UK case law

Christopher Adolphus Forbes, Re

[2025] EWHC ADMIN 1692 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2025

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Lord Justice Jeremy Baker and Mr Justice Johnson:

1. Christopher Forbes is serving two sentences of life imprisonment imposed by a court of the Turks and Caicos Islands in respect of two offences of murder. He has been transferred to serve his sentence in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State has referred his case to the High Court under section 273 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for the court to make either a minimum term order or a whole life order under section 321 of the Sentencing Code.

2. We have been provided with documents which include: (1) Messages in support of Mr Forbes from close family relatives. (2) A psychological report of Dr Robert Halsey dated 18 September 2024. (3) Written submissions of Charles Langley KC on behalf of Mr Forbes. (4) Copies of Douglas [2019] EWHC 3018 (QB) and Antar [2022] EWHC 12 (Admin) . The facts

3. Mr Forbes was born in July 1983. He was therefore 32 in April 2016 and he is now 41. He has 3 children, aged 15, 17 and 19. He was brought up in care where he had a difficult time and was regularly beaten. He moved from Grand Bahama to Turks and Caicos when he was 31. There is reference in the psychological report to Mr Forbes being convicted of handling stolen goods in 2016. That does not appear elsewhere in the papers before us, and we will treat him as if he were of good character prior to the these offences. Mr Forbes has been convicted of the murder of Yuneiry Veras and Sorineida Arias. Yuneiry Veras

4. Ms Yuneiry Veras was a national of Dominica. On 17 April 2016 she was working at a bar in Providenciales until 2am the following morning. She returned home and was last seen by her housemate at 2.25am. She was reported missing the following day. On 23 April 2016, the body of Ms Veras was found in an area of bushes. The body was partially covered by broken bushes. Her mouth was gagged with a cloth. There was a pink towel wrapped around her neck. She was naked from the waist down, and her skirt and underwear, and a used condom, were found nearby. There was an injury to her head. There were three rocks with blood on them. DNA from the used condom, and from the pink towel, was traced to Mr Forbes. A forensic pathologist determined that she had died due to blunt head injury. The following injuries were noted: a. A fractured right eye lobe and an associated 0.8 x 0.6 cm central defect. b. Multiple palpable fractures of the nasal bones and maxilla. c. A 3.1 x 1.5cm laceration on the right side of the forehead. d. Two lacerations to the upper lip. e. Fractured jawbone between the central incisors. f. Multiple fractures of the skull and frontal bone, mid skull and at the base of the skull on the right side of the head and a depressed fracture on the top of the skull. g. Extensive fractures to the rear base of the skull. h. Further fractures to the middle sections of the base of the skull i. A 12x6cm area of abrasions on the lower aspect of the abdomen. j. A 6.5x5cm abrasion on the left side of the rear aspect of the pelvic region. k. A 6.1x6cm dark red abrasion on the left hip. l. A 0.5cm abrasion on the lateral aspect of the of the left hip. m. A 1x0.5cm area of abrasion on the right wrist. n. A 2.5x1.6cm abrasion of the left hand. o. A 10x2cm area of abrasion on the left thigh. p. A 12x2cm abrasion on the left knee. q. A 4.5x0.3 cm abrasion on the dorsal and mid aspect of the left thigh. Sorineida Arias

5. Ms Sorineida Arias was also a national of Dominica. On 9 July 2016 she was working in a bar in Providenciales until 3am the following morning. She returned home but then left at about 4.15am to go to a man’s house. On 11 July 2016 a bag containing her belongings, including her passport, was found inside a manhole. There was a handwritten note on one of the pages of her passport: “I kill her she was bad just like the one I killed months ago I would not stop I hate a bad bitch all she want is money this one give me a fight so she die bad but the one before I just put a rock on her head good luck finding this one police  ” Subsequently, expert evidence indicated that this was probably written by Mr Forbes.

6. Ms Arias’ body was found 2 days later. She had a significant head injury and part of her skull was missing. Her cause of death was due to blunt head injury. Nearby was an arrangement of 4 rocks and 3 gold rings. DNA from the rings was traced to Mr Forbes. DNA taken from Ms Arias’ fingernail clippings was also traced to him. A forensic pathologist determined that she had died due to blunt head injury. The following injuries were noted: a. An oval shaped defect of full thickness measuring 3.5x2.5cm to the left frontal scalp (of the head). b. An underlying oval shaped depression measuring 2.1x1.4cm (part of a. above). c. Within depression at b, an L –shaped perforation measuring 1.2x0.7 cm in the frontal bone. d. A large trilobed punched out defect measuring 7.6x7.5 cm to the left rear side of the skull. e. Radiating fractures of the skull and the base of the skull. f. Fragments of comminuted skull inside the cranial vault. Conviction and sentence

7. Mr Forbes was arrested on 31 August 2016. He denied murdering Yuneiry Veras or Sorineida Arias. He was charged and was remanded in custody. He spent three years in custody on remand before his trial. He did not give evidence at trial. On 21 October 2019, he was convicted of both murders. He was sentenced by Ramsey-Hale J to life imprisonment in respect of each offence, which was the mandatory penalty required by law. Ramsey-Hale J directed that his sentence should be treated as having started from the day he was first remanded in custody. At the time, the court did not prescribe a minimum term to be served before consideration of release on licence. The following year, the Parole of Prisoners (Amendment) Ordinance 2020 came into force. It required that the cases of those who had been sentenced to life imprisonment be considered by the Supreme Court of the Turks and Caicos Islands for the purpose of setting a minimum term.

8. Section 6A of the 2020 Ordinance makes provision for the setting of the minimum term. It states: “6A Release of prisoners serving sentence of imprisonment for life (1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, when sentencing a person to a term of imprisonment for life, the court shall specify the period of incarceration the person shall serve before that person is eligible to be considered for release on licence, the period being such as the court considers appropriate to satisfy requirements of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, but for murder, the period shall be thirty years before the prisoner is eligible for release unless there are— (a) extenuating circumstances, exceptional in nature, in which case the court may impose a lower period of incarceration; or (b) aggravating circumstances, exceptional in nature, in which case the court may impose a longer period of incarceration. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) and any other law to the contrary, where any of the following circumstances are present— (a) the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the following— (i) a substantial degree of premeditation or planning; (ii) the abduction of a victim; or (iii) sexual or sadistic conduct; (b) the murder of a child where the murder also involves the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic conduct; (c) a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological motivation; or (d) a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder, the court shall, when sentencing a person to a term of imprisonment for life, specify the period of incarceration the person shall serve before the person is eligible to be considered for release on licence, the period being such as the court considers appropriate to satisfy requirements of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, the period shall be whole life before the prisoner is eligible for conditional release unless there are extenuating circumstances, exceptional in nature, in which case the court may impose a lower period of incarceration. (3) In making a decision under subsection (1)(a) or (b) or (2) the court shall state the extenuating circumstances or the aggravating circumstances, as the case may be. (4) The Board may, after considering the factors referred to in section 5 and in accordance with the procedures set out in section 8, recommend to the Governor, the release on licence of a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life after the prisoner has served the period of imprisonment specified by the court under subsection (1). (5) A licence granted to a prisoner under this section may be made subject to such conditions (if any) as appear to the Governor to be desirable either generally or in any particular case, and any such conditions may be varied from time to time or cancelled: Provided that before imposing, varying or cancelling any conditions, unless so doing upon the recommendation of the Board, the Governor shall consult with the Board. (6) A licence granted under this section to a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life, unless earlier revoked under section 7, shall remain in force for life, reviewable by the Board every twelve months with a view to assessing whether the conditions need to be varied.”

9. On 11 November 2020, Mrs Justice Lobban Jackson, sitting in the Supreme Court of the Turks and Caicos Islands, imposed a whole life order. She found that there was a substantial degree of premeditation and planning and sexual and sadistic conduct in both murders, such that, for those three separate reasons, the case fell within the ambit of section 6A(2)(a) of the 2000 Ordinance, such that the appropriate starting point was a whole life sentence. Further, each victim had been a sex worker and were thus vulnerable, and the bodies had been concealed. The defendant had been of previous good character. It was not appropriate to impose any “lower period of incarceration” having regard to any “extenuating circumstances, exceptional in nature.”

10. On 12 January 2021, Mr Forbes was transferred to England and Wales to serve his sentence because of a lack of a suitable facility on the Turks and Caicos Islands. Psychological evidence

11. The report of Dr Halsey indicates that Mr Forbes has found it difficult to adjust to the United Kingdom: “everything is new to me, I can’t get used to the time difference. All my family are in Bahamas and Turks. I’m trying to cope to this new life without going off the rails.” He had become involved in fights which he said was due to “the stress.” It was difficult to keep in contact with his family because of the time difference, but he received emails from family and friends. He had received some visits, the last one before the date of the report in September 2024 being in July 2024 when his daughter visited him. He maintains his denial of the offences and says he wishes to appeal against his conviction. He also wishes to return to prison in Turks and Caicos so that he can be close to his family.

12. Dr Halsey says that there are indicators of moderate levels of both depression and anxiety, which he describes as an understandable emotional reaction to the current stressors he faces. He also experiences some suicidal thoughts and a disturbed sleep pattern. Legal framework

13. Section 273 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states: “273 Life prisoners transferred to England and Wales (1) The Secretary of State must refer the case of any transferred life prisoner to the High Court for the making of one or more relevant orders. (2) In subsection (1) “transferred life prisoner” means a person - (a) on whom a court in a country or territory outside the British Islands has imposed one or more sentences of imprisonment or detention for an indeterminate period, and (b) who has been transferred to England and Wales after the commencement of this section in pursuance of— (i) an order made by the Secretary of State under section 2 of the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act 1884 (c. 31), or (ii) a warrant issued by the Secretary of State under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47), there to serve his sentence or sentences or the remainder of his sentence or sentences. (3) In subsection (1) “a relevant order” means a minimum term order or a whole life order under section 321 of the Sentencing Code …”

14. Sections 321 and 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020 state: “321 Life sentence: minimum term order or whole life order (1) Where a court passes a life sentence, it must make an order under this section. (2) The order must be a minimum term order unless the court is required to make a whole life order under subsection (3). (3) The order must be a whole life order if— (a) the case is within subsection (3A)… and (b) the court is of the opinion that, because of the seriousness of— (i) the offence, or (ii) the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, it should not make a minimum term order. (3A) A case is within this subsection if the offender was aged 21 or over when the offence was committed. … (4) A minimum term order is an order that the early release provisions (see section 324) are to apply to the offender as soon as the offender has served the part of the sentence which is specified in the order in accordance with section 322 or 323 (“the minimum term”). (5) A whole life order is an order that the early release provisions are not to apply to the offender. 322 Mandatory life sentences: further provision (1) This section applies where a court passes a life sentence for an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law. Minimum term (2) If the court makes a minimum term order, the minimum term must be such part of the offender's sentence as the court considers appropriate taking into account— (a) the seriousness of— (i) the offence, or (ii) the combination of the offence and any one or more offences associated with it, and (b) the effect that the following would have if the court had sentenced the offender to a term of imprisonment— (i) section 240 ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (crediting periods of remand in custody); (ii) and section 240 A of that Act (crediting periods on bail subject to certain restrictions); including the effect of any declaration that the court would have made under section 325 or 327 (specifying periods of remand on bail subject to certain restrictions or in custody pending extradition). Determination of seriousness (3) In considering the seriousness of the offence, or of the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, under— (a) section 321(3) or (3C) (determining whether to make a whole life order), or (b) subsection (2) (determining the minimum term), the court must have regard to— (i) the general principles set out in Schedule 21, and (ii) any sentencing guidelines relating to offences in general which are relevant to the case and are not incompatible with the provisions of Schedule 21. Duty to give reasons for minimum term order or whole life order (4) Where the court makes a minimum term order or a whole life order, in complying with the duty under section 52(2) to state its reasons for deciding on the order made, the court must in particular— (a) state which of the starting points in Schedule 21 it has chosen and its reasons for doing so, and (b) state its reasons for any departure from that starting point.”

15. Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 states: “… 2 (1) If— (a) the court considers that the seriousness of the offence (or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it) is exceptionally high, and (b) the offender was aged 21 or over when the offence was committed, the appropriate starting point is a whole life order. (2) Cases that would normally fall within sub-paragraph (1)(a) include— (a) the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the following— (i) a substantial degree of premeditation or planning, (ii) the abduction of the victim, or (iii) sexual or sadistic conduct. Aggravating and mitigating factors 7 Having chosen a starting point, the court should take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors, to the extent that it has not allowed for them in its choice of starting point. 8 Detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point), or in the making of a whole life order. 9 Aggravating factors (additional to those mentioned in paragraphs 2(2), 3(2) and 4(2)) that may be relevant to the offence of murder include— … (g) concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body.” Submissions

16. Charles Langley KC has provided helpful written submissions on behalf of Mr Forbes. He accepts that a whole life order is the starting point under schedule 21 of the 2000 Act. He points to one significant mitigating feature which, he submits, merits the imposition of a minimum term order rather than a whole life order. That is the fact that Mr Forbes is serving his sentence over 4,000 miles away from his family and friends. They are unable to visit him. That is a far greater punishment than having to serve the same sentence in his home country, and it should be reflected by the imposition of a minimum term order rather than a whole life order. Mr Langley points to Douglas [2019] EWHC 3018 (QB) where William Davis J reduced a minimum term from 34 years to 31 years to reflect that the prisoner had been transferred to the United Kingdom and that there would be additional hardship. At [18] William Davis J said: “It was not Douglas’s choice to be transferred to this jurisdiction. He has no connection to this country. Serving a very long sentence in an English prison will be a hardship additional to the mere fact of the length of the sentence. This must be of significance in determining the appropriate minimum term and the order pursuant to Section 273 of the 2003 Act . The minimum term is intended to reflect punishment and retribution. The punitive effect of serving a prison sentence, particularly one of the length involved in this case, is all the greater if it is to be served in a country far from the offender’s home. I am satisfied that the length of the minimum term should be reduced to take account of that fact. The reduction will not be substantial. The seriousness of the crime committed by Douglas is the same wherever he may serve his sentence with the retributive element remaining the same. But the nature of the punishment is significantly greater given the circumstances in which he now finds himself. For those reasons I determine the minimum term to be served by Douglas as 31 years.”

17. Mr Langley also draws attention to Antar [2022] EWHC 12 (Admin) where May J took the same approach (see at [58]). Whole life order or minimum term order?

18. A sentence of imprisonment for life, with a whole life order, is a sentence of last resort. It is for cases of the most extreme gravity. It is reserved for cases where that is what is required to secure just punishment. In the event of any doubt as to whether that standard is reached, a minimum term order is likely to be appropriate.

19. This case involves the murder of two persons. Each murder involved sexual conduct. It follows that the case falls within paragraph 2 of schedule 21 to the 2020 Act . It further follows that it is a case of a type which would normally be treated as of exceptionally high seriousness. There is nothing about the offence that would justify concluding otherwise. Mr Forbes was over the age of 21 when each offence was committed. It follows that the starting point is a whole life order. Mr Langley accepts that is the case. Mr Forbes has a small number of convictions for minor offences which post-date the murders. We agree with Mr Langley that this is not a significant aggravating factor and We leave them out of account.

20. There are, however, other significant aggravating features.

21. First, in each case the murder not only involved sexual conduct but also, on the findings of the Supreme Court, sadistic conduct. That is reinforced, in the case of Ms Arias, by Mr Forbes’ note (“she died bad”) and the injuries that were discerned at post-mortem in both cases. In the case of both women that finding follows from the nature and extent of the injuries.

22. Second, in each case there was, on the findings of the Supreme Court, a substantial degree of pre-meditation and planning and abduction.

23. Third, in each case the body was concealed. In the case of Ms Arias she was concealed to such an extent that Mr Forbes thought that the police might be unable to find her (“good luck finding this one police”). Mr Langley submits that this was part of the substantial premeditation and planning and abduction. To an extent, we agree, but whether it is considered a discrete aggravating factor, or as part of the premeditation and planning and abduction, it significantly increases the seriousness of the offence both by reason of Mr Forbes’ culpability and the harm he has caused in the sense of additional distress to the families of the women.

24. Fourth, there was a degree of gloating and goading and taunting of the police, which no doubt would have caused great distress to Ms Arias’ family and friends.

25. As against that, Mr Langley accepts that there are no mitigating factors in relation to either offence. There is some personal mitigation. Although not explicitly referenced by the Supreme Court, we would treat Mr Forbes’ previous good character and his difficult childhood as relevant mitigating features which fall to be taken into account when deciding whether to impose a whole life order or a minimum term order. In context, these are not weighty factors. They would not lead to a substantial reduction in the minimum term and they are not capable, in themselves, of making the difference between a minimum term order and a whole life order.

26. We accept the submissions of Mr Langley KC that the circumstances of Mr Forbes’ incarceration amounts to a significant mitigating feature. He was transferred from the Turks and Caicos Islands to this jurisdiction because of prison capacity. Mr Forbes had no say in the matter, and certainly did not ask for or consent to the transfer. The practical effect is that it is much more difficult for his family to visit him. The Turks and Caicos prison service has been paying for his children to make one flight a year to visit him. That will end when the children reach the age of 18. Mr Langley says that the youngest child is not in a position to come to the United Kingdom. It follows that after this year, Mr Langley may not receive visits from his children for many years, if at all. Visits from family mean a great deal to most prisoners, and Mr Forbes is no exception. The ability to talk on the phone is not the same, and even that is compromised because of the time difference. All this means that the experience of custody will be much more difficult for Mr Forbes than would have been the case if he had not been transferred to the United Kingdom.

27. We recognise that this amounts to significant personal mitigation. However, we do not consider it is sufficient to impose a minimum term order rather than a whole life order. First, this is a case which comfortably falls within a category which is recognised as normally requiring, as a starting point, a whole life order. It does so on more than one basis (that is because the two murders were accompanied not just by sexual conduct but also sadistic conduct, and also substantial planning and premeditation). Second, there were substantial additional aggravating features. Third, the mitigating features do not reduce the seriousness of the offences; they amount to personal mitigation. This remains an offence where the seriousness is exceptionally high. Fourth, the reduction to a minimum term order that would be appropriate would “not be substantial” – in Douglas it was 3 years or a little under 10%. On the facts of the present case, we do not consider that it is sufficient, even when taken together with the other mitigation, to make a difference from a whole life order to a minimum term order. Fifth, the mitigating features are outweighed by the aggravating features.

28. For all these reasons, after taking account of the aggravating and mitigating features. A whole life order must be imposed. Outcome

29. We make a whole life order. That means that the early release provisions will not apply. The practical effect is that Mr Forbes will remain in custody for the rest of his life.