London Capital & Finance Plc & Ors v Spencer Golding

MR JUSTICE MILES:

1. This is an application for two orders. The first is to extend the appointment of receivers who have already been appointed over certain of the fourth defendant’s assets so that they can take control of all assets contained in Schedule 2 to an order dated 13 December 2024 (“the December order”) which followed on from an earlier order dated 14 November 2024.

2. In summary by the December order I declared that the assets contained in Schedule 2 were held by the fourth defendant on trust for the claimants and he was under an obligation to transfer them to the claimants. There was machinery in the order for the handing over of those assets to the claimants. The assets were themselves subject to existing freezing orders and a criminal restraint order. I also made orders continuing the freezing orders in respect of those assets.

3. On 30 January 2025 and 11 February 2025 I appointed two of the administrators, and Ms Lloyd, as receivers over some of the assets. The claimants now apply to extend it to all of the assets in Schedule 2 to the December order.

4. There is, secondly, an application to vary the December order so that the fourth defendant no longer has a period of either 14 or 21 days following receipt of a variation of the criminal restraint order to deliver up certain assets to the claimant, but should only have one working day. There are two reasons for that application. First, the variation to the CRO has taken much longer than was anticipated at the time of the December order. Secondly, if receivers are appointed over all of the Schedule 2 it follows that the time period for delivery up should be truncated as Mr Golding will not require the 14 to 21 day periods contained in the order. It will be a matter of handing them over to the receivers in practice.

5. The applications were issued on 14 February 2025. I first heard them at 2 p.m. on 14 February. It became apparent that Mr Golding’s solicitor, Mr Posener of Akroyd Legal, was not available for the hearing. The claimants themselves proposed that the matter be adjourned until today and I agreed with that course. Mr Posener is abroad but he has been able to take instructions over the weekend and was also able to attend a remote hearing this morning. The fourth defendant has not been given three clear days’ notice of the applications, and so the matters before me are on short notice. Counsel for the claimants properly accepted that they were ex parte on notice, and in those circumstances acknowledged a duty of full and frank disclosure.

6. I have been provided with a helpful skeleton argument this morning which was also provided to Mr Posener. I have read the first witness statement of Mr Stubbs, the fourteenth and fifteenth witness statements of Mr Davis, and the relevant emails from the fourth defendant’s solicitors.

7. I will not give a detailed history as it is well known to the parties. I record that I am satisfied, first, that the extension of the receivership assets to all of the assets in Schedule 2 is justified. It appears to me on the evidence that there is a serious risk and a reasonable suspicion that Mr Golding has or will otherwise continue to breach the terms of the freezing orders by dissipating the assets in Schedule 2 such that they will not be available for enforcement. I am also satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that the appointment of receivers over these assets will assist in the enforcement of the December order and will serve a useful purpose in circumstances where there is some hindrance or difficulty in enforcement. I am also satisfied that this course is just and convenient, and that the demands of justice will be met by the appointment of receivers over the assets.

8. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the fact that a receivership order can increase costs and be intrusive, and that a receivership order will only be granted where there is some hindrance of difficulty in using the normal process of execution.

9. For the reasons set out in the evidence, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for the appointment of receivers and that any additional costs and intrusiveness of such an order are fully justified.

10. The second principal point of which I am satisfied is that in these circumstances it is appropriate to vary the existing order so that Mr Golding is required to cooperate in handing over any orders within one working day of the variation of the CRO. I am satisfied that the variation to the CRO has taken far longer than had been expected and, secondly, given my conclusion about the receivership order, there is no justifiable reason for further delay after the variation of the CRO before the assets are handed over. Mr Posener has explained that the fourth defendant is not in a position to consent to either the variation of the receivership order, or the variation of the December order, but that he did not oppose the order now being sought, which contains some variations to reflect points made by him in correspondence.

11. I specifically address one point made by the fourth defendant, which is the position of third parties who may claim an interest in some of the assets set out in Schedule 2. That is a matter that was addressed in the December order itself which gave a liberty to third parties who claimed any interest to apply to the court. Notwithstanding any such possibility, the December order declared that all of the relevant assets are held on trust by the fourth defendant for the claimants and any third party who wishes to contest the ownership of the relevant property would have to apply to the court as appropriate to seek to establish his, her or its claims.

12. I also note the following points: firstly, the appointment of receivers does not have a proprietary effect. The purpose of a receivership is to safeguard assets. Second, the existing provision in the December order of the court is not being varied. Thirdly, third parties are protected by CPR rule 40.9 which allows a party who is not a party to the proceedings, but is directly affected by a judgment or order, to apply to have the judgment or order set aside or varied. I acceded to a suggestion by counsel for the claimants that in this case any person who wishes to apply under that provision should do so within 14 days of being notified of the present order. In relation to that, I take into account the fact that the order was some time ago and as I understand it there has been no application thus far by any third party to seek to set aside or vary the order.

13. Counsel for the claimants has specifically addressed the question of full and frank disclosure and has done so under seven separate headings. I have considered each of those points and have concluded that it is appropriate to make the orders now sought. - - - - - - - - - - (This judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com