Michael Fred Hanson v Michael Oliver Hanson

1. This is my substantive extemporary judgment following the trial of a claim in the Circuit Commercial Court in Manchester under claim number CC-2024-MAN-000031. The claimant is Mr Michael Fred Hanson, who is in his mid-70s. He is represented by Mr David Williams (of counsel), instructed by KBL LLP of Blackburn. The defendant is the claimant’s adult son by his first wife, Linda, Mr Michael Oliver Hanson. He is in his early 50s and represents himself as a litigant in person. This is the second, and final, day of the trial of this claim.

2. Yesterday morning I delivered a short extemporary judgment refusing a renewed application by the defendant for an adjournment of this trial. In the course of that judgment, I set out the nature of this dispute and the background to it. Since this judgment is unlikely to be of any interest to anyone other than the parties themselves, I will not burden it by repeating what I said yesterday as to the nature of the dispute and the background to it. This judgment should be read in conjunction with my judgment yesterday morning refusing an adjournment of this trial.

3. Essentially, this is a sad dispute between father and adult son over the ownership of two disputed classic motor vehicles. One is a 2005 model red Ferrari 575. There is a dispute raised by the defendant as to whether this is a Ferrari which enjoys the improved sports handling pack which goes by the initials HGTC. Were it to do so, then it would make the Ferrari a much more valuable classic car. It is unnecessary to resolve that dispute for the purposes of this claim. The other motor vehicle is a 2005 Fleetwood Revolution motorhome. The Ferrari presently bears the registration number 575MFH and the motorhome bears the registration number T70MOH. The letters MFH clearly represent the initials of the claimant, Michael Fred Hanson, and the letters MOH clearly represent the initials of the defendant, Michael Oliver Hanson.

4. This case is peculiar in that not only is the defendant not legally represented, but he also has no admissible evidence of his own on which he can rely in support of his case in the form of any witness statement from himself or from any supporting witness. The claimant gave evidence himself and he is his only witness. His witness statement is dated 25 September 2025, and he was cross-examined by the defendant, his son, for about two hours either side of the luncheon adjournment yesterday. It is fair to say, as I think the defendant himself said, that good parts of the cross-examination involved the two individuals sparking off each other.

5. I found the claimant, in the course of his evidence, to be reasonable and accommodating, although firm in the evidence that he gave. It is fair to say that, despite the strenuous cross-examination by his son, he at no time materially departed from the evidence in his written witness statement. I found the form of the defendant’s cross-examination, at times, to be aggressive and belligerent, but that is no doubt a reflection of the deep emotions that the defendant feels about this case.

6. After the conclusion of the claimant’s cross-examination, there was no re-examination by Mr Williams. We proceeded to Mr Williams’s closing speech for about 45 minutes. I then adjourned at about 3.35 yesterday afternoon to enable the defendant to collect his thoughts to present his closing submissions. The matter was listed for 10.30 this morning; but, at the defendant’s request, I allowed a further 15 minutes for him to reduce his thoughts to writing. The defendant had hoped to be able to produce a written document for the claimant and the Court but, without access to any computing or printing facilities, in the end he ended up addressing the Court orally this morning.

7. The nature of the claimant’s case appears from the particulars of claim. So far as the Ferrari is concerned, that is addressed at paragraphs 5 through to 10 of the particulars. The claimant says that he purchased the Ferrari from Cheshire Classic Cars in or around 2016 for the sum of approximately £177,000. The purchase was, so the claimant says, partly funded by a lump sum of £123,000 from the claimant’s personal pension. He says that that was paid to him on 22 October 2015 by the Hanson Reyner Trust. I should explain that Rayner was the original surname of the claimant’s second wife from whom he has undergone a somewhat acrimonious divorce and financial resolution dispute extending over some years. As well as the lump sum of £123,000 from his personal pension, the claimant says that he also paid a deposit of £10,000 for the Ferrari on 18 March 2015. He annexes a copy of the relevant cheque to the particulars of claim. This is at page 20 of the hearing bundle. However, on examination, it is clear that the manuscript date which appears to be 18 March must be 18 December 2015 (as the defendant pointed out). That is so because the cheque book appears to have been issued after March 2015. More relevantly, it is clear from the endorsement on the rear of the cheque that it was in fact processed and paid on 22 December 2015.

8. During the course of his cross-examination of his father, the defendant produced an email from a senior manager at Moorfields[?] whom I understand to have been concerned in the insolvency of the company Cheshire Classic Cars Limited. This email, dated 25 September 2015, records a schedule of transactions from the company’s ledger account against a stated bank account with the name Hanson included in the name field. This shows that there was a payment by Mr Hanson Senior on 23 October 2015 in the sum of £37,500. There was also a payment by Mr Hanson Senior of £10,000 on 21 December 2015. That ties in with the processing details on the reverse of the cheque, which shows that it was processed the following day. It seems clear to me that the claimant, when giving instructions for the particulars of claim (which were verified by a statement of truth signed by his solicitor) has misread the date on the cheque and thought he had paid a deposit of £10,000 on 18 March 2015. In reality, he appears to have made two payments by cheque, one of £37,500 on or about 23 October and the other of £10,000 on or about 21 December 2015. There are other entries in respect of the claimant recorded in the company’s ledger. That document should have been disclosed by the defendant in advance of the first day of the trial whereas it was in fact only produced during the cross-examination of the claimant. I have allowed reference to be made to it because it clearly explains a misapprehension on the part of the claimant, and it accords with the processing information on the rear of the cheque. But I have declined to allow the defendant to rely upon further documents which he has failed to disclose in accordance with Judge Pearce’s order for disclosure, which was made on 4 September 2025. That order was made in the presence of the defendant, as a litigant in person, and was clear on its face as to what was required of him.

9. I am satisfied, therefore, that there is an error in paragraph 6 of the particulars of claim. I am also satisfied that that is a genuine, and innocent, mistake on the part of the claimant, due to his misreading of the manuscript date on the face of the cheque. It does, however, indicate that the claimant cannot be entirely relied upon as an accurate, and reliable, witness. I make it clear that I am entirely satisfied that the claimant was doing his best to give accurate, and reliable, evidence to the Court. There is no question of any deliberate misrepresentation of any evidence on his part. I found him to be an honest witness, in the sense that he was giving his best evidence to the Court, to the best of his recollection and belief. But so far as the date of the cheque is concerned, I find that he was in error.

10. The particulars of claim plead, at paragraph 7, that the balance of the purchase price was paid by part exchanging a Rolls Royce Phantom III, registration number DGY1, which the claimant says was given to him by the defendant by way of part payment of numerous debts owed by the defendant to the claimant. The particulars of claim go on to plead that, from 4 September 2016 until February 2024, the claimant was registered with the DVLA as the registered keeper of the Ferrari. Copies of the relevant V5C and V750 (certificate of entitlement) are annexed to the particulars of claim. These documents show that the Ferrari was originally registered under number DL05 JSU in the name of the claimant on 22 September 2016. The registration appears to have been changed to 575MFH, registered in the name of the claimant, on 11 October 2016. There is also a certificate of entitlement to that cherished registration number that is in the name of Ms - it says Mr, but it should be Ms - Gemma Lomax at Vision Techniques Limited. That was the claimant’s company, and Ms Lomax was the claimant’s personal assistant. The reelvant agreement bears the date 29 June 2016.

11. The particulars of claim also plead that the Ferrari is listed as an asset within the financial statement dated October 2018 that was used in the claimant’s divorce proceedings. It pleads that the financial order made within those proceedings required the claimant to sell the Ferrari by 20 August 2024. The particulars also plead that for a number of years the Ferrari has been kept at an address known as ‘The Barn’ at Billington. The Barn is said to be a large building which is jointly owned by the claimant and the defendant and which houses numerous vehicles.

12. The particulars of claim plead that the motorhome was purchased by the claimant in February 2013. It was bought using finance from Yorkshire Bank, which was repaid by the claimant without any contribution from the defendant. The claimant pleads that he was listed as the registered keeper of the motorhome for over 10 years until February 2024. A copy of the relevant V5C form is annexed to the particulars of claim and shows that the claimant was recorded as the registered keeper on 18 February 2013.

13. Paragraph 16 of the particulars of claim pleads that by an agreement made between the parties, the claimant and defendant are 50% joint owners of the motorhome. It also says that the same was reflected in the financial statement used within the claimant’s divorce proceedings.

14. The defence was settled on behalf of the defendant by solicitors (Westbrook Law Limited, in London) who were then representing the defendant. They ceased to act for him following an order made by His Honour Judge Stephen Davies on 27 January 2025.

15. Paragraph 8 of the defence addresses the Ferrari. It pleads that the defendant purchased the Ferrari from Cheshire Classic Cars Limited, with their name and address stated on the sales invoice. The purchase price is said to have been £180,000. This comprised £142,500, by way of part exchanging the defendant’s Rolls Royce Phantom III with registration number DGY1, and £37,500 was a gift from the claimant. The £10,000 cheque is said to have been the payment for the restoration of another vehicle, and to be nothing to do with these proceedings. The defence notes that the claimant has failed to show any evidence of what the cheque was for.

16. The defence pleads that the defendant’s Rolls Royce was part exchanged for the purchase of the Ferrari, and that there was no agreement to transfer ownership to the claimant. Annexed to the defence are copies of the purchase invoice and correspondence from the seller confirming the defendant as the purchaser of the Rolls Royce.

17. There is an invoice, number 11092A, and dated 15 October 2015. Although addressed, unhelpfully, given the names of the claimant and defendant, to Mr M Hanson. An address is given, and it is accepted that that is the defendant’s address, and that the invoice was addressed to the defendant. The vehicle is described as a Ferrari 575M, and the original DL05JSU registration is given. The narrative of the invoice from Cheshire Classic Cars Limited reads: “To sale of the above vehicle £180,000 less part exchange allowance for Rolls Royce Phantom III DGW1 £142,500. Total due £37,500”.

18. There is another invoice in the bundle with the slightly different invoice number 11092. The details are all the same apart from the sale price of the vehicle, which is said to be £177,500. There is some suggestion from the claimant, supported by an email from Mr Ian Tyrrell, who used to work for Cheshire Classic Cars, that it is the £177,500 invoice which is correct. It seems to me that that is not a matter which this Court needs to resolve. What is clear, on the basis of the two invoices, one of which, at least, the claimant seems to accept to be genuine, is that so far as the invoicing by Cheshire Classic Cars is concerned, the purchase proceeded by way of: (1) a part exchange allowance for the Rolls Royce Phantom III, and (2) the payment of the balance in the sum of £37,500. That tallies with the entry in the records from the company’s ledger for the bank account, showing entries bearing the name ‘Hanson’. As I have mentioned, this shows a payment of £37,500 on 23 October 2015.

19. The defence also pleads that the reason the registration certificates were in the claimant’s name is because this was required for insuring the vehicles under a multi-car policy together with other motor vehicles. The pleading emphasises the clear statement on the front of the form V5C that that document constitutes no proof of ownership.

20. So far as the motorhome is concerned, the claimant’s case on that is disputed at paragraph 6 of the defence. This pleads that the defendant is the owner of the Fleetwood motorhome. This was purchased under a finance agreement by the defendant, as a director of Icethaw Salt Supplies Limited. Finance payments were repaid through the defendant’s director’s account. It is accepted that the claimant did make some payments towards the end of the finance agreement. However, there was no agreement for any part of the ownership of the motorhome to be transferred. It is pleaded that the defendant wanted to sell the vehicle, and the claimant offered to carry on paying the final instalments of the finance so that they could continue to use the motorhome. It was a gift from father to son because the claimant does not have the required driving licence, and constantly needed the defendant to drive the motorhome around. Proof of the finance agreement for the vehicle is annexed to the defence. This shows a hire purchase agreement entered into between Clydesdale Bank Plc, trading as Yorkshire Bank, and Icethaw Salt Supplies Limited. The cash price is stated to be £115,000. There is also evidence of the sale of the Rolls Royce Phantom III to Mr Michael Hanson – which I understand is intended to be a reference to the defendant - on 14 January 2009, at a price of £65,000.

21. Therefore, the issue between the parties is as to the ownership of the two vehicles. On the claimant’s side, he says that he is sole owner of the Ferrari, and a 50% owner of the motorcaravan. The defendant disputes that, and says that he is the sole owner of both vehicles. There is no dispute between the parties that the defendant has interfered with the vehicles if the claimant’s case that he is owner, or part-owner of them, is correct. There is no issue between the parties that the defendant has withheld the vehicles from the claimant in circumstances amounting to a tort under Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 . The defendant says, however, that he is fully entitled to do so because the vehicles are his.

22. There are areas of common ground. It was clear from the defendant’s cross-examination of his father that he accepts that it was the claimant who wished to purchase the Ferrari. They had discovered it accidentally when visiting the showrooms of Cheshire Classic Cars for quite a different purpose. It is also accepted by the claimant that he cannot drive the motorhome because he does not have the required driving licence to do so. It is also accepted by the claimant that he has never driven the motorhome, and that he has almost never, if ever, driven the Ferrari.

23. In his closing submissions this morning, the defendant referred to his father’s generosity to him, and to his brother, in making a number of father to son gifts. Although it was not put in these terms to the claimant during his cross-examination yesterday, the defendant believes that his father is being pressured, and manipulated, in bringing, and pursuing, this claim by his father’s present partner, Michelle. The claimant is described by the defendant as a multi-faceted character. The defendant emphasises that the assertion of a £10,000 deposit is a false representation which puts all the claimant’s other evidence in doubt. During his cross-examination of his father yesterday, the defendant emphasised the complete absence of any paper documentation in support of the assertion that the balance of the cost of the Ferrari was met out of payments from the claimant’s personal pension.

24. Mr Williams, in opening the case yesterday morning, acknowledged that there were some gaps in the claimant’s evidence; but he attributed these partly to the passage of time, and partly to the loss of documents which had been caught up in the matrimonial dispute. That was a matter that the claimant confirmed in the course of his evidence under cross-examination yesterday. Nevertheless, Mr Williams submits that there is sufficient documentary, and oral, evidence to enable the Court comfortably to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant has made out his case.

25. The current status of the vehicles is that they both remain within the defendant’s possession at The Barn, and, indeed, that the defendant is presently living in the motorhome. That is the ambit of the dispute.

26. So far as the Ferrari is concerned, I cannot accept, for the reasons I have given, the precise account given by the claimant as to how its purchase was financed. Clearly, the £10,000 was not paid by way of a deposit in March 2015. It postdates the payment of the £37,500 on or around 23 October 2015. But there is no doubt, from the document produced by the defendant, and also on his own case, that the balance over and above the contribution made by the part-exchange of the Rolls Royce Phantom III was met by the claimant. I am satisfied, on the totality of the evidence, that although it is clear that he can no longer remember exactly how the Ferrari was purchased, that it was purchased for, and was to belong to, the claimant.

27. I accept that the Phantom III, which belonged to the defendant, was used by way of part exchange for the purchase of the Ferrari. But I accept the claimant’s evidence that this was effectively in recognition of the considerable gifts that the claimant had made to the defendant over many years. The claimant had provided the funds which had been used by the two together in building up a classic military vehicle collection, which seems to have been impressive in its extent, and in purchasing many other cars. I am satisfied that, on this occasion, it was the claimant who wished to acquire the Ferrari; and that the defendant willingly agreed to use his own Rolls Royce Phantom III to partly finance the purchase, on the basis that this was by way of reimbursement of gifts that had previously been made by the claimant to the defendant.

28. The claimant relies upon hearsay evidence from a number of individuals who say that, at the time of the purchase, the Ferrari was to be the claimant’s. I attach no weight to any of those hearsay statements. They come from a number of sources; Iain Tyrell, Damon Milnes and Adam Sykes, who are all said to have been involved with Cheshire Classic Cars. There is also hearsay evidence from the claimant’s former PA, Gemma Lomax. I accept the defendant’s submission that I should attach no weight to these hearsay statements. The claimant says that all of those witnesses were reluctant to come to Court and give evidence in support of his case for fear of repercussions from the defendant, in terms of his postings on social media in retaliation for any evidence they might give. But the reality is that the claimant could have served witness summonses on them requiring them to attend Court to give evidence, when they could then have been cross-examined by the defendant. The defendant says that he would have called them to give evidence had he not been under the impression that the claimant would be doing so. It does not seem to me to be right, in those circumstances, that I should hold their hearsay statements against the defendant. But, independently of their evidence, there seems to me to be clear and compelling evidence in support of the claimant’s case. There is the fact that the Ferrari was registered with the DVLA in the claimant’s name. The defendant says that this was for insurance reasons, but I do not accept that that was the case. Certainly, there was no reason for the personal number plate, bearing the claimant’s initials MFH, being applied to the Ferrari if it was not the claimant’s own vehicle.

29. There is some contemporaneous email evidence supportive of the claimant’s case that the Ferrari was his, and which explains the form of the invoice. There is an email dated 6 October 2015 from Damon Milnes at Cheshire Classic Cars to both the claimant and the defendant. This confirms the outcome of a series of telephone calls between them. It says that, subject to final inspection, the claimant and defendant have agreed to purchase the Ferrari for £37,500 plus the ‘Montgomery’ Phantom III. Mr Milnes states that he will let them know as soon as the wheels have been received, when they would be most welcome to drive the car before completing the purchase. The email concludes: “In due course, please let me know which address is to be used for the invoice”. It was, no doubt, pursuant to that, that the address of the defendant was inserted, but that is no doubt because there had been numerous previous dealings between both the claimant and the defendant with Cheshire Classic Cars over the years. What is clear is there was to be a cash payment of £37,500, and the document produced by the defendant shows that that came from the claimant. I am satisfied that the defendant provided the Phantom III in recognition of the generosity that he had received from his father over the years.

30. There are also two further contemporaneous emails. One is dated 28 March 2016 (at page 272). It is from the claimant to a friend of his, Rod Harron. It refers to a number of matters, but it includes the following: “On the car front I bought a Ferrari 575F1 HGTC as an investment in September. It’s increased in value by 75K already, it’s absolutely mint in every way having lived in Italy all its life, just like new, it’s almost too good to drive.” Later, on 4 October 2016, there is an email, again from the claimant to an individual called Ronn, which says - and it was accepted that the word ‘not’ had been mistakenly omitted: “I’ve [not] even driven my Ferrari 575F1 HGTC yet and I’ve owned it now for 13 months!!”

31. More significantly, there are emails, and WhatsApp messages, between the claimant and the defendant which are, in my judgment, consistent only with the claimant’s ownership of the Ferrari. At page 30, there is a WhatsApp, or text, message from the defendant to his father stating: “Ferrari will be outside of The Barn later today in the trailer for you to collect.” There is a further WhatsApp, or text, message in which the defendant says that he is withholding the Ferrari and will see the claimant in Court. He comments: “Some dad you are, pathetic”.

32. There are also emails, one from the defendant to the finance director of the claimant’s company, Jonathan Peach, dated 18 February 2021 (at page 301). It refers to the Ferrari, and a number of other vehicles, and comments: “I assume possession of these vehicles if not otherwise agreed within the timeframe set out.” Another email from the defendant to the claimant, on 3 December 2021, comments that the Ferrari is ‘dead’, invites the claimant to collect it with other vehicles and return all of the defendant’s, and his mother’s, possessions by 1 April 2021, and concludes: “If not collected by then, I assume ownership.” Both of those emails seem to me to be inconsistent with any existing ownership of the Ferrari by the defendant.

33. The claimant’s ownership of the Ferrari is also consistent with the way in which it was treated in the claimant’s divorce proceedings. It was included as an asset within those proceedings, to be realised for the benefit of the divorcing second wife. Why would the claimant do that if the Ferrari belonged to his son? Surely, he would have wanted to preserve it from his second wife, with whom he was engaged in a bitter financial resolution dispute? Also significant is the fact that the defendant was on notice that the Ferrari was being treated as an asset of the father in the divorce proceedings and yet he took no steps to dispute that.

34. At page 79 of the bundle, there is a letter, dated 10 August 2020, from the claimant’s family law solicitors, Maguire Family Law, to the defendant. It lists a dispute over the following vehicles and registration numbers, which are then listed; but they exclude the Ferrari. The letter then records that the claimant’s position is that those vehicles belong to the defendant, as do the registration numbers, with two stated exceptions. It was said to be the wife’s (Mrs Reyner’s) position that the claimant owned all the vehicles and registration numbers. The letter invited the defendant to confirm his position as to the ownership of the vehicles and registration number plates; and whether the defendant might wish to intervene in the proceedings and attend the pre-trial review (details of the hearing of which were given). The letter strongly advised the defendant to seek independent legal advice as to the contents of the letter and its implications. At no stage did the defendant seek to intervene in the family proceedings to assert his ownership of the Ferrari.

35. There were later emails. One of 5 July 2023 refers to an order by His Honour Judge Wallwork of 29 April 2022 ordering the claimant to sell various vehicles within the farm building including the Ferrari 575. A complaint was made of the defendant blocking those vehicles within the farm building with his own vehicles and military vehicles, thereby frustrating the attempts of the wife to sell each vehicle in accordance with the terms of the final order.

36. Reference is made to a further hearing in the matter in the family court on 1 and 2 August 2023. There was no objection by the defendant to the fact that the Ferrari had been ordered to be sold as part of the matrimonial dispute order. There is a similar email on 23 August 2023 (at page 84), with reference to a still further hearing on 9 and 10 November 2023. The fact that in those matrimonial proceedings, the claimant treated the Ferrari as his property, and that the defendant, knowing that, took no issue with the claimant’s ownership, is strongly supportive of the claimant’s case, and tends to refute the defendant’s assertions of ownership. I am therefore satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant is indeed the sole owner of the Ferrari. It was financed with a payment of £37,500 by the claimant, and with the balance coming from the sale of the defendant’s Rolls Royce Phantom III, but on the footing that that money was being provided to enable the claimant to purchase the vehicle for his own benefit.

37. I turn then to the motorcaravan. The parties are agreed that originally this was being purchased with finance from Yorkshire Bank by the defendant’s Company, Icethaw Salt Supplies Limited. However, there came a time in 2013 when that company fell into financial difficulties. I accept the claimant’s evidence that, at that point, he stepped in to avoid the motorcaravan either being repossessed by Yorkshire Bank, or being taken by the liquidator or administrator of Icethaw. The matter was not only addressed in the claimant’s witness statement, but his evidence was reinforced in cross-examination. My note records that the claimant said that Icethaw paid for the motorhome until 2013. There was still £45,000 owing, which that company could not pay. “If I hadn’t paid, Yorkshire Bank would have taken it.” I am satisfied that the claimant and the defendant came to an agreement whereby the claimant paid off the outstanding finance on the motorcaravan in return for an agreement that the claimant and the defendant would thereafter be equal owners of the motor-van.

38. The claimant frankly accepted in his evidence that he had never driven the motor caravan, and that he cannot drive it because he does not have the necessary licence. But I am satisfied that that was the agreement that was concluded between them. Whether, of course, that agreement was binding upon Icethaw, or the subsequent insolvency practitioner who took over the conduct of its affairs, is a matter that need not concern this Court. The fact is that, as between the claimant and the defendant, there was an agreement of equal ownership in return for the claimant effectively preserving the motorcaravan from either the finance company, Yorkshire Bank, or the insolvency practitioner charged with the administration or liquidation of Icethaw. That is entirely consistent with what then happened, which is that the registration certificate for the motorcaravan was changed to show that the claimant had acquired the vehicle on 18 February 2013.

39. I reject the suggestion of the defendant that that was solely for insurance purposes. I bear in mind that the form V5C is not proof of ownership, and merely shows who is responsible for registering and taxing the vehicle. But I am satisfied that that evidenced the situation, in which the claimant acquired a 50% interest in the vehicle.

40. Since the claimant and the defendant are the joint owners of the vehicle, it does not seem to me that it would be appropriate for the Court to make any order requiring the defendant to hand the vehicle over to the claimant. It seems to me that the claimant is merely entitled to a declaration that he is the joint owner of, and entitled to a 50% share in, the motorhome, and damages for the defendant’s deprivation of his 50% entitlement in the motorhome.

41. Therefore, for those reasons, I will declare that the claimant is the owner, and the person entitled to possession, of the Ferrari. I will declare that the claimant is the joint owner of, and entitled to a 50% share in, the motorhome or motorcaravan. I will order delivery up of the Ferrari; and I will order an inquiry into the damages sustained by the claimant as a result of the defendant’s refusal to afford him access to the motorhome, and for his 50% share in that vehicle. There will be interest on any sum found to be due to the claimant. My present view is that the appropriate rate of interest is not the judgment rate of 8%, which is sought in the particulars of claim, but rather 2% over base rate from time to time.

42. Therefore that concludes this extemporary judgment. End of Judgment. Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 [email protected] Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof