Delve Ram v The Commissioners for HMRC

INTRODUCTION

1. Mr Delve Ram (“the Appellant”) applies for permission to make a late appeal.

2. The underlying appeal relates to the issue by HMRC on 17 December 2021 of a Company officer liability decision notice to the Appellant in the amount of £49,200. That followed Concorde Developments Limited, of which the Appellant was the sole director, being issued with a section 69 C Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA94”) penalty on 18 October 2021 in the amount of £49,200 in respect of denied input VAT.

3. By way of brief background, HMRC issued a review conclusion letter on 29 July 2022 containing details of how any appeal could be made.

4. On 22 August 2022, the Appellant sent a Notice of Appeal to HMRC.

5. On 8 September 2022, an exchange of e-mails took place between HMRC and the Appellant’s agent, Mr Mahal. In brief, HMRC explained to the Appellant’s agent that an appeal had to be made directly to the Tribunal and not to HMRC.

6. On 8 September 2022, HMRC returned the Notice of Appeal to the postal address provided by the Appellant’s agent.

7. Subsequent events included HMRC writing to the Appellant on 13 March 2023 warning of the potential enforcement of the liability decision notice through bankruptcy action, offers to settle by the Appellant, correspondence from Mrs Ram to HMRC relating to the health of her husband and the making of a complaint, and correspondence to and from the MP of the Appellant.

8. On 11 January 2025, the Appellant made an application to the Tribunal for permission to appeal outside of the statutory time limits. THE HEARING AND EVIDENCE

9. The hearing of the appeal took place by video at 2pm on 6 November 2025.

10. The Appellant was present with his representative, Mr Kulvarn Mahal. Mr Paterson appeared on behalf of the Respondents. The Appellant did not provide a witness statement but gave oral evidence at the hearing.

11. The Tribunal considered the evidence given and the submissions made at the hearing as well as a bundle of documentation of 244 pages which included the Notice of Appeal of the Appellant and the Objection of the Respondents, dated 29 April 2025, to the late appeal of the Appellant. We considered also additional caselaw provided by the Respondents and the Response of the Appellant. For ease of reference, we will refer to the Respondents as HMRC.

12. In the interests of clarity, this decision relates solely to the application of the Appellant for permission to bring a late appeal. THE LAW

13. In relation to Section 83G (Bringing of appeals) of the VATA94, this states: “(1) An appeal under section 83 is to be made to the tribunal before– (a) the end of the period of 30 days beginning with- (i) in a case where P is the appellant, the date of the document notifying the decision to which the appeal relates, or (ii) in a case where a person other than P is the appellant, the date that person becomes aware of the decision, or (b) if later, the end of the relevant period (within the meaning of section 83D)”. (3) In a case where HMRC are required to undertake a review in accordance with section 83C- (a) an appeal may not be made until the conclusion date, and (b) any appeal is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the conclusion date. (6) An appeal may be made after the end of the period specified in subsection (1), (3)(b), 4(b) or (5) if the tribunal gives permission to do so. DISCUSSION

14. In considering the application for permission to make a late appeal, we were referred to the three-stage test in the case of William Martland v The Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 0178 (TCC)(“Martland”) which concerned an appeal to the Upper Tribunal against a refusal to grant permission to make a late appeal. The three-stage test involves establishing the length of the delay, the reason (or reasons) why default occurred and, finally, an evaluation of “all the circumstances of the case” which involves a balancing exercise assessing the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice (or harm) which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.

15. In relation to the length of the delay in appealing the Company officer liability decision notice, that is approximately 867 days. The appeal period ended on 28 August 2022 which was 30 days after the date of the review conclusion letter. We find that the length of the delay is, indisputably, both serious and significant. We note also that the misdirected appeal (sent to HMRC and not to the Tribunal) was within the appeal period of 30 days.

16. In respect of the reasons for the delay, the Appellant in the Notice of Appeal states that he tried relentlessly to explain his medical circumstances as well as to clarify the financial position and limitations in being able to clear the full balance. At the hearing, Mr Ram explained that he had suffered from a cancer scare, minor stroke and mental health problems all of which impacted upon the delay in bringing an appeal. Mr Mahal stated that he was not familiar with the Tribunal process and the timeframe for bringing an appeal and acknowledged shortcomings relating to the bringing of an appeal.

17. HMRC state that no good reason has been provided for the delay in bringing an appeal. In summary, Mr Paterson sympathised with the health and business problems of the Appellant but emphasised that HMRC generally had allowed additional time to the Appellant in early 2022 by agreeing to not correspond with him until the end of March 2022. Mr Paterson explained that the Appellant had benefitted from the opportunity to appeal at various points in time over a protracted period and only began to address the situation after HMRC began to take steps to pursue the debt.

18. Turning to a consideration of the reason(s) for delay, although we were not provided with any documentary evidence relating to the medical conditions of the Appellant nor to the timeframe of and related treatment for any of those medical conditions, we accept that the Appellant has suffered from medical problems and accept also that this matter would undoubtedly have impacted detrimentally upon his level of anxiety.

19. It is clear that an appeal was sent on 22 August 2022 to HMRC by the Appellant which would have been within the required period of 30 days to bring an appeal if it had been sent to the Tribunal rather than to HMRC. Other than sending the appeal to the incorrect place, we find that the Appellant was aware of how to make an appeal at that point in time.

20. It is equally clear that HMRC made the Appellant fully aware that the appeal should have been sent to the Tribunal (and not to HMRC). The e-mail of 8 September 2022 from HMRC to Mr Mahal provides the address of the Tribunal to which the appeal should be sent and states expressly that the appeal should be sent there. That was not done and no good reason has been provided to us as to why it was not done at that point in time.

21. Subsequent to that e-mail of 8 September 2022 from HMRC to Mr Mahal, almost two and a half years passed before the appeal was finally submitted to the Tribunal in January 2025. An attempt was made to lodge an appeal with the Tribunal on 3 November 2024 but it was rejected because it was unsigned. Even had it been submitted correctly at that point in time, it would still have been approximately 26 months out of time.

22. Notwithstanding the health issues of the Appellant and any settlement negotiations that took place between the parties, we find that the timeframe in which to bring an appeal and the process for doing so was clear to the Appellant in early September 2022 at the latest. We find that no good reason has been provided by the Appellant for failing to bring an appeal much earlier.

23. We then carried out an evaluation of all of the circumstances of the case and, whilst recognising that not granting permission to bring a late appeal would prejudice the Appellant and prevent the Appellant from bringing an appeal, we recognise the prejudice that would be caused to HMRC in having to defend the appeal, the importance of compliance with and respect for relevant statutory time limits as well as the need for finality. In this case, the delay in seeking to bring an appeal is one of several years and no good reason for such a delay has been provided.

24. In relation to the prospects of success of the Appellant, HMRC maintain that the prospects of an appeal are weak. HMRC have emphasised that the Appellant was the sole director of Concorde Developments Ltd at the time of the relevant actions of the company that caused the penalty to be charged and state that the Appellant did not make any representations as to whether or not he should be personally liable to pay the section 69 C penalty.

25. We have taken into account the comments (at paragraph 46 of the Martland case ) as to not embarking upon an investigation of the merits and we have not done so. To the limited extent that we have considered the merits of the appeal, at first blush the grounds of appeal do not appear to be strong.

26. In relation to the third stage of the Martland test (evaluating the circumstances of the case), there were conflicting decisions in respect of part of that stage at the time of the hearing in light of the case of Medpro Healthcare Limited (1) and Kalvinder Ruprai (2) v HMRC [UKUT] 00255 (TCC) . In short, the approach taken in the Medpro case was that when considering a late appeal particular weight need not be given to the importance of complying with directions and time limits and the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently. That was a less strict approach that the one taken in the Martland case . At the time of the hearing, we followed that less strict approach in respect of considering the application of Mr Ram. That said, we find that whether or not a less strict approach was taken would have made no difference whatsoever to the decision that we have reached.

27. We refuse the application for permission to make a late appeal.

28. Subsequent to the date of the hearing and the provision of a summary decision in relation to the Appellant’s application, the Court of Appeal on 19 January 2026 ( HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd & Ors ) has now confirmed that the [2026] EWCA Civ 14 Martland guidance is appropriate. DECISION

29. We refuse the application for permission to make a late appeal. RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

30. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 12 February 2026