. In my view there remains a significant risk of further harm to the child because of the chaotic lifestyle that the mother lives.

108. In relation to the threshold points, it also must be noted that even if the mother did not take the child overseas, her housing situation remains unstable in the UK. She faces eviction in the near future. She cannot provide a stable home in the UK for the child.

109. This factor weighs strongly in favour of the child remaining in long-term foster care. Capability of parent

110. The mother’s capability to parent is disputed. Ms Dirzyte conducted the independent social worker parenting assessment which the Local Authority and Guardian asked me to give little weight to. Ms Dirzyte made a number of recommendations in her initial report to support the mother caring for the child. Her conclusions were:

1. Parenting Capacity: During the assessment [the mother] has demonstrated capacity to parent the child. However, given the fact that there is a need to adapt the new culture including barriers associated to not speaking English, [the mother] requires further support which she is willing to accept. [the mother] is motivated to address concerns.

2. [the mother]’s Abilities: [the mother] has expressed the ability to make changes that could benefit her daughter's long-term development. To a degree, she has demonstrated this too. Her willingness to accept advice suggests she can provide an appropriate environment for [the child].

3. Support Network: While [the mother] has a minimal support network in the UK and is relatively isolated, it is recommended that she receives comprehensive support services. These include parenting guidance, emotional and psychological support, and access to resources that promote healthy child development.

4. Risk Assessment: Thorough assessments are required to evaluate [the mother]'s own care and support, clinical needs and determine the appropriate support and interventions, such as via The Care Act 2014 assessment, cognitive assessment, and psychological assessment. In the event of [the child] being returned to mother’s care, further risk assessment should also be conducted to cover Mother’s ability to adapt to positive changes. During this assessment, [the mother] has demonstrated the ability to assess risks, ensuring the safety and well-being of her child.

111. She was asked further questions and provided an addendum report. In this her assessment remained unchanged.

112. The Guardian’s view of the parenting assessment is that it lacks professional curiosity and challenge. Ms Hyde made similar submissions and added that the reports raise suspicions by being written in a similar voice to that used in the statements attributed to the mother, and Ms Dirzyte went beyond her remit by acting as an advocate for the mother.

113. I agree with all these criticisms. The reports fail to take account of the range of evidence available to the author, in particular the harm that the child actually suffered. They demonstrate little curiosity about the care that the mother actually provided to the child and why it was provided in this way. It is very odd that Ms Dirzyte took the mother’s history from KV rather than the mother herself, without explaining why or forming any view on the mother’s capacity when she appeared unable to explain her own background. The report does not engage with the issue of the mother failing to engage with support when offered. In terms of ‘voice’ there is a particularly weird point in the addendum report where Ms Dirzyte refers to herself in the third person at E175. These points, combined with the ISW’s conduct in refusing to attend the hearing cause me to give little weight to her conclusions.

114. However that does not mean I should not consider for myself whether the mother could provide effective parenting with support. This is a particularly pertinent point because the Local Authority actually made plans for the child to return to the mother’s care in November 2024, pre-proceedings. Looking at the evidence together there is a pattern of the mother failing to engage with support when it is offered and generally being distrustful of professionals. Her lack of insight plays an important role in this: she sees her problems being due to language, money and housing. But she fails to appreciate that decisions about her daughter’s travel, dental treatment, diet and education have negatively impacted her as well. Her conduct relating to the child’s necessary dental treatment, which had to be authorised by the High Court and took place on 8 January 2026, demonstrates her wider and most recent unwillingness to engage.

115. The mother has shown herself unable to parent effectively, organise her life or access services. For the reasons explained earlier, I do not find this is necessarily due to trauma, as Dr Buky-Webster thought. But the reason for her lack of parenting capacity do not matter because the mother has little insight into her difficulties and no plans for how to address them. Indeed her emphasis at the hearing was that her problems were caused by not speaking English. Yet it is hard to see what steps she has taken to try to learn English over the past 18 months she has been living in the UK.

116. Overall I find the mother has a very limited capability to parent. She has relied on indulgence of the child through screens and sweets. She has not maintained boundaries. She has provided an unstable home. This in stark contrast to the foster carer who has shown an ability to provide a nurturing home for the child where she thrives.

117. This factor weighs strongly in favour of the child remaining in foster care. Range of powers

118. This is a neutral factor because the court has the necessary powers to order both viable options. Conclusion on Welfare

119. The mother has commitment to her child and has demonstrated this by her engagement with these proceedings, even when this has clearly been difficult for her. However looking at the two proposed options, the balance is strongly in favour of making care orders with the care plan proposed by the Local Authority of the child remaining in foster care. This is a proportionate interference with her family life with the mother because it is in accordance with the law as threshold was met, and it is proportionate when the welfare factors are weighed as set out above.

120. The Local Authority proposes direct contact six times per year. But for that to be possible the mother must engage in indirect contact to allow effective reintroduction. I think it appropriate for the care plan to allow for more frequent indirect contact if the mother provides this through, for example, video messages and cards, to maintain the child’s link to her mother if possible.

121. Finally, I note that there may be additional information about the child’s family in the original application that was made to the Home Office for her entry clearance in 2022. I therefore propose to order the Home Office to disclose that application including the application form of the child and mother together, any support documents provided as part of those applications, and the personal details of anyone mentioned in these documents, to assist the child with being able to understand her own family background and identity.

122. I therefore make a final care order to the Local Authority and endorse the care plan of long term foster care with direct supervised contact with the mother six times per year, to be reintroduced at a pace suitable for the child. Recorder Brannan

A Local Authority v YL & Anor [2026] EWFC B 23 — UK case law · My AI Mortgage