Charles Labeja v The Estate of Shatochina Raisa Labeja & Anor

HHJ Farquhar :

1. This is an application by Dr Labeja (“the Applicant”) to set aside the Decree Absolute that was pronounced on the 21 November 2014 which brought the marriage between himself and Shatochina Labeja (“the First Respondent”) to an end. It is the Applicant’s case that the Decree was obtained through fraud and/or procedural irregularity and as such should be set aside. The First Respondent died on 8 th March 2022. Edward Shatochin (“the Second Respondent”) is the son of the First Respondent from a previous marriage.

2. The parties have each been represented by counsel with Mr Davies representing the Applicant and Mr Mertens the Respondents. They have each prepared useful notes which I have read in full, and I have also read all the relevant documents within the trial bundle. I have heard evidence from the Applicant and his son together with two other witnesses and the Second Respondent.

3. Factual Background.

4. The Applicant is originally from Uganda and the First Respondent from Bulgaria. They met and married in Donetsk, then in the USSR, on 30 July 1982. They have one child together, Andrew Labeja, who is now aged 43. The First Respondent had a child from her previous relationship who is the Second Respondent and is now aged 52. The Second Respondent is the personal representative of the First Respondent’s estate.

5. On 19 April 1991 the family all moved to the UK and applied for asylum which was eventually granted on an indefinite basis in February 2000. The Applicant would state thereafter that the marriage between the parties was a happy and devoted one whereas the Second Respondent says that he had understood that it was an abusive relationship and that the Applicant had spent significant periods of time in Uganda rather than in the UK.

6. It is now known that there was a petition for divorce dated 18 August 2008 issued by Aletta Shaw Solicitors purportedly on behalf of the First Respondent using the name Raisa Dmitievna Labeja. This was on the basis of unreasonable behaviour. There was an application to dismiss that petition on 12 November 2012, and District Judge Smith dismissed it by order of 16 January 2013. It is the Applicant’s case that he was not aware of this petition, and it had not been referred to within these proceedings prior to September 2025. The petition was noticed at the date of the PTR before myself on 5 September 2025 and I ordered that the file relating to that petition be provided to the parties.

7. A subsequent petition was issued on 3 rd April 2014 using both the names Shatochina Raisa Dmitrieva and Shatochina Raisa Labeja relying on five years’ separation. It stated that they had separated six years previously. A statement of service from a process server, Duncan Redpath, was provided stating that the Divorce Petition and a copy of the Acknowledgement of Service was personally served upon the Applicant on 27 th June 2014 at his address. An application for Decree Nisi followed with the certificate of entitlement to the decree being provided on 17 September 2014 and it was pronounced on 8 October 2014. The Decree Absolute was subsequently pronounced on 21 November 2014. It is agreed that the date of the marriage of the parties was not that which was set out within the Decree Absolute.

8. In 2015 the First Respondent purchased a shared ownership property in her sole name using her own funds. The Applicant and First Respondent had always lived in rented accommodation. There is a dispute as to who lived in the purchased property at Property A and who remained in the rented property at Property B. The Applicant states that he continued to live with the First Respondent and was with her throughout her illness prior to her death in hospital where she was always referred to as his Wife.

9. Following the commencement of these proceedings the King’s Proctor was invited to intervene within the Divorce. The papers were all provided to the King’s Proctor, and it was decided that she would not intervene. The basis of this was set out in a letter from the Government Legal Department dated 3 rd April 2025 which states: “ The King’s Proctor only intervenes in matrimonial proceedings where there is credible evidence of fraud, suppression of material facts, or a procedural impropriety that would undermine the legitimacy of the decree. Upon reviewing the court file and documents provided, including those dating back to 2014, there is no evidence to support such intervention. The divorce proceedings appear to have been conducted in full compliance with the Family Procedure Rules, with proper service affected by a professional process server….. An application to set aside a Decree Absolute granted nearly a decade ago is not only extraordinary but almost entirely without precedent in the context of matrimonial proceedings. The King’s Proctor does not intervene in matters where such a significant delay has occurred unless there is a compelling and properly evidenced justification. No such justification has been advanced in this case…. To entertain such an application would be fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty and the overriding objective of ensuring finality in litigation.”

10. It is accepted that the view of the King’s Proctor is not binding upon this Court, but the contents of the letter are noted.

11. The Position of the Parties

12. Applicant . The Applicant filed a statement with his application dated 7 th June 2023. He sets out in that document that he knew nothing about any divorce petition prior to the Second Respondent mentioning it after the First Respondent died. He stated that he had never lived apart from his wife, and she never mentioned anything about a divorce. In his application to set aside the Decree Absolute he states the following: a. He was never served with any document within the divorce. b. The decree refers to the wrong date of marriage. c. The parties never separated. d. The name of the First Respondent is wrong on the decree. e. The documents used to obtain the Decree Absolute were forged. f. He believes that the First Respondent was never involved in obtaining the Decree Absolute.

13. Once the Applicant had seen the Divorce File from the Court, he provided a further statement dated 17 th December 2024 in which he set out the following points: a. The translation of the marriage certificate was wrong (this is undoubtedly correct). b. The petition was signed by Aletta Shaw, Solicitors, and issued at Dartford Family Court. These were the same solicitors that the Second Respondent had used in two divorces of his own (this is not accepted). c. The solicitors claim that their file no longer exists, and the Applicant claims this is because it never existed. He adds that it was the Second Respondent that instructed the solicitors to prepare the petition and the First Respondent was not involved at all. d. The marriage continued throughout the life of the First Respondent and was still in existence as at the time she died.

14. Second Respondent. The Second Respondent states that he was not involved in the divorce proceedings at all and he has never been a client of Aletta Shaw Solicitors (although a former Wife of his was). He vehemently denies being involved in any fraud. The Second Respondent states that his mother told him that the Applicant frequently visited Uganda for extended periods of time where he had a girlfriend and he took money with him. He adds that in about 2010 the Applicant went to live in Uganda and took savings with him, effectively abandoning his mother. It is said that he established a shop there and bought some land. He added that his mother confided in him that she was the victim of serious domestic abuse. He states that once his mother purchased the property in 2015, she lived in that property (Property A) and the Applicant remained in the rented property (Property B). The Second Respondent states that the Applicant has brought the application for financial reasons so that he obtains the interest in Property A.

15. There are many areas of factual dispute between the parties. It is not the role of this Court to adjudicate upon each and every issue but simply to consider those that are relevant to the application and the decision that needs to be made by the Court. In his Position Statement, Counsel on behalf of the Applicant states that if the Applicant is able to establish any of three points, then it also establishes that the divorce was fraudulently obtained. Whilst that is not necessarily accepted by the Respondents, I do consider that they are relevant issues for the court to adjudicate upon. These are: a. Was the Applicant aware of any divorce proceedings? b. Did the First Respondent knowingly initiate divorce proceedings? c. Were the Applicant and First Respondent separated for five years or at all? I would add that it is important to consider what the impact of this would be if it was the case.

16. Evidence that the Applicant would have been aware of the proceedings.

17. It is central to the Applicant’s case that he had no knowledge whatsoever of either the first set of proceedings in 2008 or the second in 2014. He states that he knew of no reason why the First Respondent would have wished to commence divorce proceedings, and she had not informed him that this had occurred. Further, he states that at no time did he see any documentation in relation to these divorce petitions and the first that he heard of any such petition was shortly after the First Respondent’s death.

18. There are a number of points that counter the Applicant’s position:

19. There is a certificate of Service dated 27 th June 2014 from Duncan Redpath in which he states that he is a process server, and he personally served the Applicant at 19.57 that day with the Notice of Proceedings, Divorce Petition, and Acknowledgment of Service by handing the documents to the Applicant. He states that the Applicant freely admitted his identity to him. This occurred at Property B.

20. It is the Applicant’s case that he never received such documents. He accepted in his oral evidence that Mr Redpath would have no reason to lie but he added that there is a lot of crime in that area and if someone had walked up to him and asked who he was and then walked away he would have called the police. He says it is not possible that he would have received the envelope. He says that Mr Redpath would have asked for a signature or taken a photo and that “ he is part of the collusion ”.

21. There has been no attempt to call Mr Redpath as a witness so it is not known what he would have said in relation to this statement by the Applicant. It is accepted that the Applicant was living at the relevant address that is referred to within the Certificate of Service at the relevant time.

22. The rules in relation to service of the petition are set out within FPR r6.17(3): “ If the respondent served was the other party to the marriage or civil partnership, the certificate of service must show the means by which the person serving the applicant knows the identity of the parties served .” The notes in the Red Book to that rule adds “ If, as is generally the case, the respondent is not known to the server, his means of identifying the respondent must be described in one of the following ways, e.g. a. By means of a photograph; b. by personal knowledge of the process server or other person identifying the respondent; or c. by admission of the person served. In (B) or (C), corroborative evidence will be necessary. In the first instance, the process server should be asked to seek the respondent signature on the acknowledgement of service obviating the need for certificate of service .”

23. The Applicant states that there is no corroborative signature and as such this goes to the credibility of the evidence. If that was the only evidence in relation to whether the Applicant was aware of either of the petitions it could be considered as a flaw. However, there are a number of other points which support the fact that the Applicant had been made aware of these petitions.

24. These are as follows: a. The 2008 petition on the back right corner has writing stating “ CS Resp 26.8.08 ” followed by a signature. This would indicate that the court had served the respondent with that document on that day and the address for the respondent to the divorce (the Applicant within these proceedings) was Property B, being the correct address of the Applicant. b. Following the application of the First Respondent to dismiss that petition which she filed on the 14 November 2012 a notice of hearing was created by the court to state that the hearing was to take place at Dartford County Court on 16 January 2013. The back of that notice on the bottom right-hand corner has handwriting which states “CSBS 12-12-12 + D11”. This signifies that the court served both sides with that notice of hearing as well as the original application. c. There was a hearing on 16 January 2013 at Dartford County Court before District Judge Smith. The order states that neither party attended and that the Divorce Petition was dismissed with the Marriage Certificate being returned to the petitioner. The reverse of that order in the bottom right-hand corner has written on it “CS-BS 29.1.13” together with an individual’s initials. Again, this notifies that the court served both sides with that document. d. The Certificate of entitlement to a decree was dated 17 September 2014 and on the reverse of that document is written “CSBS 17-9-14”.

25. This Court accepts that there will have been occasions when HMCTS has not actually served a document even though it has been written on the back of that particular document that that has occurred. However, that would be the exception to the rule. In order for the Applicant to succeed in stating that he was unaware of either the original divorce proceedings in 2008 or the subsequent proceedings, I would have to be satisfied that on all of the occasions above he was not provided with the documentation and also that the process server has not been honest. I have no hesitation in saying that I am not so satisfied. The evidence is strong and clear that the Applicant was fully aware of the 2008 petition as well as the subsequent petition. On the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that he was aware of the 2008 petition and also of the second petition. His pleas to say otherwise are simply untruthful. It follows that I am fully satisfied that the Applicant had notice of both sets of proceedings which were commenced by the First Respondent.

26. This finding clearly goes to the credibility of the Applicant. Is it likely that he has simply forgotten about either one or both of the petitions? I am satisfied that that is not the case. A Petition for divorce is a significant moment in the life of a married person. If the Applicant is correct and that there was nothing wrong within the marriage, then the knowledge that his then Wife had petitioned for a divorce would be all the more impactful. These are simply not the type of events that an individual would forget. Further, they are also the obvious issue that would have been discussed between the Applicant and the First Respondent. If he genuinely understood there were no issues within the marriage and then discovered that the First Respondent had instituted divorce proceedings (which I find he did) then he would undoubtedly have raised this with her. The Applicant’s position that this was simply never discussed between the two of them is simply unbelievable and as such I reject his evidence on that point as untruthful. This finding must colour the rest of the Applicant’s evidence, although I must bear in mind the Lucas Direction and just because he has been dishonest on one issue clearly does not prove that he has been dishonest on all issues.

27. Does the Decree Absolute relate to the Applicant and First Respondent and is it valid?

28. The Applicant’s full name is Charles Labeja. The First Respondent’s full name was Raisa Dmitrievna Labeja. They married in Donetsk on 30 th July 1982. The Decree Absolute refers to the First Respondent as ‘Shatochina Raisa Labeja’ and states that she was married to Charles Labeja in Donetsk on 19 th March 1991.

29. The name of the First Respondent is wrong, and the date of the marriage is wrong. This leads counsel on behalf of the Applicant to state: “ There is simply no divorce between H and W. The purported decree absolute does not relate to W but a third party. It also does not refer to the marriage between H and W but a non-existent marriage on another date .” It is further added in the Applicant’s position statement that “ there is no authority for declaration of marital status being permitted to be used to correct errors in a decree. There is authority for rectification/amendment in limited circumstances (XvY).” It is on this basis that it is argued that there is no Decree Absolute relating to the parties and it does not relate to their marriage. Further, if there was a finding that it did relate to these parties there is no jurisdiction to amend.

30. In X v Y (Divorce: Rectification of Decrees) [2020] EW HC 1116 which was heard by Sir Andrew McFarlane P the parties had secretly married in Madrid in 1994 and then conducted a second marriage ceremony in London one year later. The petition for divorce was based upon the second marriage without any reference to the original marriage. It was held that where a decree of divorce has been granted by a competent court in accordance with the law but the decree gives the wrong date of the effective marriage, the decree is not rendered void by that error and the court has a discretion to correct that error so that the record shall refer to the correct date of the marriage.

31. It was stated at paragraph 13: “ The court held in Thynne v Thynne that where a decree of divorce had been granted by a competent court, in accordance with the law, putting an end to the status of marriage between the parties, but the decree gives the wrong date of the effective marriage, the decree was not rendered void by that error, and there was a discretion in the court to correct the error, so that the record would refer to the correct date of marriage. The decree of divorce, had remained valid from the moment it had been pronounced… And was not affected by the internal error in the pleading of the date.”

32. At paragraph 15: “ Although I am satisfied that this court does have jurisdiction to entertain this application… If it were granted, the order that flows from it, has no impact at all on the status of this couple. They were divorced by a valid order of this court made absolute on… The impact of the order that I will make today is simply, but importantly, to record that the marriage that was dissolved on that day was the true legal marriage between the couple, namely that celebrated in 1993 and not the subsequent marriage a year later which had no legal impact on their status. The purpose of the days order is to resolve and put right that which should have been the case all the way along.”

33. The judgment at paragraph 16 considers the basis upon which any decree should be varied and in particular whether it would be under FPR 2010 r4.1(6) or the inherent jurisdiction. The President stated “ I favour undertaking that task under the Rules. It seems to me that what is being corrected here is an error of process, and there is no need for the court to look to exercise any higher or esoteric jurisdiction .”

34. Rule 4.1 (6) reads as follows: “ A power of the court under these rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order.”

35. It is argued on behalf of the Applicant that the rules and the above authority do not provide any jurisdiction to a court to rectify or amend a decree absolute to change the name of a party or substitute a new party.

36. Does this Decree relate to these parties? It was the Applicant’s case that the First Respondent was not involved in initiating and pursuing either set of divorce proceedings. It was his proposition that the Second Respondent had instructed the solicitors and that they were involved in some form of conspiracy to obtain the Decree and it was suggested in his evidence that the process server was also part of this collusive plan.

37. There is simply no evidence whatsoever to support the Applicant’s conspiracy theory. It would have to follow from his theory that the Second Respondent decided to initiate the divorce proceedings in 2008 and then seek their dismissal a number of years later before initiating the second set of proceedings thereafter all without informing the First Respondent. This was all part of his masterplan, it must be suggested, to ensure that he could inherit her estate on her death. It is noted that as at the time of both petitions the First Respondent did not own any real property and there has been no evidence provided that she had other substantial assets and obviously it was not known as to when she might die. The whole theory is not only unsupported by evidence but also totally illogical.

38. In order for the Applicant’s proposition to be correct the solicitors, Aletta Shaw Solicitors, must have been involved in the conspiracy which surely would have amounted to a criminal act. The Applicant has not attempted to join them to this application or call any evidence from them to prove this element of his case. It seems to be suggested that the fact that they signed the 2008 petition rather than the First Respondent supports the proposition that they were involved directly in some form of conspiracy. However, that ignores the rules that solicitors could, and generally would, sign such Petitions under the rules.

39. It was the Applicant’s evidence that the Second Respondent had been represented by the solicitors Aletta Shaw Solicitors. He states that the Second Respondent’s former wife told him that was the case. He accepted in evidence that “ I may not have evidence but that is what I believe.” In his oral evidence the Second Respondent stated that he did not in fact instruct Aletta Shaw Solicitors in his divorce but that his first wife was represented by them. He stated that his solicitors were a firm called T G Baynes Solicitors. In short, there is simply no evidence whatsoever to support the idea that the Second Respondent was involved in either petition.

40. It was also accepted by the Applicant that the First Respondent had signed the Application Notice to dismiss the original petition and therefore he had to accept that she must have been aware of that petition. He also accepts that the First Respondent signed the statement in support for the second petition which again must mean that she was aware of this petition.

41. I am satisfied that the original petition in 2008 and the subsequent petition were both issued by and on behalf of the First Respondent. There is direct evidence, in the form of her signature, that she was aware of both of those petitions. The addresses that were provided on all of the documentations are confirmed as being accurate by the Applicant. There is evidence that both of the parties were served with the relevant documents. There is no evidence to support the conspiracy theory and indeed no logical basis for it to be the case.

42. It follows that I am satisfied that it was the intention of the First Respondent to initiate divorce proceedings against the Applicant and that as such the parties involved in those proceedings were in fact the Applicant and First Respondent to these proceedings. The fact that the First Respondent’s name is incorrectly stated does not alter that position. The name that was set out in the documentation clearly relates to the First Respondent and the name of the Applicant is correctly stated. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the people referred to within the Decree Absolute were in fact the Applicant and First Respondent.

43. As is pointed out, the date of the marriage is also incorrect. It is stated to be 19 th March 1991 whereas the correct date was 30 th July 1982. There is no dispute between the parties as to what should have been the correct date. Just as with the incorrect names being used the important issue for this court to consider is whether or not the incorrect date invalidates the Decree Absolute on the basis that it does not relate to these parties. As I have set out above, I am satisfied that the intended parties to the divorce application were indeed the Applicant and First Respondent and there is no dispute that they were only involved in one Marriage Ceremony which took place on 30 July 1982.

44. The Applicant states that 19 March 1991 date appears to be an error of the translator. All of the original documents involved in this case are in Russian and have been subject to translation. It appears that Andrew Labeja’s birth certificate was issued on 19 March 1991 and that the translator has mistakenly taken that date as the date of the marriage. The relevant test for me to consider was as set out by the President above namely “ The impact of the order that I will make today is simply, but importantly, to record that the marriage that was dissolved on that day was the true legal marriage between the couple, namely that celebrated in 1993”.

45. I am satisfied that all of the documentation within the two petitions related to the Applicant and the First Respondent’s one and only marriage. That in fact occurred on 30 July 1982 and not on the incorrectly translated date of 19 March 1991. This is not a case in which it is suggested that there is any other couple to which this petition relates or indeed that there is any other possible date for the correct date of marriage than 30 July 1982. It follows that I have jurisdiction to amend the Decree Absolute that was made to record that the marriage that was dissolved on that day was the true legal marriage between the Applicant and First Respondent. I do so pursuant to the jurisdiction provided by FPR 4.1(6), and I order that the Decree Absolute is amended to show the correct date of the parties’ marriage as well as the correct names.

46. What is the evidence in relation to the parties having been separated for five years or at all? What is the relevance of this?

47. The Decree Absolute was based on a petition stating that the parties had been separated for 5 years. It is the Applicant’s case that they had not been separated at all, and this is sufficient to prove that the petition was fraudulent.

48. The evidence in relation to the separation is in the main from the Applicant himself. On the basis of the findings that I have made above, there are serious issues in relation to his credibility. I do not accept that he was not aware of the first divorce petition or indeed the second one. He has not been honest in relation to those points. I do not accept his evidence that he was not personally served the documents by the process server. It is then difficult to accept his evidence that he considered there was nothing untoward within the marriage. The story that he wishes the Court to believe is simply not correct. He was well aware that the Respondent was not happy within the marriage and had filed two separate petitions for divorce. As such, it is difficult for the Court to accept his version of events in relation to living separately for 5 years.

49. It is now known that Ms Labeja filed a Petition in 2008 in which she alleged unreasonable behaviour. This was stated to be “ The marriage has been in difficulty for a number of years. The respondent has been mentally and physically violent to the petitioner. On many occasions the respondent has been violent towards the petitioner following bouts of drinking resulting in the police having to be called on one of these occasions. There has been no physical relationship between the parties for at least two years. The respondent has told the petitioner that he no longer has any feelings for her. As a result of the respondent’s behaviour the petitioner can no longer be expected to live with the respondent.”

50. The Second Respondent gave evidence to state that his mother had informed him that the marriage was not a happy one and indeed that the Applicant has left her in or about 2010 to live in Uganda where he had formed a new relationship. I accept the submissions on behalf of the Applicant that that was not true as he only spent short periods of time in Uganda. However, the Second Respondent also stated that his mother confided in him that she experienced serious domestic abuse and she had been physically and sexually assaulted by the Applicant. Whilst there have been no findings made in relation to the allegations of unreasonable behaviour it is noteworthy that the Second Respondent was stating these allegations had been made to him by his mother at a time when he was not aware of the contents of her initial divorce petition. That suggests, at its lowest, that there were issues within the marriage as otherwise Ms Labeja would not be filing the divorce petition and also making complaints to her son even if those complaints were not true.

51. It is against that background that I am further satisfied that the Applicant’s evidence of a happy marriage without any significant difficulties is simply not correct. The Applicant relied upon the evidence of Harry Pattison who knew the Applicant and his former wife from 2015 onwards. It follows that he would have no direct knowledge of any possible separation prior to 2014. The fact that a formerly married couple are on good terms and see each other regularly does not mean that they have not previously been divorced. Mr Pattison’s evidence was not of any great relevance to the case.

52. The other evidence upon which the Applicant relied was provided by William Ayella. He stated that he knew Mr and Mrs Labeja since 1989 and believed that they were a happy family who live together as a lovely couple. He added that during the time that he knew them together he did not see any reason to believe there was any problem in the family as they “ are always together joyfully ” and “ I believe that their love was genuine and certainly unique as they were both devoted to each other in love throughout their lifetime together.” It is noted that these were precisely the same words that was set out in Mr Pattison’s statement. Unsurprisingly, they were both asked about the identical phrases that they used, and their evidence was that although they had never met each other that these were in fact their words. This is clearly not correct as it is simply unbelievable that such an unusual phrase would be used by both individuals. This creates some doubt as to the credibility of Mr Ayella. Further, I am satisfied that Mrs Labeja was not happy within the marriage as is made clear by her 2008 divorce petition together with the second petition in 2014. As such, it is difficult to place much reliance upon the view of Mr Ayella.

53. Andrew Labeja is the son of the Applicant and Mrs Labeja. He supports the Applicant in full. He states that the parties lived together as partners up until the day that his mother died in March 2022. He states he was living with them at various properties for almost 40 years from 1982 to 2019. He stated that “ my parents loved each other deeply and live together as a devoted married couple for as long as I can remember….. My dear parents loved one another in a very stable, marriage relationship for almost 4 decades and remained together until death took them apart. This is an excellent example and encouragement in family life for me.” He stated that he was not aware of any divorce proceedings between his parents and he supported his father’s conspiracy theory as he stated “ I believe that the alleged divorce between my father and my late dear mother was a planned attempt by the second respondent to disenfranchise my father from the Estate of his late wife and take over my beneficial rights within the estate of my late mother.”

54. In his oral evidence Andrew Labeja stated that he asked his mother in 2010 to 2012 whether she was looking for a divorce. That is a surprising thing to ask if he considered that they were in a blissfully happy marriage. He states that his mother told him she was not planning a divorce. This evidence is at odds with his view that the parties were very happily married. Andrew Labeja has also completely bought into his father’s conspiracy theory even though there is simply no evidence to support it and I have found that it is not correct. There are many reasons not to accept the evidence of Andrew Labeja at face value. He was also of the view that his mother would not lie to the solicitors or to the Court, when asked about what was set out within the petitions, which I am satisfied were filed on her instructions.

55. The evidence in support of the argument that the parties had indeed separated for five years comes from the Petition itself. This was uncontested at the time. It is also consistent with the fact that there had been a previous Petition on the basis of unreasonable behaviour. It was not unusual for such a petition to be withdrawn after 5 years had lapsed and the less contentious ground of separation could be relied upon. It is also noteworthy that following the Decree Absolute being pronounced the Respondent purchased an interest in property in her sole name. If she was fully content within the marriage and living happily with the Applicant, then that would have been an unusual act. The parties had lived together for a substantial period as a married couple and not purchased any real property. That only occurred for the first time shortly after a Decree Absolute had been obtained. This is all good circumstantial evidence to support the marriage having come to an end.

56. The upshot is that the evidence in relation to whether the parties had in fact been separated for 5 years is uncertain. The obvious lacuna in the evidence is that we have not and cannot hear the First Respondent's version of events. It follows that the Court must question whether it is necessary to make any finding on the issue of separation at all at this very late stage.

57. I am satisfied that the answer to this point is clearly that the Court need not consider the factual basis now and indeed it would be totally inappropriate to do so. On the basis that I have made a finding that the Applicant was served with the Petition and Acknowledgement of Service document on 27 th June 2014 and that it is accepted that the Applicant did not file any document in response, then it is not necessary for me to consider this point. If the Applicant wished to challenge the position, then he should have done so in 2014 and he failed to do so. He cannot be permitted to raise that argument now after all these years. This was made clear in Shahzad v Mazher at paragraph 14 in which it was stated by the Court of Appeal that if a Respondent does “ [2021] 2 FLR 707 not respond to the petition as required under the FPR 2010, they are likely to find they are unable later to contest the proceedings and the court will make a decree of divorce.” The importance of the validity of a marriage was set out at paragraph 34 and it was added that “ the same importance clearly attaches to the change of status effected by the dissolution of the marriage as it does to the creation of a valid marriage and, in both respects, to the creation and dissolution of a civil partnership.”

58. Reference was made within Shahzad to the case of Meier v Meier in which it was stated that [1948] P 89 s.18(1) Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that: “(1) No appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal…(d) from a decree absolute of divorce or nullity of marriage, by a party who, having had time and opportunity to appeal from the decree nisi on which that decree was founded, has not appealed from the decree nisi;…(fa) from a dissolution order, nullity order or presumption of death order… That has been made final, by a party who, having had time and opportunity to appeal from the conditional order on which that final order was founded, has not appealed from the conditional order …”

59. These references make it clear that once the court is satisfied that the Applicant had been served with the relevant documents, as I am, then no application should be entertained some 10 years later.

60. The test to be considered was set out in Shahzad v Mazher commencing at paragraph 51: “ [2021] 2 FLR 707 a decree absolute effects an important change of status. It is equivalent to a judgement ‘in rem’ and as a result, is an order which does not simply affect the personal rights of the parties to the decree but is an order which is conclusive as to a person’s status and is, what is sometimes termed, “good against the world”. Accordingly, everyone is entitled to rely on it as establishing that the parties are no longer married.

61. The Court of Appeal set out the conclusions that had been reached by Munby P in Rapisarda v Colladon as follows: “ [2015] 1 FLR 597 I can summarise my conclusions on the law as follows: a. perjury without more does not suffice to make a decree absolute void on the ground of fraud; b. perjury which goes only to jurisdiction to grant a decree and not to jurisdiction to entertain the petition, likewise, does not without more suffice to make a decree absolute void on the ground of fraud; c. a decree, whether nisi or absolute, will be void on the ground of fraud if the court has been materially deceived, by perjury, forgery or otherwise, into accepting that it has jurisdiction to entertain the petition; d. a decree, whether nisi or absolute, may, depending on the circumstances, be void on the ground of fraud if there has been serious procedural irregularity, for example, if the petitioner has concealed the proceedings from the respondent.”

62. I am satisfied that there has been no procedural irregularity in this case. The Petition was correctly filed, service was provided to the Applicant, and he simply failed to respond. Thereafter the appropriate hearing notices were provided, and orders were made all the way up to a Decree Absolute. The only allegation that can be made in this case is that the parties had not been separated for five years. As can be seen from all of the authorities above that is not sufficient to permit this court to make an order to set aside the Decree Absolute. It must follow that it is not appropriate for any further consideration to be given to the issue as to separation.

63. The Applicant’s application must fail. The Court cannot entertain such an application more than 10 years after the decree has been pronounced when no procedural irregularity has been found. I am not bound by the view put forward by the King’s Proctor, but it is noteworthy that it is stated in their response that “ An application to set aside a Decree Absolute granted nearly a decade ago is not only extraordinary but almost entirely without precedent in the context of matrimonial proceedings… To entertain such an application would be fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty and the overriding objective of ensuring finality in litigation.” I find myself in total agreement with that statement. The application is dismissed. The Decree Absolute remains as granted subject to the amendments to the Decree that I have referred to above.

64. Costs. I have not heard any argument in relation to costs. However, on the basis of the findings that I have made it is difficult to see how there would not be some form of costs order in favour of the Respondents. I would hope that the parties are able to reach an agreement on the issue, but if they are not able to do so then written submissions, limited to 3 pages, can be submitted by any party making the application by 9 th January 2026 and any response to be provided within 7 days. I shall adjudicate upon the issue on the papers.

65. Publication/Anonymisation

66. There is a request to publish this judgment on the basis that it has dealt with issues that arise infrequently. I am content to do so. The hearing was heard in open Court as it related to the divorce suit although I gave permission for Counsel to appear without their robes. I also did not wear my robes. As is to be expected there were no members of the public present throughout the hearing, but there was no application from either party for the hearing not to proceed in open Court.

67. There has not been any request for a Transparency Order to restrict any reporting and indeed it is unlikely to have been granted in any event. There are no minor children involved in this application. There is no mention of any possibly confidential information such as medical records and there is no commercially sensitive information that has been referred to at any point.

68. Further, there have been findings of dishonesty made against the Applicant and such issues concerning the validity of Court orders is a matter of public interest. I am satisfied that there is no reasonable basis upon which it could be said that the judgment should be anonymised.

69. Post Script. Following consideration of the written submissions as to costs I have provided a separate short written judgment in which I ordered the Applicant to pay £33,750 towards the costs of the Respondents His Honour Judge Farquhar 24 th February 2026