E.ON UK Plc & Anor v Safe Hosts Internet LLP & Ors

1. I have before me an application notice of 5 December 2025 by the Second Claimant to Controlled Goods, being 4ON 365 Limited, which I will call “4ON” for, effectively, directions to be made by the Court that various goods, which I will call “the Swedish goods”, be released by the High Court Enforcement Officer, Mr Christopher Badger, to them on a particular basis.

2. Essentially, 4ON contend that the Swedish goods do not belong to the Judgment Debtor, but rather to them. They contend that the Swedish goods are required, urgently, in order to satisfy the provisions of a contract, which they have entered into with another entity, called MIS , which is owned or controlled by a Mr James Innes , and whereunder that contract they are to provide the Swedish goods to MIS for the purposes of MIS to use in terms of to fulfil a substantial contract in Sweden.

3. 4ON contend that, not only are they becoming more and more exposed to potential damages claims from MIS for failing to provide the Swedish goods to MIS , but also that there is a substantial risk that there will be some set of contractual terminations, which will result in them losing the benefit of the valuable contract with they have with MIS , and may also involve MIS suffering very substantial damage, and possibly even losing the benefit, or part of the benefit, of the contract which it has with entities in Sweden.

4. They contend that this matter has become very urgent indeed, and that I should make the directions sought now.

5. They say that they are prepared to pay an amount of £35,000 into court by way of safeguarding the rights of other parties, and also that 4ON will give an undertaking in damages to compensate other parties for any loss which they may suffer, as a result of this order, which the Court may subsequently consider that they ought to pay. The £35,000 being, effectively, a fortification of that undertaking.

6. They further contend that, on the evidence before the Court, the Swedish goods are worth substantially less than £35,000. They contend that, in all the circumstances, this is the just and convenient way to proceed and that, in circumstances where they have, they would contend, a very arguable case to ownership of the relevant assets, the balance of convenience and other principles for exercise of relevant discretions, all favour the order which they seek being granted.

7. The application is opposed by E.ON UK Plc and Npower Commercial Gas Limited, who I will call, for convenience, “E.ON”, appearing before me today for the first time by Miss Millar of Counsel; 4ON being represented by Mr Adekoya of Counsel.

8. Miss Millar has only very recently been instructed. other Counsel have been engaged by E.ON to deal with the case previously, but the fact that this hearing has been listed for 2 January has resulted in E.ON having to find alternative counsel.

9. She submits that, while her clients do not oppose the concept of release of the Swedish goods in principle, they should be given an opportunity to obtain a valuation themselves of the Swedish goods and to enter into negotiations, or make submissions, if their valuation differs from the that produced on behalf of 4ON.

10. They say that, effectively, I should give them two weeks to produce such a valuation and consider listing some further hearing, should the parties then be unable to reach agreement, in the light of it.

11. The High Court Enforcement Officer, Mr Badger, appearing in person for himself, takes a neutral position. He has raised a point to say that these particular assets have something of a rarity, and would not be the type of assets which would be sold at auction, that being the usual process under schedule 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and The Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013. But he takes a neutral position and has not made any particular submission as to what is, or might be, the value of these particular assets.

12. Miss Millar further submits that this case and application does not have the urgency which 4ON says that it has, and that the likelihood of important contracts being lost, if there is even only a very short delay, is not sufficiently evidenced on the material before me.

13. The context of all this is that E.ON has obtained a substantial judgment against the Defendant to these proceedings, Safe Hosts Internet LLP, and obtained a Writ of Control, in order to enforce that judgment. That resulted in Mr Badger, as the High Court Enforcement Officer, through his High Court Enforcement agents, attending at Safe Hosts’ premises in Cheltenham, where they seized substantial quantities of goods and equipment, principally various electronic equipment. That took place on 27 January 2025.

14. 4ON and another entity having made claims to ownership of various of those seized goods, Mr Badger issued an application seeking directions from the Court of 7 March 2025.

15. That resulted in a number of different hearings taking place, including on 20 May 2025, when I made various directions for a trial to take place as to ownership of the various goods which were in dispute.

16. In paragraph 5 of my order, I made the usual encouragement of the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution; and in relation to which, I understand, certain steps have taken place, but without any ultimate agreement.

17. In paragraphs 13 to 15, I made a provision that the parties might agree a valuation, or agree to jointly instruct a valuer to carry out a valuation, and that, if such took place, the goods would be released on payment of the amount of value attributed to particular goods by such a valuer.

18. I further provided that, if the parties were unable to agree a valuer, then either party might apply to the Court for further directions.

19. Those particular provisions have never been taken up by the parties.

20. What did happen was that a trial commenced with regards to ownership in August 2025. The time estimate for the trial proved to be inadequate.

21. That resulted in 4ON making an urgent application, in August 2025, for the release of various goods (which included the Swedish goods) based on an historic valuation, which historic valuation was only supplied to E.ON a short time before the relevant hearing.

22. In the circumstances of E.ON then contending that they had not had enough time to investigate valuation or to respond, I had to deal with the matter on a very ad hoc basis. I came to the conclusion that, in circumstances where 4ON were not prepared to provide certain undertakings and to pay an amount into court of £150,000 which I regarded, on any basis, at that point, as being a figure which must cover the value of all the assets of which release was sought, I would not make any Release Order at that particular point.

23. It seems to me that I was then there simply dealing with an ad hoc situation; being one where the party against whom the order was sought, effectively E.ON, had not had sufficient or proper time to react to the material which was being advanced by 4ON. I decided to fashion a solution which would protect E.ON on any basis, and to not make the order when it turned out that that solution was not acceptable, on that date, to 4ON.

24. It does not seem to me that I what I did in August 2025 was, in any way, laying down any final determination as to the terms upon which the Court might direct any particular goods to be released. It was simply dealing with that particular situation, in those particular circumstances, where 4ON advanced a valuation to which E.ON, it seemed to me then, had not had proper time to react.

25. Nonetheless, the fact that 4ON were taking that approach at that point in time, seems to me should have set some sort of marker, as far as E.ON was concerned, assuming E.ON was behaving reasonably, that 4ON would be, or would potentially be, seeking release of the goods and that 4ON had a particular valuation of them in mind.

26. It further seems to me, generally, that E.ON must, if E.ON had been acting reasonably, have been considering throughout this dispute as to what the goods were worth. Otherwise, there would not, at first sight, be a good reason for E.ON either to be contesting ownership; and, further, and perhaps more importantly, it would not be possible for E.ON to carry out any sensible alternative dispute resolution process unless it had in its own mind, presumably supported by some form of expert evidence, a set of values to apply to the particular goods which it was seeking to continue to have seized as part of this litigation.

27. The trial then continued to further hearings in November of this year, when I heard all the evidence, but had, as again the result of time estimates being exceeded, to make a set of directions for written submissions to be provided, so that I could come to an appropriate reasoned judgment, having heard the submissions of all the parties. That written submissions process is only due to be completed by 12 January 2026.

28. As a result, although I have heard the evidence in the trial, I have not heard all the parties’ submissions, and have not gone through the process of seeking to arrive at a reasoned judgment.

29. It seems to me that the consequence of the litigation being in that particular state, is that I should simply proceed, in terms of the matters before me, on the basis that both side’s contentions are reasonably arguable, and that both sides (E.ON and 4ON) have reasonable real prospects of success, and that each side has something of a good arguable case. To go any further than that would, it seems to me, involve my potentially subverting the trial decision process and no party has sought for me to do so.

30. 4ON, however, took the position that there is, and was, such urgency that they should continue to seek to have goods released, including the Swedish goods. It is the Swedish goods which 4ON say, in the evidence before me, are essential for the Swedish contract.

31. 4ON have instructed a Mr Lee Baldwin of an entity, AMS, who is, amongst other things, a valuer, and who had been previously engaged by Mr Badger to dispose of various of the seized goods which were not the subject matter of third party claims, to carry out valuations. Mr Baldwin on 31 October 2025, provided an emailed valuation of the goods which are the subject matter of the trial, that is to say of all the goods of which 4ON is claiming ownership. Mr Baldwin stated in an email that, having reviewed information and gone back through pictures taken on site, on the basis of a sale between a willing buyer and a willing seller, being a sale where the buyer was to remove the goods from the premises at their expense rather than seek to use them in some operation conducted on the premises, Mr Baldwin regarded the value of the goods as being £30,000.

32. That valuation was of goods which include the Swedish goods, but extends to goods other than them. That valuation does not attribute any particular amount to any particular item, and in no way seeks to split the values between the Swedish goods, that is goods required for the Swedish contract, and other goods.

33. On 2 December 2025, 4ON’s solicitors wrote to E.ON’s solicitors, to say that they required the assets currently held in order to fulfil the Swedish contract, provided a copy of the AMS valuation report, and stated that they were prepared to pay £35,000 into Court in return for the release to 4ON of all of the assets, such payment of £35,000 to abide the Court’s decision as to ownership. They pointed out that £35,000 was more than Mr Baldwin’s valuation of £30,000, and also that Mr Baldwin’s valuation might have included other assets which had been sold in the meantime.

34. They went on to say: “ If you disagree with the above summary, or with the independent valuation provided by AMS, whom your clients have previously relied upon, we request that you provide evidence of the assets value from and independent third party. ”

35. They went on, in their letter, to refer to the urgency, which they said existed, and sought a response with two or four days. No response was forthcoming at that point.

36. 4ON then took steps to try and have a hearing listed, although seemingly without engaging E.ON’s solicitors.

37. On 10 December 2025, 4ON wrote further to E.ON’s solicitors, effectively repeating what had said before, referring to their previous letter, and saying: “ In that letter, we invited you to provide an independent valuation of the controlled goods if you disagreed with the valuation of £30,000, provided by AMS in October 2025. We repeat that request again here, namely to provide our client with written details of any independent valuation you have received for the controlled goods based on their auction value ex situ . ”

38. They said that this was the second time they had made that request, and they wanted to know what it was being said would need to be paid into court so that the goods could be released for the purposes of the Swedish contract.

39. Again, no reply was immediately forthcoming.

40. 4ON then persuaded me to list a hearing for 23 December 2025, and notified E.ON of that on 15 December 2025, by an email, again referring to what they said was the urgency. E.ON responded by seeking an adjournment, but the hearing, nonetheless, took place on 23 December 2025.

41. There, I heard detailed submissions from Counsel for 4ON, Mr Adekoya, and from the solicitor for E.ON, Mr Robinson. The hearing had been listed urgently, and only for a relatively short time. It seemed to me to be appropriate to grant an adjournment for a short period. Firstly, because the parties did not fully finish their submissions and, secondly, because a number of queries had been raised which, it seemed to me, could usefully be sought to be resolved by further evidence over a short adjournment. I made an order accordingly, to which I will revert below.

42. There was further present at that hearing, Mr Innes , of MIS , who stated to me, somewhat passionately, that his company was suffering considerable difficulties and was under great commercial pressure, as a result of the delay in the release of the Swedish goods for the Swedish contract.

43. I adjourned the matter to today at 3.00pm on 2 January 2026. I provided for 4ON to produce a number of elements of material. Some of that material related to the question of what was the subject matter of Mr Baldwin’s valuation. The material provided semes to me makes relatively clear that the valuation extended to both the Swedish goods and other goods; and no party has taken any point with regards to that.

44. What I also directed was that 4ON should specify what are the Swedish goods, namely the goods which they sought to have released for the purposes of the Swedish contract. 4ON have done that, and have further made clear that what they are really seeking, on this application, is the release of the Swedish goods, namely those particular identified goods, and not other goods which fall within Mr Baldwin’s valuation.

45. Further, I sought evidence from both Mr Innes and Mr Gibbins, the controller of 4ON, as to what is precisely said to be the urgency. Witness statements were provided from both of them. Mr Innes’s witness statement indicates that his company is potentially exposed to substantial losses as a result of delay in performance of the Swedish contract, but does not go so far as to state that any other party to it has threatened to terminate the contract or that he, Mr Innes, has threatened to terminate the contract between MIS and 4ON.

46. Mr Gibbins’s witness statement does not refer to any documents relating to pressure put on 4ON, or threats of termination, but does state that he is concerned that 4ON is exposed both to substantial damages remedies, and to possible termination by reason of delay.

47. The witness statements would seem to indicate that there is some importance, under the Swedish contract, for relevant work in Sweden, which work requires this equipment as part of it, to be completed by the end of the first quarter of 2026, and that one would ordinarily expect that work to take in the region of three months from provision of the relevant equipment.

48. Mr Gibbins and Mr Innes suggest that the equipment has to be provided by early January in order for that time requirement to be met.

49. Mr Gibbins further, as directed by me, provided what are 4ON’s accountant-prepared, but unaudited, financial statements to 31 March 2025; 4ON being excused, under Companies Law, by reasons of its size, from having to file audited accounts.

50. Those accounts show a substantial balance sheet, and current assets valued at £1.1 million, including cash of £608,000 and creditors amounting to some £484,000, and net current assets of £646,000, to which a limited amount of fixed assets is to be added.

51. Mr Gibbins, however, went on to say that, although 4ON was prepared to provide an undertaking as to damages should I make the order sought, he was not prepared to provide any personal undertaking. He said that 4ON’s financial statements showed that it was well able to meet any undertaking as to damages, and contended that, for him to provide a personal undertaking, would be unfair and potentially prejudicial to both him and his partner, who he says has a condition of Multiple Sclerosis.

52. In all these circumstances, 4ON, through Mr Adekoya, submits that I should make an order that the Swedish goods should be released to 4ON immediately upon payment of £35,000 into court, and provision by 4ON of an undertaking as to damages. He submits, in particular, firstly, that there is urgency in order to enable the Swedish contract to be performed, and where substantial pressure is being placed upon 4ON, and that every day of delay exposes it both to a damages claim and to the possibility that either the Swedish entities or MIS may decide that enough is enough and that 4ON has, effectively, repudiated its contractual obligations and that such a repudiation should be accepted.

53. Secondly, he further refers me to the damage which Mr Innes says that MIS is suffering and submits that all of this means that the matter is distinctly urgent and the Court should take the unusual course of making, what is effectively, an interim set of orders during the period between completion of evidence in a trial and delivering judgment.

54. He submits that the correct approach is one of applying the American Cyanamid balance of convenience test. He says that, if one looks at the situation where I do not make the order but the Swedish goods turn out to belong to 4ON, that the resultant damage that 4ON, and also MIS , may suffer, would be damage which will be difficult to value at the end of the day and would be very considerable. He submits that in that situation; firstly, damages may not be an adequate remedy at all, and, secondly, the damage may be very substantial indeed.

55. Looking at the other side of the balance of convenience, he submits that, if I do make the order and it turns out to have been wrongly made and the Swedish goods to be owned by Safe Hosts (so that E.ON’s execution over them is valid), 4ON’s and Mr Badger’s resultant damage will be easily ascertainable by a process of valuation, and they will be easily and sufficiently compensated. There will be the £35,000 in court, and also the ability, otherwise, to enforce a financial remedy under the undertaking given in damages by 4ON.

56. He point out that the £35,000 exceeds the total value given to the controlled goods by Mr Baldwin, whom the Court should be regard as being trustworthy both because he has been used by E.ON and Mr Badger in the past, and because Miss Millar stated, in her submissions, that E.ON : “Did not distrust AMS.”

57. Mr Adekoya points to the £30,000 valuation as being of a substantial quantity of goods, which included the Swedish goods, but which also included a substantial amount of other goods; and to the amount proposed to be paid in exceeding Mr Baldwin’s £30,000 total figure.

58. He also points to 4ON’s accounts and financial statements showing that it is a substantial company with substantial assets, and which could meet any shortfall should the true value of the Swedish goods exceed £35,000.

59. He submits that, in all the circumstances, the balance of convenience plainly falls in favour of making the order. He would otherwise submit that, in any event, other discretionary considerations would favour the making of the order, and especially where, in his submission, E.ON have simply failed to get any valuation of their own notwithstanding that they have had very ample time to do so. Mr Adekoya submits that E.ON seem to be taking, a thoroughly non-cooperative attitude, and making assertions about value which are unevidenced, and where the reason why those assertions are unevidenced is because E.ON has simply refused to engage.

60. Miss Millar submits otherwise. She submits that Mr Balwin’s valuation is, effectively, based on historic matters and, although he is not to be distrusted, the Court should place limited weight upon it.

61. She submits that E.ON should be given an opportunity to obtain its own valuation, and has only not yet done so because of the Christmas and New Year period. E.ON would also be prepared to rely on Mr Badger’s efforts to find a valuer, where Mr Badger has found one person who might be able to deal with the matter quickly. Ms Millar says that 10 to 14 days should be given for such a valuation to be obtained and that, once that has occurred, the parties will then be able to further look at the position to see whether they can come to an agreement, and, if not, seek to have the Court fix a further hearing.

62. She submits that E.ON has not delayed; it has simply sought to react to what another party is doing, and where it was only on 24 December that 4ON decided to restrict its application to the Swedish goods, rather than to all the goods.

63. She submits that, if there is a delay, it is unlikely to cause any real prejudice to 4ON or, for that matter, to MIS . There are no letters or emails produced from any party threatening to terminate a contract, and, in the context of the history of this matter, all that E.ON is suggesting is a further limited short delay.

64. She further questions the reliability of 4ON’s balance sheet, which is not audited and which, of course, is as at the end of March 2025. She suggested that. Perhaps, a substantial element of it relates to the Swedish contract which, if E.ON is right with regards to the ownership of the Swedish goods, may not be capable of being performed by 4ON.

65. In all the circumstances, she submits that I should, effectively, make no order at this particular point, but leave matters to develop through a valuation process.

66. Mr Badger, as I have said, takes a neutral position. He says that he has sought to assist E.ON by seeing if he can find somebody who could provide what would be something of a specialist valuation, but that this has been affected by the Christmas/New Year period.

67. He does, however, say, and has said throughout, that his position is neutral. He is, effectively, having to stand in the middle of an argument of ownership between E.ON, who says that Safe Hosts owns the relevant goods, and 4ON which says that it does.

68. I have sought, in this judgment, to summarise the parties’ various submissions, but I have borne in mind everything that has been said to me, and everything that has been produced to me in written or oral form.

69. One question which arises, upon which the parties have spent limited time, is as to what jurisdiction and discretion I have to make a Disposal Order in relation to the Swedish goods.

70. I have borne in mind paragraph 60 of Schedule 12 to the 2007 Act : “ Third party claiming goods 60(1)This paragraph applies where a person makes an application to the court claiming that goods taken control of are his and not the debtor's. (2)After receiving notice of the application the enforcement agent must not sell the goods, or dispose of them (in the case of securities), unless directed by the court under this paragraph. (3)The court may direct the enforcement agent to sell or dispose of the goods if the applicant fails to make, or to continue to make, the required payments into court. (4)The required payments are— (a)payment on making the application (subject to sub-paragraph (5)) of an amount equal to the value of the goods, or to a proportion of it directed by the court; (b)payment, at prescribed times (on making the application or later), of any amounts prescribed in respect of the enforcement agent's costs of retaining the goods. (5)If the applicant makes a payment under sub-paragraph (4)(a) but the enforcement agent disputes the value of the goods, any underpayment is to be— (a)determined by reference to an independent valuation carried out in accordance with regulations, and (b)paid at the prescribed time. (6)If sub-paragraph (3) does not apply the court may still direct the enforcement agent to sell or dispose of the goods before the court determines the applicant's claim, if it considers it appropriate. (7)If the court makes a direction under sub-paragraph (3) or (6)— (a)paragraphs 38 to 49, and regulations under them, apply subject to any modification directed by the court; (b)the enforcement agent must pay the proceeds of sale or disposal into court. (8)In this paragraph “the court”, subject to rules of court, means— (a)the High Court, in relation to an enforcement power under a writ of the High Court; (b)the county court, in relation to an enforcement power under a warrant issued by the county court; (c)in any other case, the High Court or the county court.” I note that it merely provides that the High Court Enforcement Officer may be allowed to dispose of goods, should required payments not be made into court, to abide with the event of an ownership dispute, albeit the Court has a discretion as to whether or not to require such payments to be made.

71. It does not seem to me that paragraph 60 of Schedule 12 or, for that matter, paragraphs 48 and 49 of the 2013 Regulations: “THIRD PARTY CLAIMING CONTROLLED GOODS Application of Part 6

48. This Part applies where a person (“the applicant”) makes an application to the court claiming that goods of which control has been taken are that person's and not the debtor's. Payments into court by third party: underpayments

49. —(1) Any underpayment to be determined by reference to an independent valuation under paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 12 must be undertaken by a qualified independent valuer. (2) Any underpayment determined by the qualified independent valuer must be paid within 14 clear days after provision of a copy of the valuation to the applicant.” really deal at all with the question as to whether or not the Court may, or should, make an order providing for a third party claimant to take those goods on, or not on, any particular set of conditions. The legislation simply seems to be silent in this area.

72. However, I do also have before me Civil Procedure Rule 85.10: “ Directions and determination of claims 85.10 (1) At any hearing of any application under this Part the court may— (a) determine an application summarily; or (b) give directions for the determination of any issue raised by such application; (c) order that any issue between any parties to a claim to goods subject to enforcement be stated and tried, and give all necessary directions for trial; (d) give directions for the purpose of determining the amount of the required payments or any underpayment of the required payments pursuant to paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 12 and regulation 49 of the TCG Regulations; (e) summarily determine the amount of the required payments or any underpayment of the required payments pursuant to paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 129 and regulation 49 of the TCG Regulations10; (f) make directions for the retention, sale or disposal of goods subject to enforcement and for the payment of any proceeds of sale; or (g) make any order that the court considers appropriate. (2) Where a claimant to goods subject to enforcement or a debtor making a claim to exempt goods does not appear at any hearing listed on the application or, having appeared, fails or refuses to comply with an order made in the proceedings, the court may make an order declaring such claimant, or the debtor, and all persons claiming under them, for ever barred from prosecuting their claim against the creditor or any other claimant to the goods subject to enforcement, but such an order will not affect the rights of any other claimants to the goods subject to enforcement as between themselves. (3) Where a claimant to goods subject to enforcement alleges that they are entitled, under a bill of sale or otherwise, to the controlled goods or to the executed goods by way of security for debt, the court may order those goods or any part thereof to be sold and may direct that the proceeds of sale be applied in such manner and on such terms as may be just and as may be specified in the order. (4) Nothing in this rule limits the court’s case management powers to make any other directions permissible under these Rules.” That Rule provides that where there is a dispute about ownership, the Court can make directions for retention, sale, or disposal of goods subject to enforcement and for payment of any proceeds of sale, or make any order that the Court considers appropriate.

73. That Rule, it seems to me, gives me express jurisdiction to make an order of the sort for which 4ON contends. It seems to me that that must be all the more the case where Mr Badger has actually made an application to the Court for directions as to what he should do, and the High Court has a general inherent jurisdiction to deal with what happens under its Writs of Control.

74. In the circumstances of both that general inherent jurisdiction and what appears to be an express jurisdiction conferred by Civil Procedural Rule 85.10, and where no party contends that I do not have jurisdiction, it seems to me I should proceed on the basis that a relevant jurisdiction exists.

75. Mr Adekoya would submit that I also have the jurisdiction under the general injunction jurisdiction provision, in section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 . That may be right, although it seems to me that, if that is correct, then CPR 85.10 is really carrying that general jurisdiction into effect.

76. I next have to consider as to what is the appropriate set of principles to apply in considering whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.

77. Mr Adekoya contends that it is the American Cyanamid approach, which I have already sought to summarise in this judgment, where the Court considers where the balance of convenience lies. If the balance of convenience does not supply an answer to the question, the Court will generally leave the matter as it stands; that is to say, leave the status quo as it is. But the Court will always consider all the circumstances of the case, in considering what is just and convenient to do.

78. Ms Millar, and before her Mr Robinson, did not seek to persuade me that that is an incorrect approach.

79. I am not sure that American Cyanamid strictly applies when applying CPR 85.10, which seems to create its own jurisdiction. But it does not seem to me that that makes very much difference.

80. Whether one is considering what is just and convenient as set out in section 37 of the Senior Courts Act, or what is set out an American Cyanamid, which is effectively an application of the Senior Courts Act just and convenient test, or whether one is simply considering the justice of the case; it seems to me, that one, as the judge, is to apply, in effect, the same approach, and to ask oneself as to whether there is, or there is not, something sufficient in the circumstances of the case to cause the Court to depart from the status quo; and that, when considering that question, the balance of convenience test is a very useful analytical tool.

81. Considering that question, it seems to me that the most material matters for considering my discretion are as follows.

82. Firstly, I need to consider the situation as to what will happen if I do not make the order but it turns out that 4ON would succeed at trial, something as to which I regard 4ON to have a real prospect of success and, indeed, a good arguable case.

83. It does seem to me that the material before me suggests that both 4ON and, potentially, also MIS may suffer very substantial damage in those circumstances.

84. At first sight, there appears to be very substantial potential for them both to be in breach of contract, and potentially exposed to substantial accruing damages. It further seems to me that there is a real risk that someone, be it an entity in Sweden or even MIS , may regard enough as being enough, and that there is a real possibility of there being in the near future a valid acceptance of a contractual repudiation of a contract (between 4ON and MIS, or between MIS and a Swedish entity) which involves the supply of the Swedish goods.

85. However, it only seems to me that there isa real potential of that occurrence, but no more than a real potential. I do have to note, and do take on board, Ms Millar’s points that there is nothing in documentary form to suggest that an acceptance of a repudiation is something which is likely to occur in the next day or so.

86. As far as the damage which would be suffered in such circumstances by 4ON and/or MIS , and it seems to me that MIS would have a real argument that it would be able to pass on any damages claim against it to 4ON, is concerned; it does seem to me that such damage could be very considerable. The contracts are said to be substantial, and there is some evidence that the contract price payable to 4ON would be in the region of £1.5 million, there being an invoice for £150,000, which is said to be 10% of the value of that contract. Therefore, it does seem to me that there is potential for distinctly substantial damage to be suffered by 4ON and by MIS should I not make the relevant order on the hypothesis that turns out (as I have held may well be the case) that 4ON will succeed at trial.

87. It further seems to me that there would be some distinct complications in terms of quantifying the amount of damage which would be suffered in those circumstances, although such would not, it would seem to me, be impossible.

88. Secondly, I look at the damage which would be suffered by E.ON and, possibly, also by Mr Badger, if I do make the order sought and it turns out that E.ON succeeds at trial. It seems to me, that such damage would be readily quantifiable, since it would, effectively, simply be a matter of a valuation process, which would be a matter for valuers. The fact that the valuation process would be of assets in relation to which a valuation process might be slightly unusual, as their value would be very dependent on whether a purchaser could ever be found for them, does not, in any way, suggest that it would be impossible, or unduly difficult.

89. Ms Millar says that it would be impossible for a valuation process to occur properly without the relevant valuers having had an opportunity to inspect the Swedish goods.

90. I can see some limited force in that submission. However, the Swedish goods do appear in photographs, and appear to be of a particular standardised nature. I have some difficulty in concluding that the valuation process would be particularly difficult.

91. In terms of the amount of damage which would be suffered on that hypothesis by E.ON, it does seem to me that Mr Adekoya makes very valid points in submitting that that is likely to be very limited, if any at all.

92. The amount which is proposed to be paid into court of £35,000 is in excess of Mr Baldwin’s valuation of not merely the Swedish goods, but also a substantial amount of other goods.

93. Mr Baldwin appears to be a proper valuer, even if not E.ON’s choice at this point. E.ON themselves have said that they do not distrust him. In all the circumstances, it seems to me, that I ought to be giving substantial weight to Mr Baldwin’s valuation.

94. It does seem to me that Ms Millar is right to point to Mr Gibbens’ witness statement, and to point out that these goods exist in a very specialised market, and that there is a possibility that there is somebody in the market who might be prepared to pay a distinctly substantial amount for them. However, E.ON has produced no evidence at all to that effect. E.ON has further not produced any valuation evidence of its own.

95. While I have borne in mind what Ms Millar has said about E.ON not having been ordered to obtain a valuation previously; it does seem to me that it is very surprising that E.ON has not obtained any valuation evidence of its own in this litigation, which has been continuing for a substantial period of time, and where E.ON has known for a substantial period of time that 4ON says that these Swedish goods are essential for the Swedish contract, and has been seeking to have these Swedish goods released for that purpose. I find it very difficult to see how E.ON could have even sought to engage in ADR process on any commercial basis without, itself, having come to some view as to the value of these particular assets, something for which it says it requires specialist valuation expertise.

96. It further seems to me that there is substantial force in what Mr Adekoya says about E.ON’s failure to respond to the December correspondence, including to say at any point, and certainly initially, that it would not accept Mr Baldwin’s valuation and would want its own valuer. If E.ON was engaging properly in this process, I cannot understand as to why E.ON did not say, “We will not accept what Mr Baldwin says, we wish to have our own valuer, and take urgent steps to find its own.”

97. It does seem to me that this is a situation where E.ON, at first sight, has simply been refusing to engage, and is now potentially seeking to force a substantial financial disadvantage on 4ON, by way of saying that it wants more time for its own valuer to be engaged.

98. In any event, on the material before me, it seems to me that E.ON is unlikely to suffer any great amount of damage if I make the order sought by 4ON, and if it has failed to persuade the Court that there is a substantial likelihood of that occurring, that is E.ON’s own fault by failing to obtain its own valuation earlier, or to react to 4ON’s letters and demands earlier.

99. In all those circumstances, it seems to me that, on a balance of convenience analysis, the balance of convenience, very considerably favours making the order sought by 4ON.

100. If I do not make it, and 4ON turns out to be right, they and MIS will potentially suffer substantial, and, possibly, very substantial, damage, which will be difficult to quantify.

101. If I do make it and I turn out to be wrong; at first sight, E.ON will suffer distinctly little, if any, damage, and will be fully protected by the £35,000 payment and further by what appears to be a substantial balance sheet of a substantial company, which has given a full undertaking in damages.

102. I do need to bear in mind the status quo, albeit that the American Cyanamid test proceeds on the basis that, if the balance of convenience analysis provides a clear answer, the status quo has no real weight. Here, it seems to me that it might have some more weight in view of the fact that the trial process is at an advanced point, and is only awaiting final written submissions and the Court’s judgment.

103. However, I have to balance against that, and which seems to me to outweigh that, the potential urgency in this case where, it seems to me for all the reasons which I have given, that there is very real urgency, in the light of Mr Gibbens’ and Mr Innes ’ fears, and the fact that not making the order would damage not only 4ON, but also another company, MIS , which, it seems to me is, effectively, becoming the innocent victim of a dispute between others.

104. In this context, I note that the Swedish contract and the contract between 4ON and MIS was all negotiated and arranged before this enforcement process started to take place.

105. I have borne all the submissions and material in mind but, it seems to me, that for the reasons which I have given, that it is just and convenient to make the order sought. That is primarily because I regard my consideration of the balance of convenience as leading to that result; but, in any event, it seems to me that when one considers all the matters together, that is the clear appropriate outcome.

106. That is, however, with one variation on what Mr Adekoya seeks. He seeks for the Swedish goods to be released immediately. Having considered Ms Millar’s points on urgency and what I have already said in this judgment, it does not seem to me that the matter is clearly so urgent that the release should take place forthwith, i.e. effectively, tomorrow. It seems to me that it can wait seven days. That will enable, which is a necessary condition anyway, the £35,000 to be paid into court, and also proper arrangements to be made for the collection of the goods.

107. Further, if I grant a period of seven days, it seems to me that that would allow enough time, reasonably, bearing in mind the history of this case, for E.ON and Npower, who are very substantial companies, to pay a valuer to conduct an urgent inspection.

108. Balancing matters together, and where I am having to do what is just and convenient, it seems to me that that is a fair way of dealing with the matter; to provide that collection will only take place following payment of the £35,000 and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties, not before 4.30pm on 9 January 2026.

109. I cannot see that there is sufficient likelihood of sufficient prejudice to 4ON and MIS not to go down that route. But, in view of my considerations as to what prejudice there may be, it does not seem to me that I should go beyond that date. Therefore, I will be making the order on that basis. [Following Ms Millar submitting that the order should provide for E.ON to be able to apply to prevent a release of the Swedish proceedings once E.ON had obtained a valuation of them]

110. Ms Millar seeks for me to give a permission to apply to E.ON to prevent the release of the Swedish goods. I am not prepared to do that; and consider that I should be making a full order for release (subject to the payment in of the £35,000) today. That is primarily for the reasons given above.

111. However, I also note that I fixed this hearing urgently, because I am on leave until sometime at about the end of January. That is a further reason as to why I am not prepared to go down Ms Millar’s route. Not only does it seem to me that that route would be thoroughly open ended in terms of potential for disagreement between the parties and the need to fix a further hearing, but also my own availability, where I am obviously the judge who is appropriate to deal with this matter, means that I would not be able to deal with the matter in mid-January. Ms Millar’s route would increase the risks of and attendant upon delay which I have set out above. I regard this matter as one which, in all the circumstances, I ought to resolve today rather than leaving open potential for my release decision to be undone. 8.4.2026 This Transcript has been approved by the Judge. The Transcription Agency hereby certifies that the above is an accurate and complete recording of the proceedings or part thereof. The Transcription Agency, 24-28 High Street, Hythe, Kent, CT21 5AT Tel: 01303 230038 Email: [email protected]