Andrea Centore & Anor v The Charity Commission for England and Wales

Introduction and Background

1. This appeal, dated 3 May 2025 (Hearing Bundle (‘HB’) 4-18) was against a decision of the Respondent, upon review, dated 9 April 2025 (HB82-91) to refuse to constitute and register a proposed CIO to be known as Research Network for the Study of Esoteric Practice (‘RENSEP’) as a charity, following an application made on 20 May 2024, pursuant to section 207 of the Act, on the grounds that the proposed CIO would not be established for exclusively charitable purposes, for the public benefit. The Response of the Respondent was filed on 26 June 2025 (HB37-60). No Reply thereto was filed on behalf of the Appellants. Both parties very helpfully filed Skeleton Arguments.

2. Two witnesses for the Appellants, one of whom was one of the Appellants, Dr. Otto, the other witness being Professor Hutton, both of whom had prepared written witness statements and who had been requested to be in attendance for cross-examination on behalf of the Respondent, were present, and gave oral evidence.

3. Since RENSEP had not been constituted and registered as a charity, this appeal was brought in the names of two of the trustees of RENSEP, the two Appellants. RENSEP, the institution, was operating, at the date of the appeal, as was its entitlement, as an unincorporated association. Issues

4. The issues to be decided in this appeal, mutually agreed by the parties (and accepted by the Tribunal), were as follows: – what were the purposes (Objects) of RENSEP? – in the context of this appeal, were those purposes exclusively charitable, that is, did they fall within one or more of the 13 descriptions of charitable purposes set out in section 3 of the Act into which a purpose must fall if it is to be charitable in law? - were the purposes of RENSEP, in particular, its primary purpose, for the public benefit as that term is understood in charity law in England and Wales?

5. It was common case that the only statutory charitable purpose that fell for consideration, subject to it having exclusively charitable purposes, was whether the primary purpose of RENSEP was that of the advancement of education, a charitable purpose that does fall within section 3 of the Act.

6. Section 208 of the Act requires an application by an institution, made pursuant to section 207 of the Act, to be constituted as a CIO, and registered as a charity, to be refused if the Tribunal is not satisfied that the proposed CIO, that is, RENSEP, would be a charity, that is, an institution established for exclusively charitable purposes only. Nature of Appeal

7. These proceedings were not, and could not, in law, be in the nature of a review of the Respondent’s decision-making process. The role of the Tribunal was, pursuant to section 319 of the Act, standing in the shoes of the Respondent, to consider the Appellant’s application de novo , but having regard to the views of the Respondent as the statutory authority tasked by Parliament to make decisions such as that made in this case, it being central to the Respondent’s statutory objectives, functions and duties in the exercise of its statutory power to register, or not, an institution as a charity in the form of a CIO, pursuant to section 208 of the Act.

8. The burden of proof that the Appellant’s purposes were exclusively charitable and for the public benefit rested with the Appellants: Hipkiss v Charity Commission (CA/2017/0014); Human Dignity Trust v. Charity Commission [2015] WTLR 789.

9. Since the Tribunal, in deciding this appeal, was obliged to ‘stand in the shoes of the Respondent’, it too, had to have regard, in deciding this appeal, to the statutory objectives, functions and general duties placed upon the Respondent in carrying out its functions, pursuant to sections 14-16, respectively, of the Act.

10. Again, the Respondent and the Tribunal, on appeal, in a de novo hearing, must , pursuant to section 208 of the Act, refuse an application from an institution for constitution as a CIO, if it is not satisfied that the institution, as a CIO, would be a charity at the time of registration or, the proposed constitution of the CIO does not comply with one or more of the requirements set out in [section 206] of the Act and any Regulations made thereunder. (The latter matter does not arise in this appeal). Purposes (Objects) of Appellant Exclusively Charitable Public Benefit Parity

11. The Appellant’s purposes or Objects were stated in its application dated 20 May 2024 to constitute and register the institution as a charitable incorporated body, that is, a CIO, pursuant to section 207 of the Act, to be : “3.1 To advance the education of the public in general (and particularly amongst academics) on the subject of Esotericism by (but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing): Funding and supporting academic research projects. Promoting and publishing accessible educational material. Organising and promoting academic conferences, seminars and courses. Archiving and digitising records that serve to aid and support the academic research of Esotericism.”

12. A definition of ‘Esotericism’ was later provided by the Appellants’ representatives by way of a revision to the Appellants’ objects as follows in response to concerns expressed by the Respondent: “The term 'esotericism' in the context of the Objects means the broad category of belief systems that exist both within as well as independent of larger religious traditions and institutions. Esotericism is often distinguished from other types of religious behaviour through its focus on hidden or transcendent realities, on special or higher forms of knowledge, on non-ordinary experiences, on individualised forms of spirituality and spiritual growth, and on the efficacy of ritual. Esotericism includes (but is not limited to) Hermetism, Alchemy, Astrology, Spiritualism, Theosophy, Kabbalah, Paganism and Druidry.”

13. The Appellants’ representatives nevertheless accepted that a concise definition of Esotericism was ‘tricky’, while maintaining that some of the concepts set out in the definition provided had already been accepted as exclusively charitable by the Respondent both pursuant to ‘promotion of religion’ and ‘advancement of education’ (the latter being the stated position here) and would be for the benefit of the general public.

14. Further detailed information was later provided by the Appellants and their representatives on 5 November 2024 and in February 2025 in support of their application following their request for a Review of ‘the Respondent’s refusal decision, the said decision not being changed following review, again continuing to hold that RENSEP was not established for exclusively charitable purposes for the public benefit.

15. This means too, as correctly submitted by the Respondent, that if some of the institution’s objects are charitable and some are not, the institution does not have exclusively charitable purposes and, therefore, cannot be registered as a charity.

16. The leading case law that applies here is the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Independent Schools’ Council v. Charity Commission [2011] UKUT 421 TCC (‘the ISC Decision’), a decision that is binding on this Tribunal. This is authority for the proposition that charitable status does not depend on the motives and intentions of the Appellants but, instead, on the institution’s constitution and the context in which it operates and, if there is any ambiguity in that regard, the Tribunal may examine any extrinsic evidence to aid in properly understanding its activities to gain a proper understanding of its true purposes with a view to deciding whether furtherance of its purposes would achieve a charitable result and, also, whether those activities are capable of being for the public benefit.

17. Case law has also established certain principles that are relevant to the charitable purpose of the advancement of education including: - is the dominant or essential purpose of the institution to educate the public: is the necessary element of balance present – starting with neutral information and inviting the public to decide for itself? - for a purpose to be educative and meet the public benefit test, the topic of study must itself be worthy of study in the charity law sense: In re. Hummeltenburg [1923] 1 Ch 237 ; - the nature of the study and its delivery cannot be directed to private benefit: Geologists’ Association v. IRC (1928) 14 TC 271 ; - for an educative purpose to meet the public benefit test, it must not be for the benefit only of the institution’s members; it must, instead, be of benefit to a sufficiently wide section of the public: Geologists’ Association v. IRC.

18. The Tribunal considered that significant reliance be placed on the Geologists’ Association decision of the High Court in determining this appeal, being an analysis of the law underpinning the charitable purpose of the ‘advancement of education for the public benefit’.

19. As correctly admitted by the Appellants’ representatives, the term ‘esotericism’ is not easily defined and, they state, is an ‘umbrella’ term. This was confirmed in the Opinion of Matthew Smith, KC and in the letter dated 3 September 2024 from Professor Hutton, one of the witnesses for the Appellants who gave oral evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that the term is open to ambiguity, to the extent that precision and boundary is required, not least as esotericism is an unfamiliar field of study. The Respondent submitted that esotericism is not, in fact, limited to the examples provided by the Appellants in written and oral evidence and, if constituted as a CIO and registered a charity, other beliefs and practices, in an unfettered manner, could be added to the study of esotericism that might not meet the requirements of charity law, including the public benefit requirement, not least since, if registered, RENSEP will, in statutory law, be presumed to be charitable. Esotericism, as defined by the Appellants, does not meet even the examples referred to by Mr. Smith, KC as being areas of study that have ‘doubt around the edges’. The Tribunal also accepts the submission of the Respondent that the proposed charitable purpose of the advancement of education does not include, in this case, define the boundaries of what is, and is not, included within the Appellants’ meaning and concept of esotericism. Accordingly, that, in itself, means that the threshold for charitable registration is not met. Further, section 208 of the Act requires the Appellants to satisfy the Tribunal that RENSEP would meet the threshold posed in section 208 of the Act and, therefore, be charitable within the law governing that status at the time of charitable registration : it is insufficient to argue that, implicitly, RENSEP may meet the requirements of charity law to be a charitable institution arising from potential future research.

20. The Tribunal agrees on the balance of probabilities that there is a fatal contradiction (not merely a disconnect) between what is stated on the RENSEP website and the Opinion of Mr. Smith, KC, along with the description offered by Professor Hanegraff, that a rise in conspiracy theories concerning esotericism is a reason to study the topic.

21. Since there is doubt, on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the written and oral evidence and submissions of the parties, whether RENSEP would have the charitable purpose to advance education for the public benefit, then the appeal must be refused on that basis alone. It is not, without ambiguity, possible to discern whether the particular purpose of the proposed CIO, the advancement of education, meets the requirements of charity law, not forgetting the public benefit issue.

22. The Tribunal further, on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the said written and oral evidence and submissions of the parties, finds that the additional requirements of whether the said purpose, the study of esotericism (the precise definition of which is ambiguous), was ‘worthy of study’ as being educative in charity law, and to be ‘balanced’, that is, neutral. The Tribunal found that neither of these additional requirements were met by the Appellants for the reasons set out in writing, and in oral submissions, by the Respondent’s representative.

23. Equally, for much, if not all, of the same reasons, the resultant uncertainty surrounding the Appellants application to constitute RENSEP as a CIO with charitable status, it is not shown by the Appellants that the ‘public benefit’ criterion is satisfied; indeed, the evidence, on the balance of probabilities, points to RENSEP, if constituted as a CIO, would provide a private benefit, in particular, supporting persons engaged in some manner of private ritual.

24. The Tribunal must, where there is doubt, or ambiguity that cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the Appellants, refuse this appeal: the Tribunal found that RENSEP, could not be constituted as a CIO with charitable status as its purposes were not exclusively charitable nor for the public benefit. The written and oral evidence and submissions of the Appellants did not persuade the Tribunal to a contrary view for the reasons already outlined.

25. There was no dispute between the parties as to the facts: the dispute revolved around whether, on those facts, RENSEP could be constituted as a CIO and given charitable status.

26. The Upper Tribunal in Helena Partnerships Limited v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] S.T.C 1307, another Decision that is also binding on the Tribunal, identified principles in determining when extrinsic evidence and relevant factual background information may be taken into account in, inter alia, ascertaining the purposes of an institution, namely, where there is a doubt or ambiguity in assessing whether the implementation of an institution’s purposes or objects would achieve a charitable end result, by examining the activities of an institution, relying on the High Court decision in Incorporated Society of Law Reporting for England and Wales v. Attorney-General [1972] Ch 73 . This authority was concerned not with the motives and intentions of the founders of the institution, matters that were held to be irrelevant, but that it might well be necessary, in the case of an institution established to promote a prima facie charitable purpose), but if established to propagate a particular doctrine (that authority being concerned with the propagation of Christian doctrine and, therefore engaging the charitable purpose of the advancement of religion, a charitable purpose that did not arise in the instant appeal) to consider whether such propagation would be a charitable activity.

27. Specifically, on the question of whether an institution’s activities, purposes are capable of being, and will actually be, for the public benefit, judicial authorities such as the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in Full Fact v. Charity Commission (Ref. CA/2011/000), while not binding on the Tribunal, confirmed that considering the activities of an institution may be relevant to a proper understanding of its true purposes in assessing that question.

28. Section 4 of the Act provides that there can be no presumption that a purpose of an institution of any particular description is for the public benefit: any reference to ‘public benefit’ is a reference to how that term is understood for the purposes relating to charity law in England and Wales. This then relates back to the ISC Decision. What is clear, however, is that an institution’s ‘particular purpose’ is charitable only if it falls within one or more of the categories listed in s.3(1) of the Act and is for the public benefit pursuant to s.4 of the Act and that what is for the public benefit is not fixed but may change over time and can vary between the different categories of ‘charitable purpose’.

29. When deciding whether the Appellant’s particular purpose is beneficial to the public, the Tribunal must weigh any benefit that will result from the pursuit of the purpose against any detriment. For example, the House of Lords decision in National Anti-vivisection Society v. IRC [1948] AC 31 , held that the question whether the promotion of a change in the law to abolish vivisection was a charitable purpose was not concluded by the assertion of the moral benefits that would flow from the cessation of vivisection, but required a comparison of those benefits with the practical benefits that were proved to flow from the practice of vivisection.

30. The Appellants did not dispute the relevance of any of the authorities in the Authorities Bundle (‘AB’) as being the correct approach in the determination of this appeal.

31. As previously referred to, the Appellants made a strong case that this appeal should be allowed and RENSEP constituted as a CIO and registered as charitable because other institutions, with purposes that included activities such as some of those referred to by the Appellants in their definition of esotericism, had been registered. However, the Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s submission that each appeal must turn on its own facts and, further, that a review of registration decisions for other institutions, notwithstanding that the details of which are not before the Tribunal, are not relevant in deciding this appeal. This submission is, therefore, rejected by the Tribunal as having no substance in law. Conclusions

32. The findings of the Tribunal in respect of the ‘parity’ submissions, set out in preceding paragraphs, are repeated.

33. The case presented by the Appellants, having regard to written and oral evidence and submissions was somewhat ‘muddied’ in distinguishing between factors that are relevant in deciding the appeal and those that are not. The Appellant failed to address, and overcome, the Tribunal’s concerns that there was a substantial risk that the Appellants, if this appeal were allowed, would engage in non-charitable activity (mixed in with some charitable activity). The Tribunal also needed to be satisfied by the Appellants that the purposes of RENSEP were not only exclusively, and unambiguously, charitable but, in addition, were for the public benefit.

34. If, for example, the Tribunal in determining this appeal could be sufficiently satisfied that the particular purpose of RENSEP was confined, for example, to ‘advancement of education’, as settled in law, and referred to earlier in this Decision (but the Tribunal was not so satisfied in any event), then, if the requisite public benefit criterion was also satisfied, there may have been some scope to constitute RENSEP as a CIO with charitable status in law. The Tribunal considered and accepted that it may well be appropriate to offer a service such as that which RENSEP already offered as an unincorporated association, but the Appellants, on behalf of RENSEP, had to ensure that all of its purposes or objects were exclusively charitable and for the public benefit: the Tribunal was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, having regard to all of the written and oral evidence and submissions of the parties, that the Appellants discharged that burden of proof.

35. The crucial issue in this appeal was to ensure compliance with charity law as set out in the statutory system governing the regulation of charities should RENSEP be constituted and registered as a CIO.

36. It was clear, and perfectly understandable, that benefit, for example, in the form of gift aid and having unimpeded banking facilities, together with endorsement by the state, all of which would flow from RENSEP being constituted as a CIO and having charitable status, were hugely important to RENSEP, quite apart from its view that its stated purposes were of great importance.

37. Of the said statutory objectives, functions and duties placed upon the Respondent (and the Tribunal on appeal) in exercising its powers, the Tribunal considered that the public confidence objective, that is, to increase public trust and confidence in charities, was a crucial consideration in determining this appeal. The Tribunal decided that in order to meet this objective, too, this appeal had to be dismissed.

38. The appeal must be dismissed since the Tribunal found that one or more of the stated purposes or Objects of the Appellant were not, unambiguously, exclusively charitable. This is a separate issue from the question of whether the public benefit test is met in respect of the stated purposes of RENSEP that are, or could be, construed as exclusively charitable. For completeness, the Tribunal decided that the Appellants did not establish that the public benefit test was met in respect of the stated purposes of RENSEP.

39. The Tribunal found that there was significant doubt as to whether RENSEP satisfied the requirements of section 208 of the Act, a position that required to be certain and satisfied before registration. Any suggestion that the Respondent could simply register RENSEP and, thereafter, police the position, was not an acceptable proposition and conflicted with the position in law in any event.

40. The oral evidence of Dr. Otto, one of the Appellants, and Professor Hutton, who both gave oral evidence on behalf of the Appellants was somewhat vague and contradictory, with little by way of empirical evidence being adduced by Professor Hutton in particular, thereby undermining the credibility of the case presented by the Appellants on behalf of RENSEP. The Appellants, upon whom the burden of proof lay, were unable to satisfactorily contradict the case put forward on behalf of the Respondent.

41. This appeal is dismissed, and the review decision of the Respondent dated 9 April 2025 is confirmed.