Ameel Gray v The Information Commissioner

1. These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Thames Valley Police (“TVP”) regarding its handling of his personal data and its response to his Subject Access Request (“SAR”). The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 20 February 2025 and was dealt with under reference IC-366170-X2K4.

2. On 20 February 2025, the Applicant submitted a formal complaint to the IC regarding TVP’s handling of his personal data and its response to his Subject Access Request (SAR). The complaint raised concerns about inaccurate records, missing property information, and alleged unlawful data sharing with a third party agency.

3. In February and March 2025, the Applicant submitted multiple follow-up complaints and a personal data breach report to the IC, alleging systemic failures by TVP to retain accurate data, respond to rectification requests, and disclose information relating to property seized in earlier incidents. He also provided supporting evidence.

4. On 23 March 2025 the Applicant sent a duplicate complaint form to the IC.

5. On 7 October 2025, the IC’s case officer requested further information from the Applicant. The Applicant alleged that TVP had failed to comply with Articles 5 and 16 UK GDPR and sections 40 and 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 by refusing SAR and rectification requests and by mishandling sensitive personal data.

6. Between 7 October 2025 and 23 October2025 the IC and TVP corresponded regarding a further information request made by the IC to TVP.

7. On 23 October 2025, the IC wrote to the Applicant finding no evidence that TVP had unlawfully shared data with a third party, concluding that the misspelling of the Applicant’s surname was unintentional, but confirming that TVP had agreed to place a note on file regarding the inaccuracy. No enforcement action was taken. On the same day the IC confirmed to TVP his position that there had been no infringement by TVP on this occasion

8. In relation to the Applicant’s complaint about TVP’s handling of his SAR, this was handled by the IC under a separate complaint reference which is not the subject of this Application. The Application

9. The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC1 dated 23 October 2025. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows: “ Quashing order overturning ICO decision Declaration that TVP have infringed my information rights in established SAR & RTR, specifically their comments denying that all events referred too never happened”

10. In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated that the IC had not addressed his complaints about TVP surrounding several incidents which has caused him significant harm personally and financially. He said he had shared all relevant documents confirming the accuracy of his complaints in relation to four separate incidents. He stated that his complaint to the IC had been under the Data Use and Access Act 2025 section 18(3) in relation to these incidents. He concluded that the IC’s response had not addressed his complaints about how his information had been processed by TVP and had not responded appropriately to TVP’s refusal of his SAR and RTR applications. The strike-out application

11. The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 18 November 2025 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).

12. The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response. In summary, these were as follows: a. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the present application, as the Commissioner has already determined the Applicant’s complaint when he sent an outcome to the Applicant on 23 October 2025. b. The present application shows no discernible grounds that would warrant the Tribunal exercising its powers under section 166(2) of the DPA18, given that the Commissioner provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint on 23 October 2025 is therefore no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal to make any form of order pursuant to section 166(2) of the DPA18 c. It is clear from the grounds in support of the application that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome provided on his complaint. However, as set out above, section 166 DPA18 does not provide a mechanism by which complainants can challenge the substantive outcome of a complaint. The relief available from the Tribunal on an application under section 166 DPA18 only applies where it is satisfied that the IC has failed in some procedural respect to comply with the requirements of section 166(1) DPA18, limited solely to those orders that are set out in section 166(2) . d. The IC has taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint and has provided an outcome to him. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section 166(2) DPA18. e. If the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against the Police for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18.

13. On 18 December 2025, Judge Armstrong-Holmes directed that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 9 January 2026 under Rule 8(4).

14. The Applicant complied with the direction on the same day so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows: a. The IC has failed to appropriately handle his data breach complaint that TVP’s conduct has breached his data protection rights and human rights, causing him permanent personal and financial harm. b. The IC acted unlawfully in its handling of his complaint. Through its actions and omissions the IC breached multiple duties under domestic law therefore violating his fundamental rights. He stated “ I have exhausted all internal avenues to resolve these issues to no avail – only this Court can now provide an effective remedy and justice in this written response respectfully opposing [the strike-out application]. I have written a representation to quash ICO decision dated 23 October 2025… opposing the respondent’s irrational application to strike out this Very Important case ”. c. He requests the following relief: • A formal declaration that the IC’s actions were irrational and procedurally improper and have not upheld his data rights. He also sought declarations as to the unlawfulness of TVP’s conduct. • Quashing the strike-out application • A mandatory order directing IC to reconsider his complaints properly and in accordance with the law • An injunction to compel TVP to release all personal data it holds related to this matter • An injunction requiring TVP to correct all inaccuracies in the records it holds about him • Monetary compensation for loss of earnings, distress, emotional harm and unreturned property to the value of £1.3 billion • An order that the IC pay the costs of his proceedings. • Referral of the matter to the IC for enforcement action regarding the data protection breaches alleged. Legal framework

15. Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: “Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”

16. The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.

17. Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that: “(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a) take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b) inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c) inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d) if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a) investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b) informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”

18. In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - " …It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."

19. Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327 , paragraph 57 - " The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination... ”.

20. Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) – “ For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint .” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).

21. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “ The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of (paragraph 33). section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.”

22. The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) , noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” In considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”

23. Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “ However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.” Discussion and conclusions

24. The first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 23 October 2025. I consider that the response dated 23 October 2025 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, because it provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint.

25. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.

26. It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint. In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.

27. The outcomes sought by the Applicant are generally not ones which this Tribunal has the power to grant. Among other things, it has no power to conduct a judicial review of the IC’s complaint handling or award compensation for breach of data protection or human rights. In addition, the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction under Rule 10 is very limited.

28. The outcome sought by the Applicant is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision. In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance against a data controller need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.

29. Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.

30. The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(a) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.