Amanda Hitchings (Listing Officer) v Patricia Orton

Introduction

1. Local taxation is very long-standing, but has had different bases of calculation. Prior to the changes in the Local Government Finance Act 1988 , there was a system of domestic rates. That was replaced by the Community Charge which moved from property values to a generally flat rate of individual taxation. The Local Government (‘ Finance Act 1992 the 1992 Act ’) introduced the system of Council Tax which re-introduced an element of property valuation into the assessment of liability for local taxes. As is well known, domestic property was ‘banded’ according to property value, each band being designated by a letter: Band A, B, C etc.

2. Evidently, there was a need to resolve disputes as to valuation and determination of the relevant band for a taxpayer’s property. This is now provided for in the Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2009 (‘the Alteration Regulations’), which I describe below.

3. A statutory appeal to the High Court from the Valuation Tribunal for England (“VTE”) is available under Regulation 43 of the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Regulations 2009 (‘the Procedure Regulations’), in respect of a decision of the VTE, dated 25 th March 2025 (“the Interim Decision”). This is such an appeal.

4. The appeal is brought by the statutory Listing Officer (“LO”) for the relevant area. The Respondent is the taxpayer for a one-bedroom, third-floor flat in Middlesborough (‘the Property’).

5. The issue between the parties is whether the Respondent’s proposal to change the tax Band for the Property was a valid proposal, or whether it was barred by reason of an earlier determination. The case is about those earlier determinations by the former valuation tribunal, made prior to 1 st October 2009. It is a short point of statutory construction. The Interim Decision

6. The Respondent challenged the Band B entry for the Property via a proposal dated 20 th May 2024. She sought a reduction to Band A. After considering the merits of the proposal, the Listing Officer determined that it was not well founded, and a decision notice was issued on 23 rd September 2024. An appeal was made to the VTE on 14 th October 2024.

7. The appeal property entered the valuation list in Band C with effect from 20 th May 2004. That banding was appealed to the Teeside Valuation Tribunal. Following a hearing on 18 th November 2004, the appeal property was placed in Band B with effect from 20 th May 2004.

8. The Listing Officer raised this issue at the appeal. She contended that the appeal was not valid by reason of that previous determination which was undertaken in 2004. The VTE decided that the appeal was valid, following the reasoning in a previous VTE decision on the same issue: LW v Moore , which I turn to shortly. The Statutory Scheme

9. Via fourteen regulations the Alteration Regulations provide the framework for making and deciding proposals for alteration to Council Tax bands. Part 2 starts by identifying the scope of alteration which may be entertained, and how: Regulations 3 to 6. A proposal’s validity, or not, is addressed: Regulation 7. The first instance decision on the proposal lies with the Listing Officer: Regulations 8 and 9. There is an appeal to the VTE: Regulation 10. The outcome of that process and the mechanics of changing and notifying any change is dealt with in Regulations 11 to 13. The former 1993 Regulations were revoked: Regulation 14.

10. Neither counsel sought to argue that there was a material difference in structure or detail as between the 1993 Regulations and the Alteration Regulations, save that the appeal body is now the VTE whereas it was previously the valuation tribunals. I have considered the 1993 Regulations as originally made. The only material change is to rationalise the approach to withdrawal of a proposal and as to agreement with the listing officer. The key regulations on the scope of alteration which may be entertained are materially identical.

11. The provision which is central to this case is Regulation 4(5)(b) of the Alteration Regulations which provides: “(5) No proposal may be made under paragraph (4) where— (a) six months has expired since the day on which the person first became the taxpayer; (b) a proposal to alter the same list in relation to the same dwelling and arising from the same facts has been considered and determined by the VTE otherwise than as mentioned in regulation 32 of the VTE Procedure Regulations (hearing in a party's absence) or by the High Court;”

12. The provision is quite straightforward in most cases: a review of the Council Tax band is open to the purchaser of a property for a period of six months upon purchase, provided that there has not been a previous review. The problem thrown up by this case is ‘ review by who?’.

13. The problem arises from the position prior to 1 st October 2009, when the Alteration Regulations came into force, when there were 56 separately constituted valuation tribunals in England. The Teesside Valuation Tribunal was one of these tribunals. These valuation tribunals were abolished by s. 219(2) Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (‘ the 2007 Act ’). The jurisdiction of these tribunals was transferred to the VTE by paragraph A2 of Schedule 11 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 , which was an amendment made by the 2007 Act . The transferred jurisdiction was “to be exercised as regards all appeals under that jurisdiction, whether made before or after the transfer.”

14. Thus, on 1 st October 2009: (1) the Teeside Valuation Tribunal ceased to exist; (2) the VTE came into existence; (3) the former valuation tribunals transferred their jurisdiction to the VTE.

15. By Regulation 43 of the Procedure Regulations, the High Court may confirm, vary, set aside, revoke or remit the decision or order of the VTE, and may make any order which the VTE could have made.

16. The valuation date for those purposes was 1 st April 1991: s21(2) (a) of the 1992 Act ; Regulation 6(1) Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992. LW v Moore

17. In an appeal to the VTE heard on 20 th March 2023, the Vice President of the VTE decided an issue which is essentially the same as this issue in this case. A proposal was made to the Valuation Officer that the band of a property reduced from Band F to Band D. The Valuation Officer identified that the VTE had already determined the correct band in 1994. The Valuation Officer therefore contended that the appeal was invalid.

18. The Vice President found that the appeal was valid, giving his reasons as follows: “ 16. The VTE was established by the insertion of a new Schedule 11 to the 1988 Act from 1 October 2009 when the jurisdiction of the existing English tribunals, as defined in paragraphs A2(1) and (2) of Schedule 11, was transferred to it. I do not consider this appeal was within the jurisdiction of the NVT: the provisions as to transfer of the jurisdiction was clearly designed to deal with all pending appeals before an existing English tribunal, such as the NVT. That is made clear by paragraph A2(3): ‘The jurisdiction transferred by this paragraph is to be exercised as regards all appeals’ This appeal is made to the VTE under regulation 10(1) of the Appeals Regulations.

19. The legislative predecessor to regulation 4(5)(b) of the Appeals Regulations (regulation 5(5)(b) of the Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/290) as amended) was revoked on 1 October 2009 by regulation 14 of the Appeals Regulations.

20. Therefore, on the plain and ordinary meaning of regulation 4(5)(b) of the Appeals Regulations, interpreted in accordance with regulation 2, only a decision of the VTE (unless heard in the absence of a party) or the High Court on a proposal will invalidate a subsequent proposal on the same facts. I cannot ignore the reference to VTE in regulation 4(5)(b), especially given other parts of the Appeals Regulations (regulations 3(1)(c), regulation 4(1)(e)) make the distinction between the VTE and the valuation tribunal. It is clear to me that had the drafter of the Appeals Regulations intended to include decisions of the predecessor valuation tribunals in regulation 4(5)(b) that would have been done. The legislative purpose of omitting such a reference is also clear to me: it would give a fresh start to the invalidating effect of a decision of the then new VTE. This would be also administratively convenient given the need to unify and maintain the records of the predecessor tribunals from across England which would otherwise have arisen.” Submissions

21. For the Appellant, Mr Cain Ormondroyd submits that the VTE adopted a literal interpretation of reg 4(5)(b) of the Alteration Regulations which produces illogical and anomalous results. He says that is contrary to the purpose and context of the Alteration Regulations. Rather, he submits, the correct interpretation is a purposive one which reads the words “determined by the VTE” as referring to the jurisdiction exercised by the VTE, and therefore encompassing determinations of the predecessor valuation tribunals. Alternatively, he submits that reference to ‘valuation tribunals’ should be read into the 2009 Regulations.

22. He supports this argument by reference to: a. The different outcomes for scenarios in which proposals were made for neighbouring properties with one in September 2009 and one in October 2009. The new purchaser of one property would be able to ask for Council Tax banding to be reviewed while the neighbour would not; b. He goes further than that – he points out that there could have been proposals for neighbouring properties in early 2009 with one reaching a Valuation Tribunal hearing prior to 1 st October 2009 and thus being invalid, and one reaching a VTE hearing after 1 st October and thus being valid. This, it is submitted, would be an illogical result and cannot have been intended; c. The principle of finality of litigation and the particular use of past valuations in ensuring consistency of decision making; d. The explanatory memorandum to the Alteration Regulations explains that they do not “seek[] to alter the policy framework for dealing with appeals but rather to make the legislation more up to date and user-friendly and to allow the VTE flexibility in administrative matters” e. The legislative history supports continuity in that reg 4(5)(b) of the Alteration Regulations is materially the same as equivalent provision in the former Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993 (‘the 1993 Regulations’); see Regulation 3(1) of the 1993 Regulations; f. The transitional provisions ensured that the VTE retained the records of the former Valuation Tribunals for the obvious purpose of ensuring continuity.

23. For the Respondent, Mr Julian Hunt relies on the text of the Alteration Regulations. If the result is annoying or unjust, then the solution is to amend the Regulations, not to read words into the Regulations. This is not a case in which a fundamental right is at stake, which might justify the approach contended for by the Appellant. The scheme of the regulations is restrictive, as shown by limitation period and the limitation on appellants. The definition of VTE within Regulation 2 is precise. It would be wrong to disturb that definition and to consider opinions from the predecessor tribunal. Further, the VTE has procedural powers to strike out or to prevent abuse of its process.

24. Mr Hunt submits that the 2009 changes were wide ranging, and included a new set of procedural rules. The result was a new national service. Discussion

25. The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are seeking to ascertain the meaning of the words used in a statute in the light of their context, in a way which best gives effect to the purpose of the statutory provision; and the court’s task, within permissible bounds is to give effect to that purpose, having regard to the state of affairs at the time of the enactment: R (N3 and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] 2 WLR 386 per Lord Sales and Lord Stephens with whom Lords Reed, Hodge and Lloyd-Jones agreed, at [62-65].

26. Statutory interpretation is unified exercise, addressing both text and purpose. It is a false approach to compartmentalise these aspects. The correct approach was summarised by the Senior President of Tribunals (Sir Keith Lindblom) Singh and Arnold LLJ in CG Fry & Sons Ltd v SSLUHC [2024] EWCA Civ 730 ; [2024] PTSR 2000 at [68]: “…. Lord Banner’s submissions are founded on a misunderstanding of ordinary principles of statutory interpretation in domestic law, even leaving aside any issue of retained EU law. In particular, the suggested dichotomy between the “natural and ordinary meaning” of legislation and a “purposive approach” is a false one. The correct approach is that legislation must be construed having regard to context and in the light of its purpose. That is how one arrives at the true interpretation of legislation. It is a unified process, not one in which a linguistic exercise is to be performed first and in isolation from context and purpose. This is fundamentally because a legal norm is intended to have some effect in the real world. It must therefore always be construed in the light of its purpose.”

27. Understandably, counsel each placed different emphasis on text and purpose. Both sets of submissions were helpful in that regard. However, the court’s interpretative task is a unified one, in a way which interprets the text in a way which best gives effect to the purpose of the legislation.

28. In my judgment, the over-arching purpose of the changes brought about by the 2007 Act and the Alteration Regulations was to put in place a single statutory body to supervise property valuation issues rather than 56 individual such bodies. It is important to keep that over-arching function of the legislation in mind when coming to the detailed arguments on the terms of specific provisions in the Alteration Regulations. It is an over-arching function which sees no change to the scheme of determining appeals from decisions of Listing Officers.

29. As Mr Hunt submitted, there is a carefully balanced scheme which provides for a specifically restricted range of proposals to change the Council Tax bands. That scheme is framed to include those who purchase a property to have a time-limited opportunity to seek to change the banding, but only in circumstances where the exercise has not already been undertaken. There are also opportunities to re-visit the banding if there are material changes in the property. The scheme of the legislation cuts off proposals by corporate entities which are effectively the same as an individual. This statutory scheme is plainly derived from much practical experience of the operation of the list which relates to every domestic property within the jurisdiction.

30. Mr Hunt drew my attention to the procedural powers available to the VTE. It may strike out an appeal. That is a different and adequate means to address a misuse of the VTE’s process by seeking to re-litigate a valuation issue which has already been determined. I do not accept that submission. Validity and strike out are fundamentally different. Absent a valid appeal, there is no jurisdiction for the VTE to hear an appeal. The Alteration Regulations describe the scope of valid appeals. Strike out is a further tool which may be used in circumstances where a valid appeal should not proceed further. It is a tool which is likely to be infrequently used in a jurisdiction in which many parties will not be represented.

31. There was no substantive change to this scheme by reason of the unification of valuation tribunals in the new form of the VTE. It has remained unchanged for over thirty years. I have been unable to detect any legislative intention to change the carefully balanced scheme of opportunities and limits on Council Tax banding changes. Mr Hunt did not advance an argument that the change from many statutory appeal bodies to one brought with it some policy intention to change the scope of the substantive statutory scheme. In my judgment, he was correct not to do so. Rather, he put his case straightforwardly and clearly on the fact that the text of Regulation 4(5)(b) is expressly limited to decisions of the VTE, not any decision of the former valuation tribunal.

32. Mr Ormondroyd fairly accepted the relevance and impact of the plain terms of Regulation 4(5)(b). But he pointed to other textual elements of the Alteration Regulations which, he submitted, undermined the proposition that the sole reference to VTE, omitting reference the former valuation tribunals was deliberate or, at least, determinative of the issue in this case.

33. Mr Ormondroyd’s approach was to point to an evident error in the Alteration Regulations which indicated that the draftsperson should be taken as using ‘VTE’ to be shortform reference to both the VTE and the former valuation tribunals. Regulation 4(1)(e) addresses one of four circumstances in which the list may be corrected by reason of error or change in circumstance. Regulation 4(1)e provides (emphasis added): “in relation to a matter shown in it, account has not been taken (whether as regards a particular dwelling or a class of dwelling) of a relevant decision of the VTE, a valuation tribunal or the High Court”

34. But, when the 2009 Regulations come to set out the information which is required to be submitted as a part of a proposal to amend the list, Regulation 5(1)(d) provides, (and makes no reference to valuation tribunal) : “if the proposal is made in the circumstances mentioned in regulation 4(1)(e), a statement identifying the property to which the decision in question relates and the date of that decision and (as the case may be) that the decision was a decision of the VTE or the High Court;

35. Thus, Regulations 4 and 5 are inconsistent in that a decision of a valuation tribunal can be the foundation of a change of the list, but the decision of the valuation tribunal is not something which is to be included in the proposal to change the list. There is plainly an error in the drafting so far as reference to ‘valuation tribunal’ is concerned.

36. I accept the submissions that the drafting of the 2009 Regulations is inconsistent in its references to the VTE in combination with the valuation tribunal, and that omission of a reference to ‘valuation tribunal’ in Regulation 4(5)(b) is not determinative of the draftsperson’s intention and object in drafting these complex provisions. I accept that the text of the 2009 Regulations contains evidence of drafting inconsistency, or error, so far as reference to valuation tribunals is concerned. Accordingly, Mr Hunt’s pure textual argument is weakened to that extent.

37. Likewise, the fundamental reference point for banding remained the same in that the valuation date was 1 April 1991 for the former valuation tribunals as it was for the VTE. Consistency in valuation and therefore equality in taxation is maintained, firstly, by reference to this common valuation date. Secondly, evidence from transactions of property becomes integrated into the decisions of the valuation tribunal, and the VTE. This is know as the ‘tone of the list’.

38. The ‘tone of the list’ is an important and established practical feature of valuation. It was explained in Ryde on Rating by citation of a Lands Tribunal decision: K Shoe Shops Ltd v Hardy (Valuation Officer) and Westminster City Council , [1980] RA 333 at 353: “It may be helpful to refer to a wider meaning that has become attached to the expression “tone of the list,” with the passage of time. In cross examination the valuation officer was asked what his understanding was of this expression. His reply, as I noted it, was: “Initially this was taken to be no more than a reference to the side note to s 20. However, it has taken on a wider meaning in the profession and in Lands Tribunal decisions over the years. I now understand it refers to the levels of value appearing in a valuation list.” What has happened is this. In the initial period after the coming into force of the 1973 valuation list, and until the levels of value appearing in that list for any particular locality had settled, the correctness or otherwise of assessment of any particular hereditament fell to be tested by the application of s 20 simpliciter. Within two or three years, however, in an increasing number of localities, the levels of values in the valuation list had become established either through acceptance by non challenge or as the result of testing before local valuation courts or before the tribunal. Thenceforward, in respect of these localities, the levels of value derivable from the rental evidence available when the 1973 list was being prepared, have been treated as subsumed into, the levels of assessment that appear in the list itself. As a consequence the correctness or otherwise of a challenged assessment derivable from the rental evidence available when the 1973 list was being prepared, have been treated as subsumed into in those localities has by common consent fallen to be decided prima facie by reference to the levels of value appearing in the list, and these levels are conveniently referred to as “the tone” of the list.”

39. This is a case under the 1973 valuation list. However, that in itself shows the length and extent of the practice of valuation which relies on the accretion and accumulation of valuation decisions. It is an evidence-base which has become something of a touchstone for valuation professionals. The points of relevance to this case are twofold.

40. First, the weight to be attached to comparable assessments increases over time. In other words, valuations become settled and established. The evidence becomes more solid and reliable and therefore attracts greater weight. This point is made in Ryde on Rating as was adopted with approval in Domblindes v Listing Officer [2008] EWHC 3271 at [34].

41. Second, the evidence becomes neither weaker nor stronger by reason of its age nor does it matter whether the assessment pre-dates or post-dates 1 st October 2025. The valuation date remains unchanged and the key point of reference for valuation purposes. However, if pre-October 2009 assessments fall out of the body of valuation evidence then the usefulness and weight to be attached to the established tone of the list is necessarily impaired.

42. In my judgment, the long-established practice of reliance on a gradually improving body of comparable assessments, which results in settled and established values is a very important part of the context in which the legislation is to be construed. This is because established professional practice in a specialist area of assessment is most unlikely to be disrupted by mere omission of a reference to a predecessor statutory body. Much more would be expected in the 2009 Regulations, to make it clear that long established practice was to change. As I have found, there is no such change in the 2009 Regulations and indeed they are materially the same as the predecessor regulations, save for the administrative change to appeal bodies.

43. A further part of the relevant context is the way in which the statutory scheme treats non-domestic valuation issues, and in particular changes to rateable values. The equivalent provision to that which is in issue in this case, in Non-Domestic Rating (Alteration of Lists and Appeals)(England) Regulations 2009 (namely, reg 4(3)(ii)) is in similar terms but does include express reference to valuation tribunals (emphasis added): “ …and has been considered and determined by a valuation tribunal , the VTE, the Lands Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal;”

44. Neither party provided a policy or other reason to explain the apparent difference between domestic and non-domestic property. This, in my judgment, is because the difference is indeed apparent rather than real. The inter-locking contextual features of the regulations, taken together, lead me to conclude that a decision of the former valuation tribunals is a relevant decision for the purposes of Regulation 4(5)(b) of the 2009 Regulations. I conclude that the reference to decisions of the VTE includes reference to the former valuation tribunals. That is consistent with the transfer of jurisdiction under the primary legislation ( the 2007 Act ), the text of the Alteration Regulations when read as a whole, and the over-arching purpose of the changes made to the existing statutory scheme.

45. The detailed consideration and argument which has assisted me was not available to the Vice President of the VTE when he decided LW v Moore , nor were those points argued before the VTE in this case. According proper respect to the long experience of the Tribunal in these matters, I have come to a different conclusion. In my judgment, there is substantial relevant context which goes to the proper understanding of the purpose of the Alteration Regulations, and likewise to understanding the Alteration Regulations were not for the purpose of changing the carefully balanced scheme of valuation and assessment.

46. I have reached this conclusion without recourse to secondary material. I accept Mr Hunt’s submissions on the role of secondary material that such materials may be used as an aid, but very much secondary in its role because citizens rely on the words of the instrument: O v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] AC 225 at [29-30] per Lord Hodge.

47. However, if I had referred to and relied upon secondary material, it would have supported my conclusion rather than pointed away from it. In particular, the Alteration Regulations contain an Explanatory Note. Explanatory Notes are not the regulations, but they are material which is before Parliament when it decides to make regulations, albeit here via the negative resolution procedure.

48. The Explanatory Note stated that the regulations did not seek to alter the policy framework for dealing with appeals. For the reasons which I have discussed above, the Respondent’s case would result in an alteration to the policy framework and that would be inconsistent with the terms of the Explanatory Note. The same point derives from the Government’s consultation papers which explained the Government’s aim to provide a regulatory framework for the VTE and the handling of appeals that is better suited to the new VTE. But the Government wished to achieve this without affecting a person’s rights to appeal or making alterations to the overall policy framework for appeals in relation to council tax and business rates.

49. It is not strictly necessary to go on to consider Mr Ormondroyd’s alternative argument, namely for the court to correct “obvious drafting errors” and “in discharging its interpretative function will add words, or omit words, or substitute words”, an approach more readily undertaken for secondary legislation: (R (Noone) v Governor of Drake Hall Prison and another (“Noone”) [2010] UKSC 30 ; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1743 per Lord Mance at [74] and [75]. I note and accept Mr Hunt’s cautionary submissions in this regard. Noone is a particular case in which liberty was at stake. A strained interpretation can only be adopted where the provision is in conflict with its evident purpose: Hancock v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2019] 1WLR 3409 at [24].

50. The court may rectify where it is “abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed”.

51. I have identified the intended purpose, and also what was not intended, above. There are plain drafting errors in the Alteration Regulations for the reasons given at paragraph 36 above. The error at the centre of this case, in Regulation 4(5)(b), is a simple omission. With a negative resolution procedure, it is perhaps not surprising that the slip went unnoticed during its passage through Parliament.

52. If it were necessary to do so, I would interpret Regulation 4(5)(b) as reading: “a proposal to alter the same list in relation to the same dwelling and arising from the same facts has been considered and determined by the valuation tribunal or the VTE otherwise than as mentioned in regulation 32 of the VTE Procedure Regulations (hearing in a party's absence) or by the High Court;” Conclusion

53. I allow the appeal. I quash the Interim Decision of the VTE dated 25 th March 2025. The Respondent’s proposal dated 18 th May 2024 is declared invalid.

54. I am grateful to both Counsel for their assistance.