Leicestershire County Council v FF & Ors

RECORDER WILLIAMS: Introduction:

1. This is an application by the applicant local authority for care and placement orders with respect of two children, AA (“AA”) and BB (“BB”). The application is also for the making of a child arrangement order for CC (“CC”) to live with her father, HH. The proceedings also concerned two elder children, DD (“DD”) and EE (“EE”) but they were made subject to final orders in October 2025. DD is living with his maternal grandmother under a special guardianship order and EE was made subject to a final care order and lives in long term residential care.

2. The five subject children are therefore the following: a) DD age 16 b) EE age 14 c) CC age 5 d) AA age 2 e) BB age 8 months

3. The mother of all five subject children is FF. The father of the eldest two children is ZZ. The father of CC is HH. The father of AA and BB is GG. The allocated social worker in the case is Chris Smith and the Guardian is Ali Khan.

4. All the parties were represented within this hearing by either solicitors or counsel. History of the proceedings:

5. Proceedings were issued in relation to the four eldest children on 6 November 2024. At the time that the proceedings were issued those four children remained living in the care of the mother. BB had not been born at that time but was born during the proceedings. The local authority sought interim removal of the children on issue, albeit did not seek an urgent hearing. The C110A proposed allocation was to Lay Justices.

6. The first hearing was held on 2 December 2024 before Lay Justices. At this hearing interim care orders were granted for all four children, but alongside an order pursuant to s38(6) which kept them in the care of their mother. It is unclear from either the order or the facts & reasons (229) whether this was an order made by consent or otherwise. It matters little. The case was reallocated to DJ Jones who has undertaken all hearings thereafter.

7. The second hearing was held on 19 December 2024. On this occasion the case was timetabled forward to an IRH to take place in June 2025 following assessments and all parties filing final evidence. At this hearing the court gave permission for the instruction of an ISW, Amy Baxter, to ‘ undertake a sexual risk assessment of GG’ . This assessment was deemed to be necessary and was to be on a jointly instructed basis.

8. The third hearing was held on 11 March 2025. This hearing followed the local authority making a C2 application (261) for PETH testing and hairstrand testing of HH. At the hearing the local authority also appears to have sought a protective capacity assessment of the another against the risk assessed by Ms Baxter in the ISW assessment previously ordered. The application for testing of HH was refused and the local authority’s application in relation for a further assessment by Ms Baxter was adjourned until a hearing on 27 March 2025.

9. Since the ICOs were made a safety plan was in place that prohibited GG from being present at the property whilst the mother cared for the children. That safety plan was dated 2 December 2024 (1920) and included the following relevant matters: ◦ That the mother wouldn’t drink alcohol whilst the children were in her care. The mother was to inform the local authority if she drank alcohol with the children in her care. ◦ That the mother would have no contact with GG whilst the children were present. ◦ GG would also have no unsupervised contact with the children and any contact would be supervised by the local authority. ◦ That GG would not reside at the family home and would not visit the family home at any time. ◦ That the mother would ring members of her support network if she was struggling to care for the children. The support network did not include GG.

10. The relevance of this safety plan was that prior to the FCMH listed on 27 March 2025, the local authority on 20 March 2025 applied for the immediate removal of the children from the care of the mother (289). A statement from a team manager, Mary Battle (659) accompanied this application and detailed that GG had been observed leaving the family home in breach of the safety plan. A hearing took place on 27 March 2025 at which the local authority (supported by the Guardian) sought removal of the children from the care of the mother. The application was opposed by the mother and GG, albeit GG accepted that he had attended the family home on three occasions ‘due to being concerned about his wife’s wellbeing’ . However, he denied living in the family home as alleged by the local authority (329).

11. DJ Jones approved the removal of the children from the care of the mother and them being placed into foster care. The application for a protective carers assessment by Ms Baxter was also approved at this hearing.

12. An IRH took place on 3 July 2025 at which the case was listed for a final hearing on 20-24 October 2025. BB had been born some four days earlier on 30 June 2026 and was placed into foster care alongside AA under an interim care order. GG had applied for a programme of intervention by the Lucy Faithful Foundation, but this was refused. The local authority was pursuing final orders that didn’t see any of the children return to the mother’s care. Further evidence was ordered to be filed with respect of BB.

13. On 17 October 2025 the parties collectively applied to adjourn the final hearing that was due to commence on 20 October 2025. The application to adjourn was made on the basis that Amy Baxter was unable to attend the final hearing due to a ‘medical issue’ (403). The application was heard on the first day of the final hearing and the recital to the order provides that (412): The court and the parties agreeing that the court should consider the evidence of A Baxter before making final orders in relation to the three remaining children.

14. The proceedings for DD and EE were able to conclude on 21 October 2025 with the court making the special guardianship order for EE and the final care order for DD. The mother didn’t oppose the making of these final orders. The court also within this order approved an interim plan of CC moving to live with her father, HH and changing school to a school near to his address. A reduction in the mother’s contact with CC was also agreed at this hearing.

15. The case management order of 21 October 2025 re-listed the final hearing for the five days before me, together with provision of a pre-hearing review. There was no provision within that order for there to be further assessment of the mother and GG. There is a notable recital to that order in the following terms (413): The local authority having indicated that it will use its best endeavours to make any appropriate referrals for work that the parents can undertake pending the final hearing, however it asserts that the specific recommendations for work in respect of sexual risk and protection, made by Amy Baxter are outside the time scales for the proceedings.

16. This recital is notable because it clearly rebuts any suggestion that there could be any further assessment as the local authority’s clear view was that any such changes would not be within the timescales for the proceedings. Updating final evidence was also filed to be ordered in advance of this hearing, including from the guardian.

17. This was the seventh case management order within these proceedings. A further hearing then took place on 5 December 2025 when GG again sought to have an assessment by the Lucy Faithful Foundation. The application (419) itself is dated 25 November 2025. Within that application (425) GG through his solicitors sought to argue that it was necessary for ‘a plan of intervention work with both parents’ regarding sexual risk. The assessment was sought to include a report to consider ‘their motivation and engagement with the intervention.’ Specifically, the work was sought so that the organisation could provide ‘their own observations regarding any level of risk posed by the Second Respondent and the First Respondent’s ability to protect from any risk identified.’

18. Of further relevance within that application is the following paragraph (426): ‘Amy Baxter also concludes that any intervention with the Second Respondent would need to be undertaken when he is not in denial. Amy Baxter did not identify any perpetrator programmes that work with people in denial. She disregards a resolution style intervention because there is no in her view a robustly suitable protective network.’

19. This application was adjourned generally by DDJ Demosthenous on 5 December 2025 (450). The order includes a recital that sets out that the court was concerned about the lack of current information in support of the application and if the application was to be pursued ‘it should be properly constituted and contain updated information relevant to the issues.’

20. The final case management hearing (the ninth) occurred as a pre-hearing review on 24 February 2026. On this occasion the local authority was ordered to file and serve a schedule of allegations setting out agreed findings and those in dispute. GG was ordered to update his application for work via the Lucy Faithful Foundation. Ms Baxter continued to be warned to attend the final hearing but an updating report from her was outstanding.

21. An updating composite schedule of findings was filed on 26 February 2026 and I will consider this in detail below. The parties’ positions

22. The local authority within its final evidence seeks for the court to make final care and placement orders for AA and BB. It seeks to place them in adoptive placements. The care plans filed with the final evidence are silent about the two children being placed together, however there is agreement to look for an adoptive placement that agrees to ongoing parental and sibling contact.

23. The local authority proposes a final child arrangement order for CC to live in the care of her father. The local authority suggested that the mother’s contact remains every four weeks and is subject to a child arrangement order. The local authority supported the making of a live with order to JJ, who is HH’s current partner so that she could also share parental responsibility. No application was made for a supervision order for CC, with the local authority agreeing to keep a child in need plan open for a period of three months.

24. The mother opposes the making of final care and placement orders for AA and BB. She seeks the return of both children to her joint care with GG, or for there to be further assessment of their ability to care for the children. The mother did not oppose the making of a child arrangement order for CC to live with her father, but did oppose a joint order with JJ. The mother sought for her to have contact with CC every four weeks and for this to be supported by a spend time with child arrangement order.

25. HH sought a child arrangement order in his favour to care for CC. He also sought for there to be a child arrangement order in favour of his partner, JJ which would give her parental responsibility. HH sought for the mother’s contact to be reduced to every six weeks, rather than every four weeks. He agreed that there should be an order that required such contact to take place. He understandably took no position in relation to the two other children who were not his own. He did however seek for there to be no direct contact between GG and CC.

26. GG agreed at the outset of this hearing that he would not have any contact with CC without the written consent of HH, this however would not include any indirect communication between him and CC that was included in the mother’s communication. GG like the mother opposed final care and placement orders with respect of AA and sought that they either be placed back in their care, or that there be further assessment of their ability to care prior to final orders being made.

27. The Guardian supported the making of final care orders in respect of both AA and BB. He didn’t support any further assessment of either parent before such orders were made. Within his evidence he supported there being contact orders for sibling contact under any placement order, but not for the parents. The guardian supported CC being placed in the care of her father but did not support a joint child arrangement order including JJ. He supported a reduction in the frequency of mother’s contact to four weekly with further reductions in the event that the mother was inconsistent.

28. There were of course minor adjustments to these positions during the hearing which I will consider in detail below. Legal position

29. CC, AA and BB’s welfare needs are my paramount consideration as per s1 Children Act 1989 . I am required by s1(2) of that Act to the general principle that any delay in determining the question of a child’s welfare is likely to prejudice the welfare of that child.

30. In determining an application under s31 Children Act (as I am here) I am required to have particular regard to the matters set out within the welfare checklist. For the avoidance of any doubt these are: a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question.

31. In determining an application for a placement order I have to also consider the slightly different welfare checklist within s1 Adoption and Children Act 2002 . For the avoidance of doubt these are: a) the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding), b) the child’s particular needs, c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person, d) the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant, e) any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, f) the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any other person in relation to whom the court considers the relationship to be relevant, including— i. the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, ii. the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs, iii. the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.

32. The cessation of the relationship between a child and its birth parent is the subject of several cases in the Supreme Court and many within the Court of Appeal. These decisions emphasise the draconian nature of the order that is being made and the overwhelming welfare reasons that must be present before an order could be regarded to be necessary and proportionate. The cases emphasise that Article 8 of the Human Rights Act is clearly invoked given the considerable interference such an order would have on the child’s right to a family life.

33. Further to the welfare checklist within s1 Children Act 1989 is what is commonly known as the no order principle. That being as per s1(5) CA 1989 that Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Act with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all.

34. It is important to emphasise that the test for making most private law orders is not whether such an order is necessary and proportionate (it clearly is for care orders & placement orders) but instead whether it is in the child’s best interests and whether it is better than to make no order at all.

35. The factual basis upon which welfare decisions are made is sometimes incredibly relevant. The seminal case with regards to this is the case of Re A [2015] EWFC 11 and the decision of Sir James Munby. Within that decision he says the following: a) It is for the local authority to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the facts upon which it seeks to rely. It is for the local authority, since it is seeking to have A adopted, to establish that “nothing else will do” (para 4) b) … the local authority, if its case is challenged on some factual point, must adduce proper evidence to establish what it seeks to prove. Much material to be found in local authority case records or social work chronologies is hearsay, often second- or third-hand hearsay. Hearsay evidence is, of course, admissible in family proceedings. But, and as the present case so vividly demonstrates, a local authority which is unwilling or unable to produce the witnesses who can speak of such matters first-hand, may find itself in great, or indeed insuperable, difficulties if a parent not merely puts the matter in issue but goes into the witness-box to deny it. ( para 9 ) c) The schedule of findings in the present case contains, as we shall see, allegations in relation to the father that “he appears to have” lied or colluded, that various people have “stated” or “reported” things, and that “there is an allegation”. With all respect to counsel, this form of allegation, which one sees far too often in such documents, is wrong and should never be used. It confuses the crucial distinction, once upon a time, though no longer, spelt out in the rules of pleading and well understood, between an assertion of fact and the evidence needed to prove the assertion. (para 10)

36. Further to these points are matters raised by the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 . Within that case the court expressly endorsed the interpretation of Butler-Sloss LJ in Re M & R [1996] 2 FLR 195 when she said the following: "[Counsel's] point was that if there is a real possibility of harm in the past, then it must follow (if nothing is done) that there is a risk of harm in the future. To our minds, however, this proposition contains a non sequitur. The fact that there might have been harm in the past does not establish the risk of harm in the future. The very highest it can be put is that what might possibly have happened in the past means that there may possibly be a risk of the same thing happening in the future. Section 1(3) (e), however, does not deal with what might possibly have happened or what future risk there may possibly be. It speaks in terms of what has happened or what is at risk of happening. Thus, what the court must do (when the matter is in issue) is to decide whether the evidence establishes the harm or the risk of harm. We cannot see any justification for the suggestion that the standard of proof in performing this task should be less than the preponderance of probabilities. Were such a suggestion to be adopted, it would mean in effect that instead of acting on what was established as probably the case, the court would have to act on what was only possibly the case, or even on the basis of what was probably not the case."

37. Within her judgment in Re B, Baroness Hale explains the rationale for these principles in these terms: To allow the courts to make decisions about the allocation of parental responsibility for children on the basis of unproven allegations and unsubstantiated suspicions would be to deny them their essential role in protecting both children and their families from the intervention of the state, however well intentioned that intervention may be. It is to confuse the role of the local authority, in assessing and managing risk, in planning for the child, and deciding what action to initiate, with the role of the court in deciding where the truth lies and what the legal consequences should be. I do not under-estimate the difficulty of deciding where the truth lies but that is what the courts are for."

38. The cases also remind the court of several other significant legal principles when it comes to the welfare balance: a) That the passing of the s31 threshold is not an automatic invitation for the court to go on to make a public law order. The passing of threshold only opens the door to the making of such orders, the court has to then balance the welfare of the child and decide what order is in the child’s best interests; b) That the court is required to undertake a holistic analysis of all of the realistic options, weighing up the positives and negatives of each option as part of its conclusion; c) That the court should only make care and placement orders for a child where such orders are necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances of the case and such a care plan should only be endorsed where ‘nothing else will do’ and as ‘a last resort in exceptional circumstances’ d) ‘It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing’ – YC v UK (2012) 55 EHRR 967 ; e) ‘society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent…some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.’ – Hedley J in Re L (2007); f) ‘…but the courts are not in the business of social engineering. The courts are not in the business of providing children with perfect homes …. So we have to have a degree of realism about prospective carers who come before the courts.’ – Munby LJ in Re A 2015 g) The principle has to be that the local authority works to support, and eventually reunite, the family, unless the risks are so high that the child’s welfare requires alternative family care. ’ – Hale LJ in Re C and B (2000).

39. I am acutely aware of the significance of the decision that I am being asked to make for AA & BB in this case. It is rightly emphasised within the dicta of the higher courts to be draconian and when analysing all the available options to me in this case it is particularly notable. There is realistically no other more draconian power that I have as a Judge than the one that I am asked to exercise in this case.

40. Whilst the orders sought with respect of CC are not so significant in their outcome, the same importance about her future life choices are equally important, and require a focus upon the welfare checklist. Threshold

41. There are an astonishing number of attempted threshold documents within the court bundle for this hearing. I have located the following: a) LA interim threshold dated 6 November 2024 (12) b) LA composite threshold, undated (41) c) LA amended composite threshold, undated (79) d) LA final threshold, dated 31 July 2025 (103) e) Final threshold for EE & DD, dated 20 October 2025 (M1) f) LA final threshold, dated 12 November 2025 (116) g) LA updated schedule of allegations, dated 26 February 2026 (M100).

42. There is no dispute that the final threshold in this case is crossed, indeed that was accepted for the purpose of making the final order for DD in October 2025. The agreed final threshold from that date is in the following terms: Physical and emotional harm arising from exposure to domestic abuse a) Domestic discord has been an ongoing feature of the relationship between the First Respondent Mother and the Second Respondent Father GG. b) The First Respondent Mother came into contact with EE on 16/07/2024 when he attempted to intervene in a domestic incident between the First and Second Respondents [SWET C4]. The First Respondent accepts that part of her body made contact with part of EE’s body when he intervened in an argument between her and the Second Respondent. c) Domestic arguments were a feature of the relationship between the First Respondent Mother and the Third Respondent HH. These arguments led to Police call outs on occasions d) Domestic violence was a feature of the relationship between the First Respondent Mother and the Fourth Respondent e) It is likely that the children will be at risk of physical and emotional harm if they are exposed to further domestic incidents between the First Respondent Mother and the Second, Third, Fourth Respondents. Emotional harm arising from exposure to adult matters – in particular mental health f) On 15 August 2024, the First Respondent Mother consumed a large quantity of paracetamol tablets as a cry for help. This resulted in her needing to go to hospital and for her mental health to be explored, [SWET C4]. g) At the time protective measures were taken the First Respondent Mother was not taking her prescribed anti-depressant medication [SWET C17]. Substance misuse h) The First and Second Respondent accept consuming alcohol whilst the children were in their care which could place the children at risk of physical and emotional harm [SWET C4, C6]. Neglect / emotional harm arising from neglect i) The First Respondent Mother accepts she struggled at the relevant date to manage EE and DD’s behaviours and implement guidance and boundaries consistently placing them at risk of emotional harm. Failure to cooperate with social services j) It is accepted that in March 2025, the First and Second Respondents, GG and FF breached the safety plan that had been put in place by the Local Authority to keep the children safe [SWET C5-6; Safety Plan 01.10.24]. k) The first Respondent, Mother accepts she did not inform the local authority about her pregnancy with BB. The mother accepts drinking alcohol during this pregnancy and her other pregnancies with her older children. [SWET in BB’s proceedings page 4]. The mother accepts that her alcohol test results for the period of 19 March 2025 until 15 April 2025 have concluded that the mother has consumed alcohol excessively during this period.

43. There is agreement between the parties that the threshold under s31 Children Act 1989 for the making of public law orders is crossed and indeed this was accepted some time ago. The fact that the s31 threshold is crossed only opens the door to the making of the making of public law orders. I must now consider whether it is in any of the children’s best interests for me to make these orders. CC – Who she will live with?

44. I will deal with my decisions for CC first, predominantly because there is a greater degree of agreement in respect of CC’s position. All parties agree that CC should live with her father HH, and this should be a final order.

45. HH was assessed by Catherine Gamble and her assessment is dated 12 May 2025 (697). This assessment concluded that (710): It is in my professional opinion that after working closely with HH, he can continue to play an important and positive role in CC’s life and offer her a safe and settled home, where she will thrive by having her safety prioritised, identity promoted, and basic needs met within her father’s care. I conclude this assessment is positive and recommends that CC is transitioned into her father’s care.

46. Following this recommendation there was a transition of CC into HH’ care commencing on 12 May 2025 (762). This transition plan aimed to have CC placed in HH’s full-time care by 15 June 2025. This indeed took place (despite it appears the objections of the mother) and by HH’s ‘final statement’ on 20 June 2025 (804) she had been in his care for some five days. CC has been placed in his full care since this date and no party raises any objections as to how well he has cared for CC since this time.

47. The local authority’s updated final evidence says the following regarding CC (905): Since moving into her father’s care, CC has settled well. She presents as happy and content, and observations indicate that she is comfortable and appropriately supported within the home environment. CC continues to attend St Andrews Primary and Nursery School, where she is doing very well. She has settled into the school environment with confidence and ease, showing good levels of engagement across the school day. Staff report that she has formed positive relationships with both her peers and adults, and she is beginning to develop a growing circle of friendships. CC has settled well in her father’s home and has benefited from the stability, structure and predictability provided there. The routines established by HH and supported by his partner, JJ, have helped her adjust to her new environment. The consistency of her daily care, the emotional warmth provided by the adults in the household, and the supportive involvement of her wider paternal family have contributed positively to her sense of security. This has helped to minimise the emotional impact of the move and has supported her in forming stable attachments within her new home.

48. It is entirely obvious and fully within CC’s long term welfare interests for her to continue living with her Father. I heard oral evidence from HH during this hearing and he demonstrated a clear love and dedication towards his daughter. He has demonstrated an ability to meet her needs well over the past 9 months and there is no better alternative where she could live at present. Whilst the mother at one stage suggested that HH should not care for CC (765) her position has changed and now she also supports CC remaining in his long term care.

49. The more contentious issue is whether the live with order should also be made to include the name of his partner, JJ. JJ has been in a relationship with HH for several years. She describes it as being a ‘loving, secure and stable relationship’ (935) within her statement dated 9 February 2026. JJ and HH have been living together since November 2025 when they moved into a property together.

50. It is clear from JJ’ statement (and not disputed by anyone) that she plays a significant role in CC’s daily life. HH works from 6am until 6pm on Mondays to Thursdays. Therefore, JJ is responsible for taking CC to school on these days or to HH’s parents. She also picks her up from HH’s parents until he returns home. She says that she is a point of contact for the school.

51. Within JJ’ statement she says the following which sums up the purpose of her application for a joint lives with order: Because of the amount of time I care for CC, it would be very beneficial for her for me to share parental responsibility. If, for example, she had an emergency during the time that I was caring for her, I would be able to deal with it with no issues.

52. The challenge to this position comes from the mother and from the guardian, who query the benefit to CC of such a shared care arrangement. They make the following broad points: a) That JJ and HH have only been living together for approximately 4 months and it is ‘early days’ in their cohabiting relationship, even if they have been in a relationship for many years. b) That if they separated there could be conflict in relation to who cared for CC or there would need to be separate proceedings to discharge the order made in JJ’ favour. c) That JJ has been able to take CC to medical appointments, opticians appointments and liaise with school to date without any significant issues. Indeed no party has queried her lack of parental responsibility which means that it is not required. d) HH could sign a form delegating parental responsibility to JJ were she ever to require it within an everyday or emergency situation, even in the absence of FF or HH. Such an order is therefore not required.

53. This issue was fully litigated in the hearing before me. Miss Thind asked a number of questions of all the relevant witnesses to seek to progress the argument that JJ should have a joint lives with order, which would grant her parental responsibility. She rightly opposed the suggestion from the Guardian that the test for such an order was a question of necessity. Surprisingly, the order dated 21 October 2025 (411) gives permission for a statement to be filed by JJ setting out why she felt an order was ‘necessary’ when this is not in my view the test.

54. I heard oral evidence from JJ via telephone on the third day of the hearing. She came across in that evidence well. She clearly demonstrated a love for CC and a commitment to caring for her. Her evidence was direct and honestly given. It was clear that she was heavily involved within the care of CC daily and clearly intended to provide ongoing support.

55. JJ accepted that she had not experienced any difficulties from not having parental responsibility to date but continued to think that it was in CC’s interests for it to be shared. She hadn’t discussed or considered parental responsibility before the hearing in October. She hadn’t considered the consequences for the order if she separated from HH because that was not her intention. There was no evidence of mistrust or bad feeling towards the mother. She expressly said that she was not seeking to replace her role with CC.

56. HH gave evidence after JJ, however he was present in person. His evidence made it clear that he trusted JJ to share parental responsibility. They are clearly in a loving relationship and have been for some time, albeit he accepted that he had not lived with her for long. He had not considered the effects of separation from JJ and what would occur in that situation.

57. He was asked to describe the mother’s recent contact and clearly explained a sporadic engagement with recent contact. He was clear that it was important for CC to have a relationship with her mother, however there was a negative effect on CC when the mother cancelled her contact sessions. He described the consequences of a recently missed contact where she had cried all the way home from the library and he’d had to take her to a soft play centre in the afternoon to cheer her up.

58. As for the arrangements, whilst his initial position had been that contact should be every six weeks when I asked him about this, he accepted that the mother had only missed one contact since the contact was at that frequency. He was willing to accept contact being four weekly, provided it could reduce down to six weekly if the mother didn’t engage with that contact. He was equally willing to accept indirect facetime contact occurring in the alternative to direct contact. He gave some helpful further details about how mother should give additional notice for contact if she was running late for whatever reason.

59. Having heard the evidence it is abundantly clear that CC should live with her Father. She has clearly settled well into his care and he is meeting all of her needs. I have no hesitation in making such an order.

60. The bigger question is whether this order should be made jointly with JJ. I agree with Miss Thind that the test for making such an order is not whether it is necessary for JJ to have parental responsibility. The test is that which is set out within s1 Children Act 1989 and is a question of what is in CC’s best welfare interests, rather than whether an order is necessary in some way. I am therefore cautious about the guardian’s recommendation regarding this as his written and oral evidence demonstrates that he has applied some form of inflated ‘necessary test’ within his analysis.

61. However, having undertaken my own analysis I do not believe that it is in CC’s general welfare interests for JJ to share parental responsibility for her. Whilst I accept that making a joint child arrangements order would allow her to exercise parental responsibility, I cannot see any realistic circumstance where that would be required. JJ has been able to provide a significant amount of care for CC without needing parental responsibility. She is clearly trusted at CC’s school without having been awarded parental responsibility. She has also been trusted by other medical institutions without having parental responsibility. She has not been hampered in any way by the lack of a joint lives with order to date.

62. I accept that there are potential examples where there might be an issue. However, for these issues to arise the relevant service would have to raise an issue of parental responsibility and then it would require both HH and the mother to be incommunicado. There is no suggestion that either of them are in poor health or would not be available if required. Whilst HH works, I heard no evidence that in some form of medical emergency for his daughter his employers would not allow him to take a telephone call or attend at medical provision (if there was no other option).

63. Even if such a situation occurred, and HH & the mother were not available, these issues could be simply resolved by HH delegating his parental responsibility to JJ. Whilst I accept Miss Thind’s argument that HH/JJ may not be ‘paper people’ for this instance they could be so. I would note that any court order would be on paper in any event, so if an issue did arise JJ would always need to carry with her a copy of her shared care order, just in case she needed to show she had parental responsibility. This clearly would be excessive in general life, which shows again that the order would offer little.

64. The vast majority (if not all) issues can be resolved by pragmatic engagement with professionals by JJ without HH being present. Those limited remaining issues can be resolved either by HH being on the end of a phone or having written out a delegated form of PR that could be stored by medical institutions or education providers.

65. There are other arguments against the benefit of such an order, but the majority of those require a great deal of speculation. I have no idea whether HH & JJ will split up in the future, I sincerely hope that they do not. Clearly if they did then an issue might arise about what to do with JJ’ shared care order, however this would not be critical, and the reality is that it would probably be forgotten about in the emotion and other practical issues of separation.

66. Having balanced CC’s general welfare needs, the elements of the welfare checklist and most notably the no order principle, I take the view that making a child arrangement order in favour of JJ to allow CC to live with her, would not be better for CC than making no order at all. Ultimately, I do not believe that making such an order provides a sufficient benefit to make it a Joneswhile order in the circumstances.

67. I specifically do not refuse to make this order on the basis of any lack of love or commitment that JJ has shown to CC. She clearly plays a crucial role within her life at this time, but that role is not one that is such that I should order that CC lives with her and she shares parental responsibility. CC – What time should she spend with her mother

68. At the outset of the hearing before me there was a degree of dispute as to how often CC should see her mother. The mother, guardian and local authority were saying four weekly and HH was saying six weekly. HH within his evidence took a pragmatic (and ultimately child focussed) view that such contact could commence on a four weekly basis and only reduce to six weekly if the mother showed a lack of commitment to either direct or indirect contact with CC.

69. Even if HH had not changed his position, I would have made this decision myself. Whilst the mother’s recent engagement with CC’s contact has been sporadic, her contact prior to that and for the other children has been good. There is no lack of commitment for CC that I could perceive by the mother, but rather having moved to HH’s care her focus had shifted to demonstrating a commitment to the other children. With their cases being resolved within this judgment there is a greater opportunity for her focus to be spread more equally.

70. It is in CC’s best interests to see her mother as much as is realistically feasible. I accept that given the long-term plan for CC to remain with her father there needs to be a degree of caution to the frequency. There also needs to be a realism about the geography involved. The mother lives near Leicester and the father lives in Mansfield. The journey to see CC involves the mother getting two trains, including a change of trains in Nottingham.

71. However, if the mother’s commitment to contact becomes consistently poor then a higher frequency of contact will only create a higher degree of harm from them being missed. I take the view that CC deserves the mother having the opportunity to demonstrate commitment to four weekly contact but in the event that this commitment cannot be maintained then it should be reduced to six weekly.

72. I also take the view that to avoid confusion or accidental missed contact, the contacts should be on a set date and at a set time.

73. I therefore make an order for CC in the following terms: a) CC shall live with her father, HH. b) HH shall make CC available to spend time with her mother on the second Saturday of every month from 12pm until 3pm. c) In the event that the mother is not able to attend an in person contact pursuant to paragraph [b] and she informs the father by 5pm on the night before the contact then the in person time shall be replaced with an indirect contact via Facetime. d) There shall be the following conditions of such contact at paragraph [b]: a. The handover location shall be the town centre in Mansfield. b. Such contact will be supervised by an individual chosen by HH (save for that HH shall not supervise any direct contact). c. The mother will confirm her arrival by contacting HH’ father (or any other superviser arranged) when her train to Mansfield is leaving Nottingham station. d. GG shall not attend the direct contact or be present during any indirect facetime calls, except without the previous written permission of HH. e) In the event that that the mother fails to attend (without good reason) either direct or indirect time pursuant to paragraph [b] above on two successive occasions then the frequency of such contact shall reduce to every six weeks. If this is the case then the contacts will take place on the second and fourth weekends of alternating months. Sexual risk posed by GG

74. I move on to consider the final arrangements for AA and BB. It is essential that I deal first with (to use Mr Bowe’s phrase) ‘the elephant in the room’ for this case. It is a fact of this case that there have been five separate allegations by five separate young girls of sexual abuse by GG. These are set out within a schedule within the court bundle (1305) and can be summarised as follows: Date Incident details 2007 GG “snogged” a 7-year-old girl whilst babysitting her and playing a game of “dare”. GG was 17 at this time. GG was arrested and questioned but was not charged. 2007 On a separate occasion, GG inserted his finger into the vagina of a second 7-year-old girl whilst babysitting. This was reported in 2019. GG was arrested and questioned but not charged. 2014 GG inappropriately touched the breasts of a 12 year old girl, the niece of his wife at the time. This was reported in October 2019. GG was arrested and questioned but not charged. The allegation was later retracted but the victim maintains that the report was true and was only withdrawn due to pressure from family members July 2020 GG had inappropriate sexual contact with his 7 year old daughter. His daughter disclosed on more than one occasion that GG tried to touch her private parts and tried to put his willy in her bum. GG was arrested and questioned. Police investigation concludes December 2020, insufficient evidence to progress to CPS January 2021 GG vaginally raped, on at least 5 occasions, the daughter of GG’s partner at the time. GG was arrested and questioned and was placed on bail and was to have no contact with children under the age 18 years. GG was not charged. The allegation was later retracted by MR

75. It is critical to emphasise that these are allegations of sexual abuse, none of these have ever led to convictions or indeed even a criminal charge. The local authority has also never sought to prove these allegations against GG within these civil/family proceedings. No one appears to have ever sought to speak to the alleged victims or to make these allegations anything other than that.

76. The local authority’s threshold documents have set out the basis of fact that they wish to pursue this case under as follows: a) The Second Respondent has had allegations of child sexual abuse made against him. A risk assessment of GG was completed in March 2021 by Nottinghamshire Children & Family Services. The assessment concluded that on the balance of probability, GG poses a significant risk of harm to children. The social worker completing the assessment stated that “the pattern of the alleged abuse also suggests GG poses a risk of intrafamilial sexual abuse towards children as well as to members of the community” (Initial threshold dated 6 November 2024) b) Same paragraph repeated within the composite threshold (37) c) Same paragraph repeated within the amended composite threshold (81) d) Same paragraph repeated within the ‘final threshold’ (104) e) The Second Respondent has had five separate allegations of child sexual abuse made against him. The consistency of these allegations raises a pattern of concern for Ms Baxter. The second Respondent’s lack of insight, failure to acknowledge concerns and the history of multiple allegations means that GG poses a risk of sexual harm to any children, including the subject children and his stepchildren. A risk assessment of the Second Respondent, GG was completed on 9 March 2025 by Ms Amy Baxter. Ms Baxter concluded that the Second Respondent, GG presents a High Risk to children: ‘these allegations [of sexual abuse] do represent a likely pattern of harmful behaviour at worst or a pattern of behaviour that is able to be construed by others as inappropriate at least.’ (Final threshold dated 12 November 2025) (118)

77. GG said the following with respect of the allegations in his first response document (32): The Second Respondent accepts that allegations have been made against him but those allegations are denied, he has no convictions and no findings have been made against him in any previous Court proceedings. The allegations, if to be pursued by the Local Authority must be particularised so that the Second Respondent can respond properly. [He] accepts that a risk assessment was undertaken by Nottinghamshire County Council. The Local Authority have not produced the risk assessment. Further comment will be made once the Local Authority produce the primary evidence they rely on.

78. Despite this there was never an attempt to particularise the allegations at any stage, nor any attempt to prove them as being true within these proceedings. I go back to the sage and crucial words of Sir James Munby in Re A: … the local authority, if its case is challenged on some factual point, must adduce proper evidence to establish what it seeks to prove.

79. I also go back to the equally sage and crucial words of Baroness Hale in Re B: To allow the courts to make decisions about the allocation of parental responsibility for children on the basis of unproven allegations and unsubstantiated suspicions would be to deny them their essential role in protecting both children and their families from the intervention of the state, however well-intentioned that intervention may be.

80. For reasons that I cannot understand there has never been an attempt to either prove these allegations within these proceedings or to remove them from the threshold document. It is simple and uncontroversial law that unproven allegations should form no part of a threshold document, nor indeed a welfare analysis.

81. However, the situation in this case is far worse than this. In this case despite there being no acceptance of the allegations and no attempt at proving the allegations a risk assessment was undertaken on the father based solely on these allegations. At the second hearing in this case (19 December 2024) the court sanctioned an independent social work assessment by Amy Baxter. This assessment was on a jointly instructed basis. The order was made following a C2 application by the local authority on 21 November 2024.

82. The order (251) said the following: The parties are given permission to instruct Amy Baxter, Independent Social Worker, as a single joint expert to undertake a sexual risk assessment of GG.

83. This order was made despite the father had filed a response to threshold setting out that he disputed the allegations on 29 November 2024. It appears that the order was made on an agreed basis, and the C2 application by the local authority specifically says that the application is being made as ‘GG’s solicitor specifically requested an independent expert assessment as opposed to a risk assessment completed by the social worker.’

84. It is difficult to be too critical of the local authority when GG’s own legal team were not raising the inevitable legal issue as to why GG was being risk assessed without an established factual basis for the risk, or even a mechanism as to how that factual basis would ever be made.

85. Sadly, the situation gets worse. Ms Baxter was instructed, and an agreed letter of instruction was dated 16 January 2025 (1229). The letter quoted from a historic assessment of the local authority within which the social worker completing the assessment states that ‘the pattern of the alleged abuse also suggests GG poses a risk of intrafamilial sexual abuse towards children as well as to members of the community.’

86. Despite this the letter of instruction specifically noted (in bold) that GG was not charged for any of these offences and no criminal proceedings have taken place.’ However, the same paragraph went on to say (1301): The purpose of your assessment is to determine whether GG’s profile presents as someone who may have propensity to carry out the alleged acts in the future. Is there any intervention that could reduce the risk, if so the timescales of such work.

87. Despite this under a heading noted ‘Nature of instructions’ the letter told Ms Baxter: You are requested to carry out a Sexual Risk Assessment of GG on the basis that there are no findings of fact made in respect of any past allegations made against him.

88. However, Ms Baxter was then asked (as a formal question): Please assess, if you are able to do so, on the information available whether on the balance of probability, there is a likelihood of GG being a perpetrator of sexual abuse.

89. Having considered this matter there is no clear basis at all as to why the assessment was ordered or how such an assessment could be completed without a factual basis behind it. However the use of this question totally undermines the legal system, it specifically invites the independent social worker to form, on the balance of probabilities, a view as to the likelihood of GG being a perpetrator of sexual abuse.

90. This is a material misunderstanding about the differing roles between social work assessments and determination of a factual basis. It cannot be the social worker’s role, within a set of public law proceedings to determine a factual basis within a disputed case. Even more so when the assessment is meant to be on the basis that there are no findings made in respect of the historic allegations. The whole assessment was undertaken on a false premise.

91. Ms Baxter within her report concluded that GG does pose a high sexual risk of sexual harm based on these unproven allegations. Ms Baxter undertook a detailed risk assessment and provided the following notable conclusions: a) On the balance of probability, it is more likely than not that GG has engaged in sexually inappropriate behaviour. The presence of multiple allegations over time suggests that concerns about his behaviour are not isolated or incidental. While no criminal charges have been brought against him, the consistency of allegations over a period of time suggests a pattern of concern. (1321) b) If all allegations were purely malicious or false, one would expect to see some level of self-reflection or consideration of how to avoid being placed in such situations again. However, GG does not take any responsibility for ensuring his interactions with children are beyond reproach. (1321) c) GG demonstrates little to no understanding or insight into concerns of sexual harm. He does not acknowledge any reason for the allegations beyond attributing them to malicious intent. (1322) d) Based on his lack of insight, failure to acknowledge concerns, and the history of multiple allegations, GG does pose a risk of sexual harm to a child he has contact with, including both his own children and step-children. His inability to reflect on his actions or follow the protective measures put in place previously increases the likelihood that he could place children in unsafe situations. (1322) e) Unfortunately, any intervention would need to be undertaken when GG is not in denial. I do not know of any perpetrator programmes that work with people in denial. Resolutions style interventions where denial is an accepted factor can be successful but only where there is a robust and suitably protective network. (1322)

92. Ms Baxter therefore concludes that GG has on the balance of probabilities engaged in the sexually inappropriate behaviours as alleged, that his denials demonstrate a lack of insight and based on these two elements he poses a high sexual risk of harm to either his children or step-children. In addition to this he cannot undertake any work to reduce his risk because he continues to deny findings that have never been made on allegations.

93. I pause to re-iterate that GG has never been convicted of any of these allegations, never accepted any of these allegations and the local authority has never sought to prove these allegations. On the binary nature of factual matters within a court process they have not occurred. Yet he allegedly poses a high level of sexual harm because of these events. There appear to have been no formal written questions posed of Ms Baxter to seek to challenge her conclusions or any questions of clarification.

94. Sadly, the situation gets even worse than this. Despite the ongoing denial by the father of the allegations the local authority pursued a further assessment by Ms Baxter to assess the mother’s ability to protect against the risk that Ms Baxter had assessed GG posed. This assessment was ordered on 27 March 2025. Potentially unsurprisingly, given the mother disputed the truth of the allegations, this assessment concluded that the mother was not able to protect against the risk posed by GG. Ms Baxter said the following within this assessment: a) FF’s insight into sexual risk, both generally and specifically in relation to GG, is limited. Despite my assessment concluding that GG poses a high risk of sexual harm to children, FF does not accept that he presents a danger and believes the allegations against him are malicious. She has not demonstrated an understanding of how sexual abuse can occur without obvious signs (1361) b) FF has not demonstrated the necessary understanding or awareness of grooming behaviours or the signs of sexual harm. She continues to reject the findings that GG poses a sexual risk, relying on her own view that she has not observed concerning behaviour. This suggests limited insight into how sexual abuse and grooming often occur covertly and without obvious signs. c) Despite clear professional assessments concluding that GG poses a high risk of sexual harm to children, FF does not accept this view and continues to dispute the allegations. d) She does not accept the assessment findings that GG presents a high risk and continues to minimise or dismiss the allegations (1363) e) The timescales for such work would be considerable. Given the depth of change required — moving from denial to acceptance and being able to demonstrate protective behaviours — it is likely to take at least 6 to 12 months of regular and intensive work. This would need to be reviewed throughout to assess whether progress was being made and whether FF was demonstrating sustained change in attitude and insight.

95. Again, no questions appear to have been posed of Ms Baxter following this report and there is not even a reference within the report to suggest that there is an ongoing awareness that the allegations have not been proven. Indeed, the use of the word ‘findings’ appears on a number of occasions within this report, suggesting that the fact that Ms Baxter’s assessment has determined something has led to this being a settled fact within the case.

96. Sadly, the situation continues to get worse than this. Both the local authority’s parenting assessment and their final evidence are riddled with references to Ms Baxter’s assessment and the conclusions that she reached. The parenting assessment of Ms Gamble is dated 19 May 2025, this was an assessment of both the mother and GG. Within this assessment there are repeated references to Ms Baxter’s report including: ‘GG is in denial after being assessed by a specialist as high risk to children. Moreover, regarding the five child sexual abuse allegations made against GG, FF flatly refuse to believe they are true and would not entertain the idea of what if they are true.’

97. The final SWET quotes verbatim from Ms Baxter’s including within the section that balances the realistic options. Indeed, with respect of the analysis regarding the return of the children to the care of the parents the sexual risk is listed as the first ‘factor against’. It is stated specifically that they would be at risk of sexual harm from GG. The final SWET for BB says the following (836): In relation to the risk of sexual harm to BB, although GG has never been convicted, there have been 5 concerning reports made against him of sexual harm to children and these are contained within previous reports and range from kissing to penetration … However, the sexual harm risk assessment completed highlights that “On the balance of probability, it is more likely than not that GG has engaged in sexually inappropriate behaviour.

98. The relevance of this is that this second SWET was undertaken by the newer social worker, Mr Smith. He continued to rely upon the unproven allegations to support his welfare conclusions, as had the previous social worker and the parenting assessor.

99. Sadly, the difficulties do not end there. Prior to an attempted final hearing in October 2025, GG applied for an intervention/work by the Lucy Faithfull Foundation regarding sexual risk. Within a C2 application dated 2 July 2025, GG sought for them to provide ‘a programme of intervention work to be completed with the parents separately. With FF they would provide eight two-hour sessions and with GG ten two-hour sessions. At the conclusion of the intervention, they would provide to the Court a report setting out the parent’s engagement, motivation and what they have learnt from the intervention.’

100. This application was refused at the IRH on 3 July 2025. At the same hearing the local authority was invited to file an agreed threshold document within 3 weeks. Given that the parents were not also ordered to file further responses, no other primary evidence was proposed and GG continued to deny the allegations, this must have been intended to include no findings of sexual abuse.

101. Again however, the difficulties continue. The case was listed for a final hearing in the week of 20 October 2025. Unfortunately, Amy Baxter was unwell in the lead up to this hearing and was unable to attend to give evidence. The case was therefore adjourned until this final hearing to make final decisions for the remaining three children. The recitals to the order say that ‘the court and the parties agreeing that the court should consider the evidence of A Baxter before making final orders in relation to the three remaining children.’ It does not appear that the glaring issue with the evidence of Ms Baxter, nor the lack of factual basis for any allegations of sexual harm appear to have been noted at this hearing.

102. Indeed, another recital to that order said the following: The Local authority having indicated that it will use its best endeavours to make any appropriate referrals for work that the parents can undertake pending the final hearing, however it asserts that the specific recommendations for work in respect of sexual risk and protection, made by Amy Baxter are outside the timescales for the proceedings.

103. There appears within this recital to have almost been a tacit acceptance that the risks set out within Ms Baxter’s report were factually present. Furthermore, GG made a further application for work with the Lucy Faithful Foundation on 25 November 2025. This C2 application was accompanied by a position statement that says the following: The Local Authority have agreed to undertake some work with the parents in relation to domestic abuse but have not identified any work or resource that the parents can engage with to reduce the concerns around sexual risk or increase the First Respondent’s protective capability.

104. Essentially again GG was seeking to undertake work to reduce ‘concerns’ around a risk that he disputed and there was no factual basis for. The application was adjourned by a DDJ on 5 December 2025 to be considered by me again this hearing.

105. Finally, there was a pre-hearing review before this hearing on 24 February 2026. At this hearing the local authority was required to file and serve a final schedule of allegations including those that were still in dispute. That schedule (M96) again specifically did not seek to prove the truth of the allegations, but merely sought to prove the following: The mother’s desire to support and remain in a relationship with GG despite having knowledge of there being five separate allegations of sexual abuse against children against him, took priority over the needs and welfare of CC, AA and BB, with little regard or insight into the impact on the children .

106. On receipt of the papers for this hearing I was concerned to note the significant history above and was alarmed at the layers upon layers of reliance within the welfare decision fundamentally on unproven factual matters. It appeared that the most basic of elements, facts, had been missed within the preparation of this case.

107. I raised this on the first morning of the hearing with the advocates. The local authority confirmed that it was not seeking to prove the allegations against GG of sexual abuse. It was unclear when this decision was made as two of the local authority’s witnesses told me that this decision had been taken in the previous week, even though it had never formed part of their threshold at any time.

108. Ms Meredith maintained this position that it did not rely upon the sexual abuse allegations throughout the final hearing and made no submissions about a risk of sexual harm within her closing submissions. Indeed on the evening of the first day she redrafted the list of findings to particularise other matters which I will consider below.

109. Despite Ms Meredith’s careful advocacy, the same cannot be said of the local authority’s witnesses. Both Ms Gamble and Mr Smith had clearly been impacted both in their written evidence and in their oral evidence by Ms Baxter’s assessment. Ms Gamble went so far as to tell me that she specifically had been ‘guided by the assessment of sexual risk.’ She told me that it ‘did play a big part in her assessment, together with the continual denial of the allegations by GG.’ Within cross examination by Mr Bowe for the father she said the following: a) ‘I couldn’t ignore it [the sexual abuse allegations’] because there are that many allegations from that many children.’ b) ‘I couldn’t ignore it, I couldn’t place a child with someone who had those worries’ c) ‘It is hard to ignore it, what happens if we put them back and then something happened’ d) ‘Of course I took them into consideration, there is no one in this room who could ignore those allegations.’

110. Mr Smith’s evidence was slightly more cautious, however he’d had very limited involvement with the family having taken over the case after the final evidence had been written. He repeatedly referred to the parenting assessment and how it was negative. He accepted that he’d relied upon that assessment and that of Ms Baxter as he’d not done his own investigations. He accepted that the written evidence of the local authority clearly relied upon the sexual abuse allegations as being relevant to the welfare decision. I was struck when he was asked about post-adoption contact with GG, where he was far more cautious about agreeing to it than he was regarding the mother.

111. The Guardian’s evidence was given on the last day and he was again more cautious to avoid referencing the sexual abuse allegations as the basis for his recomendations. However again his final report makes repeated references to Ms Baxter’s report and within the analysis of harm (M77) he specifically says that there is a possible risk of sexual harm.

112. I have set out the history in this significant detail because I accept the general tenor of Mr Bowe’s submission. The allegations of sexual harm are intermingled within all of the welfare analysis of the professional witnesses. The nature of sexual abuse allegations has a particularly stark effect on professionals, entirely understandably given the serious lifelong harm that it can cause. However, it is important to be aware that if those allegations are either not true, or more critically not proven, they cannot be used as part of my welfare determination. I am acutely aware from the papers that this appears to have been exactly what has happened in this case.

113. The un-pleaded and denied allegations have been allowed to fester within this case because of the whole series of decisions that have been taken above. I emphasise again that this is not solely the fault of the local authority in knowing how it puts its case. Criticism must also fall upon the legal professionals within the case, including the instructed solicitors, counsel who have attended the various hearings and those who have sat and presided over hearings. It should not have taken until the first morning of the adjourned final hearing to drill down into how any of the sexual abuse allegations could form part of any welfare analysis.

114. The instruction of Ms Baxter was particularly surprising at a time when there was no admission regarding the allegations. The questions in the letter of instruction are even more surprising. Thereafter the lack of follow-up questions, the instruction of her to do further work about protecting against risk and then the adjournment of a final hearing because of her non-availability are in hindsight very unhelpful decisions. This has led to confusion to the local authority as to what case they are pleading, it has led to confusion for the parents as to how they can demonstrate risk is reducing and ultimately confusion for all parties on what factual basis the court is undertaking its welfare conclusions.

115. I have set out the detail because I want to make it abundantly clear at the outset of my analysis as to final decisions for BB & AA that these sexual abuse allegations have formed no part of my welfare analysis. The binary nature of facts within our legal system means that they are not true. I cannot be satisfied that there is any risk of sexual harm from GG because he has not been found to have done anything wrong. Many people might suspect that he has done, but that is not sufficient for a finding to be made and if it isn’t sufficient for a finding then it cannot be considered as part of the welfare determination. I would have hoped that this was trite law from the case of Re A and many others, but it appears that it has been missed throughout this case. Application for further assessment and adjournment

116. Inevitably, given the situation that has been reached, Mr Bowe made an application within his final submissions for an adjournment for there to be a fresh assessment of both parents. An assessment that would be undertaken on a clear factual basis and didn’t seek to bring in unproven sexual allegations to taint the outcome.

117. GG and the mother ultimately argue that it is impossible for them to have a fair hearing with all the assessments undertaken tainted by the belief that GG posed a sexual risk. This application is opposed by the local authority and the guardian who submit that the evidence is available without the sexual abuse allegations to make final care and placement orders.

118. I entirely understand the reason for the application being made and I would have been surprised had it not been. However, for me to accede to it I would need to consider that it was necessary for there to be a further assessment for me to justly resolve the case. Ultimately, I have a significant amount of information available having heard the five day hearing and I must consider as part of my overall analysis whether any further assessment is necessary to resolve the case.

119. I propose to undertake that analysis throughout the remainder of my judgment. Other factual findings

120. As above there was an agreed basis for threshold at the hearing in October 2025 when the boys proceedings were concluded. The local authority sought additional findings at the hearing before me (M96) and then some further findings beyond those from the morning of the second day. I allowed the morning of the second day for Ms Watkins and Mr Bowe to take instructions on these further particular allegations. Neither sought any additional time after the lunch break and after some consideration neither sought to file a further statement.

121. I will deal with each area in turn. The first relate to further allegations about sexual harm and most fall from the evidence that Ms Baxter gave to the court. I do not intend to make any of these findings, save for one. This is not because I don’t necessary accept the professionalism of Ms Baxter. However for all of the reasons above, she was asked to undertake a task that was not hers to do. She was asked by the parties in a joint letter of instruction to carry out a judicial role, which she did. Within her oral evidence I was surprised that she didn’t see an issue with this, noting that this was often the role that she had to undertake as a social worker.

122. Thus, whilst I make no other criticism of Ms Baxter’s work I cannot rely upon her conclusions given that it is based on an incorrect premise for all of the reasons I have set out above. She was set an impossible task and given inappropriate instructions to undertake.

123. The sole additional finding about ‘sexual abuse’ that I do make is the following: Due to the mother’s lack of insight into any allegations of risks GG poses to the children, the children are at risk of physical and emotional harm

124. This falls under a header of ‘sexual abuse’ but it specifically is not a finding about sexual risk. I heard oral evidence from the mother. She was cross examined at length about her ability to protect the children from any risk that GG did pose. I have set out above that I do not believe that there is a sexual risk evidenced on the facts of this case. However, the mother’s naivety about the mere possibility of risk was incredibly concerning.

125. The mother was aware prior to her relationship with GG that children had made allegations about him historically. She told the court that he had told her this in confidence prior to the relationship even commencing. Despite this the mother made no further enquiries of her own about any potential risk that he may pose, either of a sexual nature or any other form of risk. The mother explicitly told me that she’d made no enquiries, and she didn’t feel that she needed to. She hadn’t even spoken to GG’s ex-partner to get some further information, nor made any police check. The mother showed a total lack of curiosity at the time and during her evidence showed that she hadn’t developed any insight as to why this might be required.

126. Whilst her lack of insight didn’t put the children at a sexual risk, it clearly could have done and put the children at a wider degree of other risks. The mother had a duty to protect the children in her care and her lack of any enquiry placed them at risk. Her ongoing naivety or lack of any curiosity makes this an ongoing risk were the children to live with her in the future.

127. The next few disputed allegations relate to domestic violence incidents, most notably three specific incidents, one in June 2024, another in July 2024 and the final one in March 2025. I heard oral evidence from both parents about these incidents, all of which are covered in police disclosure that is within the court bundle.

128. Dealing first with the allegation from June 2024. On this occasion it is accepted that GG called the police after the parents had been drinking. On this occasion he was holding AA and he said that he was being ‘attacked by his wife’. The limit of the allegation was that the mother had pushed him and sought to take AA from him. The police on arrival record that the mother was ‘intoxicated, very emotional and engaging with officers but then stormed out of the property so she was arrested.’ The police later released the mother and comment that the assault is ‘very minor.’

129. GG within his evidence was clear that this incident had occurred. He was clear that this was precisely how it had occurred, including the boys seeking to separate the two of them. The mother’s evidence on this incident was entirely unpersuasive. She appeared to not remember what had occurred and it was difficult to understand what her case was. She accepted drinking on the evening but disputed being as drunk as suggested by the officers.

130. Having heard the evidence and read the police log I am far more persuaded that GG’s account is accurate, and the mother’s evidence cannot be preferred. Her evidence at best is incoherent on the point and it is far more likely to have occurred as GG suggests. I therefore find that on 08.06.24, GG called the police as there had been a domestic incident between the mother and GG whilst GG was carrying AA. Both the mother and GG had been drinking. DD and EE had to intervene.

131. The next allegation relates to events in July 2024. The previous final threshold in October 2025 was the result of a compromise and said that ‘part of’ the mother’s body made contact with EE when he intervened in an argument between her and GG’. The family were staying in Lincolnshire at the time and the mother was again arrested. During the incident GG reported to the police that the mother had kicked him to the legs and body and had then kneed EE in the groin.

132. Again GG in his evidence was clear that this was an accurate account. The mother again was incoherent in her account about this event. I have no trouble in deciding that GG was more likely to be accurate regarding his account of this event. Notably this was another occasion when the mother’s drinking appears to have caused an argument and then physical violence. I therefore find that on 16 July 2024 when he attempted to intervene in a domestic incident between the Mother and GG the mother, whilst under the influence, kneed EE to the groin causing him physical harm and pain.

133. The third physical abuse allegation relates to events on 17 March 2025. At this time GG was meant to have been excluded from the family home. I will consider the details of this below, however it is accepted that he was at the family home in breach of a safety plan. It is accepted by both parents that DD was refusing to get out of bed that morning even when his transport for school arrived. EE on arrival at school shared that there was an incident that morning where GG grabbed DD by his wrists to drag him out of bed. DD had then apparently been hit in the face by GG causing an injury to his cheek. There is a photograph of the alleged injury in the bundle.

134. DD was seen at school and agreed that he had pulled his leg and not his wrist. DD went on to say that he had been ‘thumped’ by GG but he had not noticed he had a mark and said it ‘ain’t much’. The parents’ account was in general alignment with what the boys had said, save for the final detail. Both accepted there were difficulties in getting DD out of bed. GG went on to accept that he had pulled the duvet off the bed and accepted that he may have accidentally gotten hold of DD’s ankle whilst pulling. He denied that he had pulled him out of bed, or that he had then subsequently hit him. The mother’s account supported GG.

135. Having considered matters there is clearly some limits of the available primary evidence. However, what is clear is that both boys (who had no reason to lie) went into school that morning and clearly told members of staff that something had occurred that morning. There is an inconsistency between them as to whether it was the wrist or the ankle that was pulled, however not much turns on this. Having considered the written evidence and GG’s account, I prefer the account of the boys. I take the view that this is more accurate and that what they both said about being pulled from the bed and then being struck was accurate. I cannot see an injury in the photograph of DD in the bundle and thus this plays no role in my decision making.

136. I therefore find that on 17 March 2025 DD suffered physical harm when he was grabbed by his ankles and dragged from his bed by GG. During the subsequent struggle DD was hit in the face by GG.

137. The final array of disputed allegations relates to the parents’ honesty regarding the caring arrangements in late 2024 and early 2025. Following the incident that I have considered above on 16 July 2024, bail conditions were implemented so that the parents should not have contact with each other, nor the mother care for the children. The mother’s bail conditions were varied to allow her to care for the children again. The safety plan and bail conditions remained to prevent GG having contact with the children. Indeed, GG spoke to the social worker on 15 August 2024 to say he wanted no further involvement with the children.

138. Despite this, whilst bail conditions were still in place, GG returned to the family home in August 2024 before confirming with the social worker that he had been visiting the family home in September 2024. Neither parent disputed that the safety plan had been breached at this time, albeit GG sought to say that he had attended the family home as he was concerned that the mother wasn’t coping with the care of the children and had begun drinking again. I have no difficulty in finding that the mother and GG were dishonest about GG’s return to the family address in August and September 2024.

139. The bigger dispute relates to whether GG latterly returned to the family home in breach of another safety plan. On the issuing of the proceedings in December 2024 the parents signed a safety plan (1920) on 2 December 2024. This agreement specifically involved both parents accepting that GG would not reside at the family home, that he wouldn’t live at the family home and that he would have no contact with GG whilst the children were present. Supervised contact was established for GG to have contact with AA at a local authority contact centre.

140. On 17 March 2025 DD went into school and informed staff that GG had been residing in the family home for approximately two months. Social workers were informed and that evening two social workers attended the property for an unannounced visit. The mother allowed access to the property and accepted that there were some belongings to GG in the property, including in the wardrobes. A social worker, Ms Cooper, spotted a door in the wardrobe which led to another room. The mother refused for them to access this room, putting herself in front of the door and not allowing access. The social worker noted that there was a wire running into that room.

141. On 19 March 2025 another social worker sat outside the family home and saw the mother initially leave and then GG leave shortly thereafter. GG had been leaving the property to attend supervised contact with the children. He attended a meeting that day before the contact and said that he was missing the children. The mother was challenged the following day about the father being at the property but denied it.

142. The local authority sought an urgent hearing which was listed on 27 March 2025. At this hearing GG accepted that he had attended the family home on 3 occasions in breach of the safety plan as he was concerned about the mother’s wellbeing, however he denied living at the property. The children were subsequently removed from the mother’s care.

143. The parents were asked about this within their oral evidence. Prior to this their counsel had taken instructions and told me their position. The positions had been that GG had only been at the property on either two or three occasions in advance of the children being removed but they continued to deny living together.

144. In oral evidence the mother accepted that GG had stayed over on the night of the 16 th , but that he was not hiding in the cupboard on that occasion. She was unclear as to whether he had then been at the property on the 19 th when he had been seen by the social worker. She continued to say that he had only been there on those two occasions.

145. Within his oral evidence GG was far more honest. Within examination in chief, he accepted that he’d been living at the property for approximately four weeks, but denied it was as long as two months. He accepted that this was in breach of the safety plan but said that he’d had to do this because of his concerns about the mother’s mental health. Her text messages and calls to him suggested that the local authority were letting her down and the mother was struggling to cope with the care of his children. In cross examination he continued to accept a breach of the safety plan and that he'd been dishonest until this point about it. He accepted that he had been dishonest to the local authority, to the judge at the removal hearing and to me with the instructions he’d given earlier in the week. He continued to dispute that he’d ever been hiding in the soundproof cupboard.

146. Having heard the evidence of the parents I struggle with trusting with what they say about this. At the end of their evidence their evidence is different, with one saying that GG had been there for two nights and the other saying he had been living there for a matter of weeks. The clear evidence of the social workers is that these two were essentially caught red handed having been alerted by DD in school.

147. I entirely prefer GG’s account, albeit belatedly given, that he had been present in the property for several weeks. It is incredibly concerning that the mother continued to be dishonest about this even within her oral evidence and that GG had sought to deceive me in advance of his evidence. Having considered the evidence about the 17 th and 20 th I also am of the view that GG would hide in the cupboard in the property and this is exactly why the mother would not allow professionals into the cupboard. Ms Gamble’s evidence about the mother’s mannerisms and the wire going into the cupboard make me more than satisfied that GG was in this cupboard and was seeking to continue the deception.

148. Therefore, on the balance of probabilities I find that GG moved back into live in the family home at least four weeks prior to 17 March 2025 in breach of the safety plan. GG moved back in with the full knowledge that this breached the safety plan. Thereafter the parents were repeatedly dishonest to professionals and the court about this significant breach of the plan. They did all that they could to seek to deceive professionals regarding their own dishonesty, including refusing entry into a cupboard where GG was hiding.

149. The local authority also pursues other findings about these events. I am invited to make two findings about what they told Ms Baxter. I am not willing to make these findings, nor do I think they make much difference to the case in any event. However I am also invited to find that the parents involved the children in their deception to the social services. The evidence base for this is that CC shared that she was told to act surprised when she saw GG. This was confirmed by EE subsequently.

150. The parents deny this, however given their other dishonesty around these events I have little confidence in what they say. None of the children told professionals about what was occurring in the house until DD was assaulted on the morning of 17 March 2025. In this instance I trust the account given by CC, corroborated by EE that they were involved within the deception. Notably GG was also continuing the deception himself, attending contact and complaining about the time he got to spend with the children (despite living in their house). Him continuing to attend contact on 20 March 2025 from the family home, whilst claiming travel expenses from a different property are further evidence of the ongoing deception.

151. I therefore find that it is more likely than not that the children were involved in the deception regarding GG residing again in the family home. They were encouraged to be dishonest with professions and pretend that they had not seen GG.

152. These determined disputed allegations, together with the findings already accepted within the previous final threshold form the factual basis upon which the welfare determinations must be completed. Analysis - Risks in the parents care

153. A child placed in the care of GG and the mother would be at risk of significant harm. They accepted that such a risk existed at the outset of the proceedings and I am not satisfied that there has been a notable reduction in risk since the precipitating events. The risks in their care fall under the following broad headings: a) Alcohol misuse b) Domestic violence c) Mental health difficulties d) Dishonesty

154. Both parents consume alcohol at times to excess. Whilst this on its own is not a barrier to an individual caring, it does lead to difficulties in meeting the needs of a child. It also can lead to the prevalence of other risks existing alongside such alcohol use. It is notable that all the events involving physical altercations between these parents have been at times when they have been consuming alcohol.

155. Both the mother and GG have been tested for alcohol throughout these proceedings by way of Peth testing. Neither party dispute the results of these tests and I am satisfied on the basis of this evidence, together with the parties’ oral evidence and their history of alcohol misuse that the results of these tests are more likely than not to be true. A summary of the Peth testing within these proceedings is as follows: Type of test Date range Mother GG HST May – November 2024 Chronic excessive Not excessive Peth November 2024 Social/moderate Peth December 2024 Social/moderate Peth January 2025 Low/Occasional Peth April 2025 Excessive Peth November 2025 Social/moderate Peth December 2025 Social/moderate Peth January 2026 Excessive Social/moderate Peth February 2026 Social/moderate

156. GG was candid about the problems that he felt the mother had with alcohol during his evidence: a) He described alcohol as being ‘the main issue within the case’. b) That the mother had a problem with alcohol and that she didn’t realise she had a problem with alcohol. She was not immediately open to addressing it and that it required a specialist service that was beyond his knowledge. c) He accepted that within his first statement saying that it was not safe for any of the children to live in the mother’s care IF she continued to use alcohol. d) Alcohol led him to be concerned that the mother was not coping with the care of the children in September 2024 and then again in February/March 2025. He was of the view that she had been drinking in these times and needed assistance. e) That he continued to believe that when he left the property he’d seen the mother having alcohol delivered to the property via an Uber driver. f) He accepted that he had called the police on several occasions due to physical assaults whilst the mother had been intoxicated whilst also caring for the children. g) He accepted that they would drink together and that the mother would often drink the same volume of alcohol that he did. He didn’t show any insight as to how him continuing to drink whilst he felt the mother had a problem with alcohol offered her no support in stopping. h) That the mother had sought to commit suicide in August 2024, which is what led him to move back in during September. Notably when the mother struggled she drank more, didn’t cope with day to day life and needed support and directions. i) He specifically accepted that the mother was still struggling. He accepted that alcohol did not assist with the mother’s mental health nor with her ability to meet the children’s needs.

157. I was struck by the clarity with which GG gave this evidence regarding the mother. It was notably different to the elements of deception at other times within his evidence. However, what was also notable was the lack of insight that he had about his actions/inactions on the mother’s problems. He appeared to have an almost total lack of insight that him continuing to drink with the mother was only creating the issues. He struggled to see how his own involvement may have an impact on matters. He didn’t seem to have encouraged her to change despite knowing clearly that she had a problem. He struggled to explain how things would be different if the children were to return to their care with the additional stressors that this would provide.

158. He knew that the mother needed professional support to address her alcohol misuse but hadn’t done anything to encourage her to engage with this. Worse than this he continued to drink alcohol with her and attend nights out where they consumed the same level of alcohol. Whilst being able to accurately see the issue that alcohol provided he had almost no insight as to why this might need to change.

159. Thus, whilst GG may be a social drinker and can see the risks of alcohol, he himself offers very little if any mitigation to the current risks that exist around the mother’s drinking. Those problems on the evidence of GG are endemic and deep routed. They lead to problems with mental health and to heated arguments that include physical assaults. The toxic trio of alcohol/drugs, domestic abuse and mental health problems are firmly embedded within the risks in this case.

160. The mother’s evidence was far less coherent on this point than GG’s. She showed no insight into the problems shown by her drinking and had no understanding about why professionals may be concerned about this. She ultimately minimised these matters. Notably the mother was unable to stop drinking throughout her pregnancies. She sought to deflect any criticism about this saying that it 'wasn't a lot and it wasn’t all of the time.’

161. The mother was able to see that the domestic abuse incidents were when she was in drink but sought to underplay how intoxicated she was on these occasions. She had no explanation about why she hadn’t stopped drinking, noting that she had friends that she wanted to go out with. The mother accepted that the children had recognised that she needed to stop drinking but she hadn’t done so. She accepted that neither she nor GG had encouraged the other to stop drinking and neither had sought to engage in professional alcohol services.

162. I am incredibly worried about the impact that alcohol would have on the mother’s ability to care for the children. The historic issues all appear to be clearly linked to a use of alcohol, or all go back to a need for her to drink alcohol. There is a clear pattern of behaviour within this case whereby at times of heightened stress the mother will use alcohol. The fact that GG does not think that the children would be ‘safe’ when she is drinking alcohol is telling. Equally his comment to Mr Wiesnewski during cross examination, that she is someone who drinks and doesn’t know when to stop, was important.

163. I accept that there has been no involvement with a professional support service such as Turning Point. As to why this has not occurred is unclear. The mother quite clearly would have benefited from such a referral, which appears to have not been properly pursued by the local authority. However, the mother’s lack of insight has led her not to pursue it herself, nor appear to self-reflect about her potential need to have professional support to address her alcohol consumption.

164. The testing shows that the mother has continued to consume alcohol during these proceedings and has shown no insight or intent to stop using. There appears equally to be little ability for GG to mitigate the mother’s use of alcohol, nor despite recognising the issue, any inclination for him to seek to help her address these matters. The risks from alcohol in this case, both on its own and then to lead to other risk factors remain high. Any child placed in the care of these parents would be at a significant risk of harm because of this use and it is difficult to identify a mechanism at present for this to be reduced.

165. Further to this is the risk from domestic abuse. As I have found there have been several incidents of domestic abuse between the parents (predominantly perpetrated by the mother) which have involved intoxication, the police and have been witnessed by the children. Not only have the children witnessed the abuse they have at times intervened to prevent matters escalating. It is notable that there is a threshold finding (M3) that all three of the mother’s previous relationships have all involved domestic arguments, discord or violence. There is an accepted finding that further such domestic incidents would expose the children to physical and emotional harm.

166. However, it is notable that the domestic abuse events between the parties are not among the most serious that are seen in these cases. That is not to seek to minimise the impact that domestic abuse can have on children, but it is important to note that this is at the lower end of severity of such abuse/conflict. It is also important to note that there has been no reports (and thus no) domestic abuse between the parties in approximately 18 months. It is however important to note that in this time the children have not been present, and the parents have been dishonest about other elements of their lifestyle (including in the face of the court).

167. The parents since the aborted final hearing have undertaken work with Holly French regarding domestic abuse. There is a suggestion from the local authority that this was an assessment, however for the reasons above I am incredibly cautious in this case about the conclusions of assessments by the local authority. Worryingly Ms French’s statement (887) makes repeated references again to Ms Baxter’s documents and appears to place considerable reliance upon it’s conclusions, even though her work was limited to work around domestic violence (897).

168. However, I can be assisted by understanding the work that the parents did with Ms French. The parents engaged fully with this work and appear to have gained some knowledge. It appears from Ms French’s evidence that the mother was willing to explain difficulties in her previous relationships but less so involving GG. The parents had gone away and done ‘homework’ set by Ms French. Both parents were willing to accept pushing and shoving between the two of them. Ms French was left with the impression that they were not telling the truth about the allegations that had been made about domestic abuse. Ms French said repeatedly that she was concerned about minimisation by the mother, particularly in relation to the incidents involving GG. She had not been told about the number of incidents involving the police.

169. I was surprised given the nature of what she was discussing that Ms French didn’t have separate sessions with the parents. However, it appears that the parents were keen to have the work together and Ms French didn’t pursue the point.

170. I accept that the parents have done some work around domestic abuse more recently. However, having considered what was said within those sessions, the risk from domestic violence is still one that is present and must be considered as part of the analysis within the case. It is notable that the historic shows that the mother’s relationships all involve a degree of domestic discord which reaches such a point that the local authority are involved. Whilst the underlying reason for this discord involving GG might have either been linked to the boys (who are not in her care anymore) or has now resolved, there remains an ongoing significant risk of harm when stress is increased, when disagreements occur and in particular when alcohol has been consumed. There would still be an ongoing risk were any children to be placed in the care of the parents.

171. I was struck by the points of difference between the parents in the way that they gave their evidence. GG was perfectly willing and able to critique the mother at length. He was able to set out significant concerns that he had about the mother’s ability to care. He accepted points readily put to him cross examination, but when seeking to conclude elements of questioning he sought to emphasise that the mother could still parent well. Indeed, despite accepting a number of matters to me, he went on to say that there would be little to no risk in the mother’s care. There was a notable disconnect between what he was saying and what the objectively inevitable consequences of those things would be.

172. Mother by contrast failed to consider any risks really existed with regards to GG. She failed throughout her evidence to seek to accept any forms of risks that flowed from GG, even so far as their relationship would pose. The mother also pushed back on most suggestions that she had harmed the children or had failed in her caring responsibilities historically.

173. This distinction was notable, and no doubt could lead to arguments between the two as it appears to have done historically. There are some vivid descriptions in the parties’ own evidence about the types of abusive things they used to say to each other. Both parents have resolute views, and GG is not cautious about setting out his views on the mothers’ risks. Seeing the oral evidence of the two parties did little to assuage me of worries regarding ongoing risks of domestic conflict between the parties, particularly when one is so strident and the other so defensive.

174. The other notable factor is mental health problems. I accept that this predominantly relates to the mother. Indeed, there is a threshold finding that the mother consumed a large quantity of paracetamol tablets as a ‘cry for help. This occurred in part because the mother had stopped taking her prescribed medication. The mother was asked about this incident during her oral evidence. She said that it had occurred because of everything that had been going on at the time, but accepted that she was continuing to struggle now with her mental health.

175. This was corroborated by GG. The mother’s mental health was one of his main explanations about why he had breached the safety plan. He said that she was still struggling but that he’d seen an improvement from her overtime. He accepted there was limited professional input (save for medication from GP) which was different to the support that he knew about and had accessed for his own mental health difficulties. In cross examination from Mr Wiesnewski, GG accepted that seeing the mother’s evidence was distressing and that she was not in a good place at the moment. He accepted that she had been like that for a while with her mental health and it was going to need a lot of help.

176. Again, there was a disconnect between what GG said and the potential impact that this might have. He told me all of these concerns about the mother’s mental health, but when I asked him questions about the effect of this, he said that she was a lot more stable and she would ‘100% be able to care for the children.’

177. It was evident from the tenor of the mother’s evidence, together with the descriptions provided by GG that the mother continues to struggle with her mental health. It is an ongoing difficulty that she has and has not reduced during these proceedings. I accept that there has not been a significant event (such as the one in August 2024), however the underlying issues are still there, in part led by alcohol, domestic disagreements and pressures from either these proceedings or the potential for caring for children. The mother’s evidence was flat throughout, and she displayed very limited emotions. Whilst these are not significant on their own, they contribute to a wider narrative about the state of the mother’s mental health currently and her ability to cope with the care of herself, even without having any additional pressures from caring for the children.

178. In my judgment the risks to a child (or children) in the care of the mother and GG would be significant and would exist daily. The risks all interrelate and are impacted by increasing stressors. Whilst no doubt these proceedings have been stressful, the daily care of two young children would be equally if not more stressful. The difficulty for the risks in this case is that they interlink and could exacerbate or trigger the likelihood of the other risks that are present. Necessity for further assessment

179. I have deliberately set out the relevant risk factors in detail above before considering whether with that information I require further evidence to make a decision within this case. It can only be if it is necessary to justly resolve the proceedings that I should adjourn these proceedings and order a fresh assessment. In doing so I would also need to be satisfied that a further extension to these lengthy proceedings would be required.

180. Parenting assessments are to provide the court evidence about the welfare decision that the court needs to undertake. The conclusions are sometimes relevant, however sometimes it is the material within the assessment, upon which the conclusion is drawn, that is most beneficial to the court. I do not accept the simplistic use of terms such as positive or negative assessments as they underplay the important balancing exercise that social work professionals and judges must undertake. The use of such terms leads to linear analysis and the risk of individuals falling into error with a balanced holistic analysis.

181. In this case for all the reasons that I have set out above I am not minded to automatically follow any of the recommendations made by the local authority’s witnesses. I am incredibly concerned that all of them (Ms Gamble, Mr Smith and Ms French) have all relied extensively upon the unproven allegations to reach their own welfare conclusions. I have reached this view having read the material that they have provided but also hearing the oral evidence that they gave. All that evidence was clearly tainted by a reliance upon the unproven allegations and the opinions of Ms Baxter.

182. I am similarly (although to a lesser extent) concerned about the recommendations of the guardian. Whilst his written recommendations make significant references to Ms Baxter’s opinions (and the unproven risk) they are not as numerous as those of the social workers. Also, his evidence was far more carefully given and he confirmed to me that even without those allegations forming any part of the evidence he would still be of the view that care and placement orders were necessary. I therefore have professional advice from the guardian which I can utilise to come to conclusions, albeit I will need to be far more cautious than I might ordinarily be if his evidence wasn’t so tainted.

183. I have also been able to draw my own conclusions from the written material and hearing from the parents giving evidence. I have been able to come to my own factual determinations and set out what the risks are within this case and the current level of those risks. Whilst I accept that in part the written material could be said to be all slightly tainted by the views of those who have written it, I have been very cautious in drawing evidence predominantly from the parents own evidence, the written records but also the undisputed elements of the social work evidence.

184. Having considered all of that I take the view that I have sufficient information before me to decide this case. I accept that the parents have not necessarily had a ‘fair’ parenting assessment, however I have been able to gain all of the necessary information that I need to in order to form a view about the case. Whilst a further assessment could give an opinion that is fairer than those given by the local authority, I am of the view that I don’t need that opinion to come to my own decision. I can decide on the information, findings and evidence I have heard. They can have a fair hearing because of the independent analysis that I have been able to undertake.

185. As part of that decision, I will not rely upon the conclusions of the local authority witnesses and will be cautious about the conclusions reached by the guardian.

186. Thus, whilst I accept there is an argument for a further assessment, I take the view that it is not necessary to justly resolve these proceedings, and I can make decisions without such further evidence. I therefore refuse the application for an independent social work assessment. Realistic options

187. I must therefore turn to the substantive decision I am being asked to make which is where BB & AA will live in the long term. The available realistic options for the court to consider are accepted to be: a) Placement with the parents. b) Long term fostering. c) Placement for adoption. d) An adjournment so that the parents can demonstrate further changes’.

188. As I have considered below, the fact that an individual could be argued to be a ‘realistic option’ does not mean that they are an appropriate option for the children. I take the definition of ‘realistic’ relatively broadly so that I can ensure that I have analysed fully the widest array of potential carers, to avoid a linear analysis.

189. There have been some alternate carers put forward for the children, however no positive viability assessments have been undertaken. It is clear at this time that there are no realistic options from wider family or friends who are in a position to care for the children. No family member has actively challenged their assessments, and none have attended before me to seek to say that they are a realistic option to care for the chidlren. Sadly, I have to conclude that there are no wider family members who at this time can care for the children, and thus there are no realistic options from the wider family. Analysis of realistic options

190. I will start with a consideration of the parents’ ability to care now. I was unclear at the end of their evidence whether either was pursuing a return of AA & BB immediately. This in many ways shows at least some insight into the significant risks that I have considered above.

191. Understandably much of Mr Bowe’s submissions and part of Ms Watkins’ were focussed upon the need for further assessment or the difficulties with the local authority’s evidence. For all the reasons above I accept a lot of this criticism and have explained why. However, when I consider in detail the submissions that were made there was not a resolute (or a realistic) push for a return to the care of the parents at this stage. Emphasis was put on the lack of analysis of alternative options by the local authority, the lack of a ‘shadow plan’, the lack of support offered to parents during these proceedings. This mirrored the evidence of the parents where I was unclear as to what they precisely wanted me to do.

192. I accept that there has been a general lack of support by the local authority within this case, particularly around the more central issues of drug misuse, mental health and until recently around domestic violence. I accept the point that the reliance upon the risk of sexual abuse led to a distraction from professionals (including the lawyers) to focus on the real provable issues within this case. However, it is important to note that the parents themselves within their evidence (most notably GG) accept that more work would need to be done before the children could return to their care. I share this view.

193. Equally the newly allocated social worker appears to have undertaken very limited work of his own within this case. He was allocated midway through 2025 but has only spoken to the parents on two occasions. He has not undertaken any form of assessment, nor sought to challenge or reconsider the views of his predecessor.

194. However, were a child (or children) to be placed in the parents’ care at this time that child would be at a significant risk of ongoing harm. It would mean placing a child in a situation where the realistic risks are as evident now as they were at the outset of the proceedings. A child would be at the significant interconnected risks that I have set out above. Whilst inevitably a risk of harm is not a barrier to return, it is important to note that the level of that risk in my judgment would be significant. That risk would need to be balanced against the benefits of returning to live with a parent, including the lifelong potential of remaining within the family unit.

195. It is important to recognise that the parents have a good history of attending contact with AA & BB. When they attend contact, they do not attend under the influence, they meet the children’s basic care needs and they engage appropriately with the professionals. There have not been recent domestic violence incidents, there have been no major incidents of mental health difficulties (such as in August 2024) and the most recent alcohol tests show some ability to mitigate alcohol use.

196. However, a return to the parents could only be objectively conceivable with a significant amount of ongoing teaching and ongoing professional support. The parents themselves appear to accept that their skills at present would not be sufficient to meet the children’s care needs.

197. A major issue with any plan of the parents caring is their honesty during these proceedings. Whilst I must crucially consider the availability of support, the protection that this will provide is significantly undermined by the parents repeated and widespread dishonesty shown during these proceedings. As I have found above both parents have been repeatedly dishonest about the events in February/March 2025 regarding GG’s presence in the family home. Not only have they been dishonest to social workers, but they have also written statements (with statements of truth) that are clearly untrue, they have been dishonest with the court historically and they have been dishonest with me during this hearing.

198. Further to this the parents have sought to conceal their dishonesty from professionals by GG hiding within the property and access not being permitted. They have also then sought to play up to the lies, with GG fraudulently claiming travel moneys from an address he was clearly not living at and seeking to pretend that he was only seeing the children at contact and that this was making him upset. Even more so they sought to include the other children within their dishonesty to protect their interests, rather than those of the children. All of this creates an elaborate web of deception that makes it very difficult to have any trust in what they say.

199. This is crucial because any plan to protect against the significant risks that would exist in this house would be underpinned by an element of trust. The professionals (and the court) would need to know that what was being said was true. However, the parents have been repeatedly dishonest to seek to protect their position up until this hearing and thus I can have no confidence that they wouldn’t do similarly in the future. It also goes further than this in that for any further teaching or interventions (whilst caring for the children) to be effective would require ongoing honesty about the situation at home. Without that honesty those professional interventions would make limited progress and leave risks outstanding for potentially years.

200. Also, I am not sure that the parents are even being honest to themselves. The mother appeared from her evidence to be in denial about almost all the risk factors within this case. She appeared to underplay her alcohol misuse, her current mental health difficulties and the historic issues with domestic abuse with GG. I don’t go so far as to say she is being dishonest about these, but she doesn’t have any insight which also would be required for any notable improvements to make.

201. Whilst GG might be more honest about what he believes the issues with the mother are, he is far less insightful about his role within these issues. He equally struggles to perceive how he might need to make changes to reduce or ameliorate the risks that exist.

202. From the totality of the evidence available I have come to the view that placing BB & AA with their parents at this stage would lead to them inevitably being at an ongoing risk of significant harm. The issues that were identified by the local authority at the outset of their proceedings remain almost as stark now as they did back at that time. Any placement of these children with their parents would lead to her being at daily risk of harm from physical abuse, emotional abuse or neglect from them.

203. Having considered the documents and heard the evidence the level of support that the parents would require at this stage would be considerable. I don’t go so far as to say that it would be 24 / 7. Local authorities regularly say in these cases that there would be a need for 24 / 7 support to protect against all risks. I am not in a position of having to remove all risks, as this is an attempt to balance up various options, none of which are often good outcomes. However, given the nature of the risks there would need to be very regular, potentially daily, to provide any reassurance that the children’s needs were being met. Even then given the dishonesty I have no confidence that the true picture would be disclosed, limiting the effectiveness of any protective measure.

204. The parents argue that they could care with support. I accept that there appears to be somewhat of a gap in the local authority’s evidence about the support that might be available by family members. The local authority’s lack of analysis of alternate supportive carers is a notable omission. There appears to be a lack of real analysis by the local authority about the support group that would be around the parents. DD is currently living in the care of the maternal grandmother. There is no detailed consideration as to her ability to offer support in the long term, or even any support at all. She notably has cared for four of the children historically and is still caring for one of the mother’s children well.

205. I have not heard from the maternal grandmother regarding the support that she could provide, nor has she provided a statement. The mother didn’t set out the detail of any support that could be provided by her. This appeared to be the extent of the mother’s support network and it is unclear, save for being well meaning, what further support it would beyond what professionals services might provide. I accept that further information might have been provided about this support, however the detail of what it actually might have provided is unclear.

206. Whilst the parents have shown some improvements in the last few months these are very limited in the context of the risks. I note the lack of real progress forward in their lives that I have considered above. The parents need to make dramatic changes to their own lives before they are in a position to safely and sufficiently meet the needs of a child.

207. Thus, whilst there are clear advantages of AA & BB being able to be placed within their biological family it will have the significant detriment of such a placement exposing them to significant daily risks and having repeated ongoing interventions in their life. This level of intervention inevitably causes harm itself, or if they are not available or ineffective due to ongoing dishonesty they will be at risk of significant harm in their parents’ care. Whilst the presence of risk or harm should not preclude such a placement it is a stark position to be faced with at the end of a set of proceedings.

208. A plan of long-term fostering is not realistically pursued by any party. The limit of which it is pursued by the parents is so that they could have further time to make changes and have the children placed in their care in the future. This is something that I will consider below and is not really an argument for long term fostering. The reality of long-term fostering as an option is that it would allow an ongoing relationship to remain with both parents. They would remain AA & BB’s registered parents and would retain their parental responsibility. They would continue to have some say in her upbringing and would be invited to reviews. The key advantage for AA & BB is that they may be able to have ongoing contact with family members, including their multiple siblings. That advantage is more nuanced in this case given the agreement by the local authority to look for adoptive placements that allow ongoing sibling and parental contact.

209. The disadvantages for long term fostering are well known and well understood. Essentially whilst having a degree of permanence and security it would be objectively less so than were they to be adopted. That is not to say that long term fostering is not a permanent option, it clearly is, however it retains a degree of state involvement through statutory requirements, and it is far easier (and statistically more likely) that long term fostering placements may break down rather than adoptive placements. These two children are very young (27 and 8 months old) and thus would remain looked after for a significant number of years, always open to a real risk of placement breakdown or a change in circumstances.

210. Balancing those two matters against each other, whilst it has its advantages the disadvantages clearly weigh heavily given AA & BB’s young age and the lack of any fact specific reasons in this case to lean towards long term fostering, save for the greater surety of parental and sibling contact. Neither child have specific needs that require long term fostering.

211. Coming finally to a plan of adoption, the disadvantages of this order for BB & AA are the possible loss of a relationship with their biological parents and siblings. Whilst the local authority is agreeable to locating a placement that will accommodate both children together there remains a serious risk that there might be no contact with their birth parents were such an order to be made. They also would have the lifechanging adjustment to who their legal parents are, they will cease to be the child of their parents in these proceedings and all parental responsibility will vest in their new carers. It will involve a degree of change for them and will vastly adjust their future life arrangements. It will inevitably in its own way cause harm as they may lose these relationships their parents and those who they have some recollection of providing their caring needs during these proceedings.

212. That said there are inevitably advantages to adoption for BB & AA and these mirror the advantages of adoption for many children in this situation. Adoption is accepted to offer a degree of security to children and permanence that doesn’t have the ongoing intervention of the state through fostering. Whilst the interventions from long term fostering can be limited to an extent they are never removed. AA & BB through an adoptive placement could find security with a family who are committed to caring for her as their own for the remainder of her minority and beyond. Whilst there are adoption breakdowns, there are no signs from this case that these children would be at a greater risk of such a breakdown at present given their stability in foster care and lack of any specific additional needs.

213. A plan of adoption inevitably has considerable side effects but also considerable benefits. The lifelong impact of such a plan is why the welfare test is described as at such a high level. A court could only possibly consider ordering this level of intervention if there was no realistic alternative because the effects are so great and the consequences so lifelong.

214. Having weighed up all the options in this case I have sadly come to the conclusion that despite the inevitable negatives the only option for AA & BB is the making of both care and placement orders. When I balance the realistic options against each other, the order that best meet their needs (by a considerable margin) is the making of such orders. The downsides of both living with their parents and long-term fostering far outweigh the positives of the same. A placement with their parents, although initially attractive, is simply unachievable and is unsafe. The provision of regular support will be detrimental and is sadly likely to make limited impact on the risks in this case. It is not a viable plan for me to coherently consider ordering and thus it cannot be a better option than adoption, regardless of the inevitable negative consequences of an adoptive order. This is one of those exceptional cases that justifies the making of care and placement orders.

215. I note in passing that this is entirely in keeping with the views expressed by the professional witnesses in this case. Whilst I emphasise again, I have not taken into consideration the welfare views of the local authority the view of the guardian was robustly given in his oral evidence. Whilst there is some reliance placed on unsubstantiated matters within his report, I am satisfied that his evidence broadly stood up to scrutiny. Even when I apply a degree of caution to the guardian’s evidence, I have no reason to depart from his conclusions.

216. I have specifically considered the parents argument for an adjournment of the proceedings to allow for further testing or just making a care order with a plan of rehabilitation considered again within 6 months. I specifically have considered the dicta in Re S [2014] EWHC 529 (Fam) where the then president considered the issue of an adjournment for further work or improvements to be made, and he said the following (albeit in the context of an FDAC case): These appraisals must be evidence based, with a solid foundation, not driven by sentiment or a hope that ‘something may turn up’. Typically three questions will have to be addressed. First, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent is committed to making the necessary changes? If so, secondly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to maintain that commitment? If so, thirdly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to make the necessary changes within the child’s timescale?

217. Whilst I accept that the parents have made some progress during the proceedings these are realistically limited in nature. They sadly do not go to addressing the substance of the concerns that I have about their ability to care. I do not doubt that they believe that they are committed to making changes, however I am not convinced that they know what those changes are. The mother demonstrates a lack of any real insight into her ability to care, whilst GG has lacked any action in seeking to make changes. I sadly do not have a solid evidence-based reason to believe that they are capable at this time of making the necessary changes. The changes that would need to be made by these parents are extensive and apply to many areas of their lives. Crucially they would need to address all three areas of domestic abuse, alcohol abuse and domestic violence separately so that exacerbations in some issues do not then cause relapses within the others.

218. Whilst I have been critical of the local authority in not providing much support to these parents during these proceedings, equally the parents do not appear to have recognised what support they might require. Even if they had simply saying that we want to do work is not sufficient. There may have been some progress more recently with respect of domestic violence work, there has been a lack of any progress regarding alcohol misuse (and the causes for it). Behind all of this is the real issue of the parents case which is the underlying dishonesty that creates real issues for trusting anything that they say that they have done.

219. I also think that it is unlikely that any change is viable within at least the next nine months as ultimately there is too much change to be made to realistically adjust the position that they are currently in. Any changes would need to be made, maintained and then tested before it could be said to be in the children’s best interests.

220. Thus, whilst I entirely understand why the parents make the argument, I am unable to accept that these proceedings need to be extended to allow for that further period of testing or assessment. These proceedings need to ideally be resolved now and the justification for them to be extended would be based on a hope rather than anything more concrete.

221. That said, the parents should be commended by some of the steps they have taken during these proceedings. Their love for their children was evident. Their commitment to contact has been good. Their engagement with these proceedings has been notable. However the likelihood of the risks reducing to a sufficient standard However, I have insufficient confidence at this time that they will continue these steps and address the real issues to determine that it is necessary to delay these proceedings.

222. Therefore, having carefully weighed all the various options, including adjournments or delaying these proceedings further, I have come to the view that it is necessary and proportionate for me to approve a plan of adoption for BB & AA. I have specifically considered the two welfare checklists in coming to this decision and weighed up the various positives and negatives of the available options. I have come to the clear conclusion that the only orders that can meet the children’s needs moving forward is both a care order and a placement order. Whilst I have not slavishly gone through each element of the welfare checklists I have factored them into all of the decisions and analysis I have undertaken above.

223. Both children should be made aware in the future that both of their parents love them and have tried within these proceedings to meet their needs. They have engaged actively at time within these proceedings and have sought to show that they can care for them. Whilst their commitment hasn’t been total, and they have not always been truthful, they have done what they can do in the context of their lives as they are at the moment. I have made criticisms of them above which I believe are legitimate to make, but that doesn’t undermine their love for their children and their wish for them to have a good childhood.

224. Neither parent consents to the making of a placement order and I will dispense with their consent to do so. For the reasons above I take the view that it is necessary for me to do so and is the only available welfare option available to me. Contact post order

225. Upon the making of both the care order and the placement order I am required to consider the issue of contact between the children and their parents, together with their siblings moving forwards. The parents ask me to consider the possibility of post adoptive contact and to make an order for contact. The guardian also on balance supports the making of an order for ongoing sibling contact but does not support an order requiring ongoing contact with the parents, albeit he is of the view that this would be in the children’s best interests.

226. No party seeks to argue that the contact should not reduce to monthly from its current frequency. The Guardian noted the lack of detail within the care plan regarding a reduction and wanted detail from the local authority. I suggested the following arrangement to reduce contact from four times per week to monthly which the Guardian agreed with: a) Week 1 – 3 times b) Week 2 – 3 times c) Week 3 – 2 times d) Week 4 – 2 times e) Week 5 – 1 time f) Week 6 – 1 time g) Week 7 – 1 time h) Week 8 – 1 time i) Week 9 – No contact j) Week 10 – 1 time k) Week 11 – No contact l) Week 12 (and four weekly thereafter) – 1 time

227. I would approve a care plan on this basis. The more substantive issue is that I am asked to consider whether there should be a requirement that the local authority only searches for adoptive placements that will agree to direct contact between either BB and AA and their siblings and/or between BB and AA and their parents. This judgment is being written still at a time of potential change in the adoptive system in this country. As was said by Baker LJ in R & C [2024] EWCA Civ 1302 there is a renewed discussion at this time about open adoption. Baker LJ makes the point in R & C that in two lectures the President was doing little other than reiterating the approach to post adoptive contact (and particularly s26 orders) as was mandated by caselaw. I must consider on the making of a placement order whether to make an order for direct contact.

228. Ms Meredith within her closing submissions confirmed the following would be included within an amended care plan: a) Confirmation that BB & AA would be placed together. For the avoidance of any doubt I have relied upon this as part of my welfare analysis above. If this was to end up not to be the local authority’s plan then this would in my view be a change sufficient such that a party might apply to reconsider the revoking of the placement order. The social worker was clear in his evidence that this would not be in the children’s interests and that it would not occur. b) That a reduction in the parents’ contact would be as per the above proposed reduction. c) That there would be a commitment to search for an adoptive placement for the girls that would accommodate ongoing sibling contact at least 2-3 times per year . This was in line with what the guardian had sought, albeit he viewed it as an absolute that adopters would agree to this level of contact. d) That there would be a search for adopters that would agree at least one face to face contact with the parents and then another indirect contact.

229. I had ordered an updated care plan prior to giving this decision but I have not been able to find one. I will scrutinise it when it arrives to ensure that these elements are included.

230. In this case on the issue of direct contact I have come to different conclusions. I have concluded that it would not be in AA & BB’s best interests for me to make an order for direct contact with their parents. The local authority has committed to such an arrangement, and I trust that they will do so. It is potentially the beginning of a new arrangement that allows post-adoption contact with parents and I am hopeful that such adopters will be located. However, I am not of the view that such an order (in light of the local authority’s intention to ask) is appropriate in this case. I will trust the local authority to look for such a placement but not obligate it to find such a placement with a contact order.

231. I take a different view when it comes to the sibling contact because of a difference in what I determine is the importance of such contact. This is a sibling group who shares a common history. Whilst BB was not born when they all lived together, AA was. Her siblings are all living in separate placements; however they retain a key bond for life. That relationship cannot be as good as it might have been were they all living together with a family member, but it must be allowed to develop and be available for the children during their lives. The professionals all agree that this should be able to be promoted with adopters and I have undertaken my balancing exercise on the basis that it will.

232. Indeed, the former social worker, Ms Tooth, wrote a sibling assessment in May 2025 (677) which concluded (695) that ‘ all of the children would need ongoing sibling contact, the frequency would need to be determined based on the location of the children once final care planning decisions are made.’ This assessment was not challenged by any party, including the local authority.

233. The current social worker and guardian were both clear that sibling contact had to take place. They both viewed it as an absolute given the welfare benefits to the children of such contact. I am acutely aware that whilst these two professionals believe that it is required, they will not be involved within the placement search or the matching process. Even my words within this judgment may be lost within that matching decision.

234. In this case I take the view that it is better to make an order under s26 for a minimum level of ongoing contact than it is to not. I share the view of the former social worker, the current social worker and guardian that such contact is crucial for the welfare interests of these children and that all efforts should be taken to find a placement which they can have ongoing contact with their siblings (and hopefully their parents).

235. The local authority filed a statement in December 2025 from the Family Finding team (880). These statements are always useful but not determinative as the statistics within them change on a regular basis. At that time there were 32 adopters nationally who would be able to adopt them (884), of which 9 would be open to direct contact with siblings. This is a sizeable number of potential adopters, out of the total 149 prospective adopters profiled.

236. Clearly if the local authority cannot locate a placement that will allow contact with siblings post-placement, then it can make an application to discharge the order and significantly change the care plan. However, I want to ensure (as much as I am able) that AA and BB have ongoing contact at least with their siblings. This indeed is the collective view of the professionals. To avoid this being missed I am willing in this case to make such an order. As above I take the view having considered the Adoption and Children welfare checklist, most notably the impact of adoption throughout their lives, that direct contact a minimum of twice per year, is in their best interests and I so order that.

237. I accept that this order may cause some delay in placing the children for adoption, however in the event that the initial potential adopters found would not be willing to countenance direct contact twice per year with siblings then this is not the correct placement for these children. It may be that if such a placement cannot be found then matters need to be further considered by the court, but at this time that is the correct placement for them and I make such an order. Conclusions

238. For all those reasons I will make the orders that I have set out above. I understand that this decision will be deeply disappointing for the mother and GG.

239. I understand the criticisms that were made of the approaches of the professionals in this case, particularly the issues involving the denied allegations of sexual harm. I have set out my thoughts on these in considerable detail to avoid any suggestion that I have sought to include these within my own welfare analysis. I have either excluded any consideration of the conclusions of the professionals from that analysis or treated it very carefully. I acknowledge that the conclusions of the assessments filed by the local authority should not be relied upon and have undertaken my own independent analysis. With the material available to me I have taken the view that I can conclude this case without a fresh assessment, nor is it appropriate to adjourn the proceedings for a further period of testing.

240. I re-iterate all that I have said above about the way these cases must be determined based on facts. Facts cannot be established within public law proceedings by asking an independent social worker to take a view on allegations that have been made. The fact that an independent social worker (however well meaning) determines that they are more likely than not to be true, does not make them so. Matters are either true or they are not. If they are not true then they should not form the basis for a welfare conclusion, they certainly should not form a central pillar of that welfare conclusion. Much time and expense could have been saved in this case had this issue been addressed far earlier in these proceedings.

241. I am grateful to all the advocates for the way that they presented this case. There is nothing further that any of them could have said within this hearing that could have changed my decision. All of them put the cases of their clients in the fullest way possible. This judgment is so lengthy partly because of the significant number of issues, but also because of the numerous coherent and compelling arguments that were made.

242. I will approve a final order and a final care plan in the terms above. Recorder Williams 22 March 2026