Sharon Elisabeth Brace v Torridge District Council

Amended under rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) General Regulatory Chamber Rules 2009 Introduction

1. This is an appeal under regulation 24 of the Animal Welfare (Licencing of Activities Involving Animals) (England) Regulations 2018 (the 2018 Regulations) against a decision made by the Torridge District Council (the Council) and sent to the appellant on 31 March 2025, to refuse to grant the appellant an animal activity licence for dog breeding on the grounds that the appellant had not met the minimum standards to be issued a licence.

2. The appellant had submitted some documents to the tribunal that had not been included in the bundle and which I had therefore not read before the hearing. As this information was potentially relevant, I gave both parties the opportunity to make written submissions following the hearing. I took those submissions into account when determining the appeal. Factual background to the appeals

3. The appellant lives with her husband at a property in Beaworthy, Devon. At that property reside 18 breeding dogs and 11 non-breeding dogs.

4. On 5 September 2024 the Council attended the appellant’s property to investigate reports of unlicenced dog breeding. The appellant subsequently applied for a licence on 18 September 2024.

5. The Council inspected the property on 18 December 2024. The following people took part in the inspection: Mandi Farinacci – Council’s Neighbourhood Officer and Animal Licencing Officer Gareth Cross – Veterinarian Freya Brooks – Veterinarian Grant McGill – Planning Enforcement Office Ian McIver – Community Safety and Public Health Officer

6. Ms Farinacci prepared a report which was considered by Christopher Parkhouse, the Lead Licencing Officer.

7. Mandi Farinacci made a further visit on 21 January 2025.

8. The Council refused to grant the licence and a notice of refusal was sent to the appellant on 31 March 2025. Legal Framework

9. Under paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 of the 2018 Regulations, either or both of the following activities are ‘licensable activities’: a. breeding three or more litters of puppies in any 12-month period, unless the person carrying on the activity provides documentary evidence that none of them have been sold. b. breeding dogs and advertising a business of selling dogs.

10. The relevant parts of the 2018 Regulations provide: Conditions of grant or renewal of a licence Regulation 4.—(1) This regulation applies where— (a) a local authority has received from an operator an application in writing for the grant or renewal of a licence to carry on a licensable activity on premises in the local authority's area, and (b) the application gives such information as the local authority has required. (2) The local authority must— (a) appoint one or more suitably qualified inspectors to inspect any premises on which the licensable activity or any part of it is being or is to be carried on, and (b) following that inspection, grant a licence to the operator, or renew the operator's licence, in accordance with the application if it is satisfied that— (i) the licence conditions will be met, (ii) any appropriate fee has been paid in accordance with regulation 13, and (iii) the grant or renewal is appropriate having taken into account the report submitted to it in accordance with regulation 10. … (5) On receipt of an application in writing for the grant of a licence in respect of the activity described in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1, if no inspector appointed under paragraph (2)(a) is a veterinarian, the local authority must appoint a veterinarian to inspect the premises with the inspector appointed under that paragraph. (7) In considering whether the licence conditions will be met, a local authority must take account of the applicant’s conduct as the operator of the licensable activity to which the application for the grant or renewal relates, whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be the operator of that activity and any other relevant circumstances. … 10 Inspector’s report (1) Where a local authority arranges an inspection pursuant to regulation 4(2)(a), it must arrange for the submission to it of a report by the inspector. (2) The inspector’s report must – a. Contain information about the operator, any relevant premises, any relevant records, the condition of any animals and any other relevant matter, and b. State whether or not the inspector considers that the licence conditions will be met. (14) A local authority must have regard in the carrying out of its functions under these Regulations to such guidance as may be issued by the Secretary of State.

11. The “licence conditions” are defined as both the general conditions which are contained in Schedule 2 and the relevant specific conditions which, in the case of licences for breeding dogs are contained in Schedule 6.

12. The relevant guidance is ‘Dog breeding licensing: statutory guidance for local authorities (updated 1 October 2023)’ (the Guidance).

13. The Guidance states that: It is expected that all businesses will meet and maintain minimum standards…. To grant a new animals activities licence for breeding dogs, you must check that businesses meet all of the minimum standards in this guidance. Notice of refusal

14. The notice of refusal stated that the appellant had not met the required minimum standards to be issued a dog breeding licence and attached a schedule providing details of the minimum standards that the appellant had not met and the reasons for the refusal of the licence.

15. The schedule to the decision specified that the following standards in the general conditions set out in Schedule 2 of the 2018 Regulations were not met: 4(2) The licence holder or a designated manager and any staff employed to care for the animals must have competence to identify the normal behaviour of the species for which they are caring and to recognise signs of, and take appropriate measures to mitigate or prevent, pain, suffering, injury, disease or abnormal behaviour. 5(4) Where appropriate for the species, a toileting area and opportunities for toileting must be provided. 5(6) The animals must be transported and handled in a manner (including for example, in relation to housing, temperature, ventilation and frequency) that protects them from pain, suffering, injury and disease. 5(8) All resources must be provided in a way (for example as regards frequency, location and access points) that minimises competitive behaviour or the dominance of individual animals. 5(9) The animals must not be left unattended in any situation or for any period likely to cause them distress. 6(4) Feed and drinking receptacles must be capable of being cleaned and disinfected, or disposable. 6(5) Constant access to fresh, clean drinking water must be provided in a suitable receptacle for the species that requires it. 7(1) Active and effective environmental enrichment must be provided to the animals in inside and outside environments. 7(2) For species whose welfare depends partly on exercise, opportunities to exercise which benefit the animals' physical and mental health must be provided, unless advice from a vet suggests otherwise. 7(3) The animals' behaviour and any changes of behaviour must be monitored. Advice must be sought, as appropriate and without delay, from a vet or, in the case of fish, any person competent to give such advice if adverse or unusual behaviour is detected. 7(5) All immature animals must be given suitable and adequate opportunities to— (a) learn how to interact with people, their own species and other animals where such interaction benefits their welfare, and (b) become habituated to noises, objects and activities in their environment. 8(2) The animals must be kept separately or in suitable compatible social groups appropriate to the species and individual animals and no animals from a social species may be isolated or separated from others of their species for any longer than is necessary. 8(3) The animals must have at least daily opportunities to interact with people where such interaction benefits their welfare. 9(4) All reasonable precautions must be taken to prevent and control the spread among animals and people of infectious diseases and parasites. 9(7) Where necessary, animals must receive preventative treatment by an appropriately competent person.

16. The schedule to the decision also included the following specific conditions from Schedule 6: 2(2) Each dog must be provided with sufficient space… 4(1) The licence holder must implement and be able to demonstrate the use of a documented socialisation and habituation programme for the puppies. 4(5) Any equipment that a dog is likely to be in contact with and any toy provided must not pose a risk of pain, suffering, disease or distress to the dog and must be correctly used. 6(6) The health, safety and welfare of each dog must be checked at the start and end of every day and at least every 4 hours during the daytime. 6(12) A preventative healthcare plan agreed with the veterinarian with whom the licence holder has registered… must be implemented. Notice of appeal

17. The grounds of appeal are: Ground 1: Condition 4(2) – competence of licence holder

18. The appellant argues that: a. the care of a male peacock is not relevant because it is not covered by the licence. b. the factual matrix relied on by the Council is wrong. Ground 2: Condition 5(4) – opportunities for toileting

19. The appellant argues that the Council has wrongly assessed the facts, failed to properly apply the guidance and taken into account irrelevant considerations. The appellant says that the commentary/alleged conduct in the decision focusses on exercise/enrichment not toileting. She argues that the condition is met. The appellant notes: a. Although there is no access run, all kennels are internally connected through ‘pop holes’ allowing free movement. b. The kennel walls are 4 feet high and could safely be jumped over if toileting, exercise or companionship are required. c. There is access to a secure outside area for toileting and the animals can regularly leave the kennel for toileting. Ground 3: Condition 5(6) – transporting/handling safely

20. The appellant asserts that the Council places undue weight on the fact that there is no space for a crate, because other suitable restraints were available.

21. The appellant asserts that the requirement is met. She says that an adult dog harness is fitted for the Border Collies and the puppies have always been transported safely in suitable cages that fit the vehicle. Ground 4: Condition 5(8) – minimising competitive behaviour/dominance

22. The appellant submits that: a. Water is provided in a way that minimizes unsuitable interacting with drinking water and ensures constant access to clean water. b. The appellant disputes that there was a need to have water bowls within each stall, but these were, in any event, provided a couple of weeks after the visit on 21 January 2025 and notified to the Council before the refusal decision. c. Although one bucket may have been waiting to be refilled on the visit on 21 January 2025, the dogs had access to other water stations. d. The refusal decision does not state that the water was provided in a way that increased competitive behaviour and the criticisms are of little relevance to condition 5(8). Ground 5: Condition 5(9) – leaving animals unattended

23. The appellant submits that the Council’s rationale is flawed and incoherent. She argues that the Council’s comments and reasons in relation to condition 5(9) are not relevant to whether the dogs are left unattended in any situation or for any period likely to cause them distress but relate to access to toileting and exercise. Ground 6: Condition 6(4) – feed and drinking receptacles

24. The appellant submits that it is unclear on what basis the Council submits that condition 6(4) is not met because she uses a natural antibacterial cleaner and tea towel to clean the bowls. Ground 7: Condition 6(5) – access to water

25. The appellant asserts that this condition is met because fresh drinking water is provided daily and changed as often as necessary in clean receptacles and all dogs have access to water. She relies on the matters set out under Ground 4. Ground 8: Condition 7(1) and part B 4(5) – enrichment and equipment

26. The appellant asserts that the factual summary in the reasons for the refusal decision falls into error and that the focus should be on the breeding dogs. She sets out a list of matters that she says ensure an active and effective environmental enrichment. Ground 9: Conditions 7(2), 8(3), part B 4(1) and 7(5) – socialisation/interaction/exercise

27. The appellant raised the following points: a. The appellant took advice from her vet who raised no concerns with the whelping arrangements and the appellant puts a divider in the puppy pen as necessary. It is averred that this satisfies paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 of the 2018 Regulations. b. The requirements were met in relation to whelping which is not required to be done inside a house. The appellant questions the legal basis on which the Council suggests that conditions 7(2), 8(3), Part B 4(1) and 7(5) are met. c. There is no rational basis for the Council’s assertion that the puppies or border collies are not provided with opportunities to exercise. The Council’s reasoning is based on an assumption that they are ‘likely in solitary confinement for hours a day’. d. The appellant provides details of her case on the steps taken in relation to socialisation, interaction and exercise. She asserts that the averment that the dogs are born and raised without socialisation is unsupported by any evidential basis. Ground 10: Conditions 9(4), 9(7) and part B 6(12) – spread of infectious diseases/preventative treatment/health care plans

28. The appellant argues that as the Council admit that the dogs are all now vaccinated, it is unclear on what basis it is suggested that condition 9(4) is not met.

29. The appellant says that she takes appropriate steps to comply with the guidance: a. She relied on the professional advice of her vet, who said that the older border collies did not need vaccination. b. The adult and younger border collies were vaccinated in May 2024 and will have their annual vaccines in May 2025. c. Where there is evidence of external parasites, treatment is discussed with the vet before it is administered. d. In relation to the puppies, the appellant initially relied on veterinary advice not to vaccinate before the puppies were 12 weeks old but has agreed to an appropriate healthcare plan moving forward, including vaccination of any puppies at 8 weeks old.

30. In relation to condition 9(7) the appellant says that she has sought advice from her vet and discussed and agreed a plan. As per the Guidance and in compliance with Part B 6(12) there is an appropriate healthcare plan agreed orally with her vet, including preventative flea sprays, flea treatment every 3 months for the cats and a worming treatment every 3 months. Ground 11: Condition Part B 2(2) – sufficient space

31. The appellant asserts that none of the breeding dogs reside in the garage and there is sufficient space in the Barn. In relation to the whelping bitch, the appellant asserts that the pre-licensing arrangement was discussed with the appellant’s vet who did not suggest that the space was too small. Further, the appellant asserts that future whelping will take place in the puppy pen, extending to a larger space as the puppies grow which it is asserted satisfies the requirements. Ground 12: Condition Part B 6(6) - health, safety and welfare checks

32. The appellant asserts that the Council’s comments under 6(6) are immaterial because they relate to whether the dogs are let out and not to the conditions in 6(6). Ground 13: Condition 7(3) - Identify and monitoring changes of behaviour

33. The appellant submits that these conditions are satisfied and that nothing within the Council’s comments suggest that she has not satisfied or met the Guidance. Response

34. In its response to the appeal, the Council relied on a letter to the appellant dated 28 May 2025. That letter included a schedule of each condition with comments/responses to the points made by the appellant in the grounds of appeal. The Council also rely on a document produced by Mandi Farinacci (at p C246) which responds to the appeal points. Ground 1

35. In relation to condition 4(2): a. The Council argues, in essence, that the appellant’s conduct in relation to the peacock was relevant to the appellant’s ability to maintain good welfare of all animals on a premises. b. The Council asserts that the appellant admitted that the older dogs who grew up in the house at the appellant’s old address were more confident with people. The Council asserts that the appellant did not identify any appropriate measure that she would take to mitigate this behaviour. Ground 2

36. In relation to condition 5(4), the Council says that observations of the Animal Licencing Officers and two vets were that the dogs do not jump the stall walls and doors but wait to be let out for toileting. It appeared at the visit that the dogs were first let out to toilet at 11am at the start of the visit. The Council says that a log sheet/schedule could be produced showing when dogs are let out of the kennels.

37. The Council assert that the ‘pop-holes’ were not open at any point during the three visits allowing for free movement. Ground 3

38. In relation to condition 5(6), the Council say that they did not place weight on there being no room for a crate. The appellant did not agree to buy a harness and said that she held on to the dogs in the rear of the vehicle. The appellant did not say that puppies had been transported in suitable cages. If this has been addressed retrospectively it could be reassessed at a re-inspection. Ground 4

39. In relation to condition 5(8), the Council say that observations show that there was competition for water as it was a limited resource. This was not corrected by the follow up visit in January. The assertion that each dog now has a water bowl and constant access to water could be rechecked at re-inspection and unannounced visits. Ground 5

40. In relation to condition 5(9) the Council say that there was no evidence dogs had been let out or were being regularly observed. At the visit on 5 September 2024 the appellant and her husband were still in bed at 10.30/11 am. On 18 December 2024 some of the dogs were not let out during the long visit. On 21 January 2025 when let out the dogs were very keen to drink and toilet. Being in real need of water and toileting would cause a dog distress. A log sheet could be produced to provide evidence that regular checks are being undertaken. Ground 6

41. In relation to 6(4) the Council asserts that cleaning with a spray and a cloth will lead to build up of the natural cleaning fluid. The Council says that bowls were not suitably cleaned and that it is good practice to wash bowls in hot soapy water. The assertion that it is now being done could be checked at a re-inspection. At the time of the inspection there was no hot water in the kitchen. Ground 7

42. In relation to 6(5) the Council asserts that the appellant had disputed the need for dogs to have constant access to water. There were still no water bowls on the second inspection. Buckets would be an acceptable receptacle, save that at the inspection two puppies could not reach the water when it was half full. The claim that the appellant has now placed bowls of water in each stall can be assessed at a re-inspection. Ground 8

43. In relation to 7(1) the Council asserts that appropriate toys were not provided. The Council says that very few nylon chews were seen and that the appellant said that she gives the dogs old margarine tubs, milk cartons and bleach bottles to chew on. If appropriate toys have been purchased since the inspection this can be assessed at a re-inspection. Ground 9

44. In relation to 7(2) the Council assert that based on observations of behaviour of three younger dogs/puppies, officers did not have confidence that the condition would be met. The fact that 3 puppies from 2 different litters were observed as being fearful puts into question the appellant’s assertions re interactions.

45. In relation to 7(3) the Council said that no steps had been taken between inspections to address the signs of nervousness that had been observed in 2 young dogs.

46. In relation to 7(5) the Council said that, based on behavioural observations and the construction of the whelping kennels seen in use on the day of the inspection, officers and vets believed that the puppies needed more socialisation and habituation.

47. In relation to 8(2) the Council say that there was no evidence of harmonious groups, almost all dogs were in individual stalls and only some dogs could see each other through a ‘peep hole’ covered in metal mesh.

48. In relation to Part B 4(1) the Council say that, on inspection, puppies were not given suitable opportunities to interact with people and become habituated to noises, objects and activities. A checklist detailing interactions could provide evidence of this. Ground 10

49. In relation to 9(4) the Council accepts that at the revisit all vaccinations had been completed and boosters will need be checked at re-inspections.

50. In relation to 9(7) the Council states that this condition requires routine, preventative treatment for parasites. The Council says that it is still unclear whether the dogs are receiving preventative treatment for ticks and fleas. Ground 11

51. In relation to Part B 2(2) the Council says that at the time of the inspection officers believed that the garage contained the male breeding dogs and any male dogs that were too old or too young to breed. At the time of the inspection, a whelping bitch was in a kennel area in the barn below the required size. The Council notes that the appellant states that there is a new whelping area, which can be reassessed at a reinspection. Ground 12

52. In relation to Part B 6(6) the Council says that, based on observations made at all 3 visits, the particular construction of the stalls and the appellant having said that the dogs have to be let out in three separate groups, it did not appear that all the dogs were observed regularly. A checklist detailing interactions with the puppies could provide evidence of this. Ground 13

53. The Council states that the appellant got very agitated and cross when Ms Farinacci pointed out that two young dogs were very fearful and said that ‘she was not going to have anyone saying any of her dogs were scared of people’. Ms Farinacci says that the dogs were cowering and retreating backwards when they approached. She says that the appellant let the male dog out despite being requested not to, and did not try to use reassurance, biscuits or praise to give the dogs a positive experience to aid socialisation. The appellant’s reply dated 11 June 2025

54. The appellant sets out the background and says that they were initially told by Mandi Farinacci that they would be given a licence. The appellant asserts that a ‘welfare inspection’ under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 was carried out ‘under false pretences’. The appellant asserts that the vet’s report was ‘a faked inspection report’ and that Mandi Farinacci was prevented from overruling it. The appellant asserts that the vet did not look at the breeding collies on the inspection day. The appellant asserts that no improvements were needed and that they had passed the inspection on 18 December 2024.

55. The appellant sets out her response on the factual matrix underlying each of the conditions, which I have taken into account. Evidence

56. I read a bundle of documents sent to the tribunal on 6 October 2025 with 418 PDF pages comprising: a. A1-A72 b. B1-B67 c. C1-C279

57. I also read the following documents which the appellant uploaded to the Document Upload Centre: a. An 80-page document entitled ‘Licencing emails – Mandi-ourselves. In order. b. An 11-page document entitled ‘Email – Susan-ourselves’

58. I read witness statements from: a. Lisa Stevens, Occupation Neighbourhood Officer b. Christopher Parkhouse c. Grant McGill d. Mandi Farinacci e. Ian McIver, Community Safety and Public Health Officer f. Martin Chapman, the appellant’s husband

59. The appellant did not provide a witness statement of her evidence, but confirmed that any factual matters set out in the following documents were true to the best of her knowledge and belief: a. The grounds of appeal, b. The appellant’s reply dated 11 June 2025, c. The appellant’s skeleton argument dated 19 July 2025 d. The appellant’s reply to the respondent’s skeleton argument dated 27 September 2025

60. I heard oral evidence from Miss Farinacci and from the appellant. The role of the tribunal

61. In the leading case on appeals against local authority licensing decisions Hope and Glory , Lord Justice Toulson said:

62. “It is right in all cases that the magistrates' court should pay careful attention to the reasons given by the licensing authority for arriving at the decision under appeal, bearing in mind that Parliament has chosen to place responsibility for making such decisions on local authorities …The weight which the magistrates should ultimately attach to those reasons must be a matter for their judgment in all the circumstances, taking into account the fullness and clarity of the reasons, the nature of the issues and the evidence given on the appeal.”

63. Regulation 24 of the 2018 Regulations provides: 24 Appeals (1) Any operator who is aggrieved by a decision by a local authority – a. To refuse to grant or renew a licence, or b. To revoke or vary a licence, May appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. (4) On appeal, the First-tier Tribunal may overturn or confirm the local authority’s decision, with or without modification. Written submissions

64. I read and took account of the following: a. A document entitled ‘Appellant Evidence’ dated 3 July 2025. b. Appellant’s update/skeleton argument dated 29 July 2025 c. Respondent’s skeleton argument d. Appellant’s reply to the skeleton argument dated 27 September 2025 e. Submissions from the appellant and the respondent and the appellant’s reply submitted following the hearing. Oral submissions from the respondent

65. On behalf of the respondent Mr Jukes focused on the appellant’s claim as set out in her grounds of appeal and on whether the conditions were met, rather than on the appellant’s theories about what he termed a ‘conspiracy’ underlying the refusal of her licence.

66. Mr Jukes submitted that the appellant had spent time and effort in focusing on trying to prove that documents had been falsified and on the existence of a veterinary report rather than on showing, on the evidence, that she can comply with the conditions for the licence. He submitted that she had not discharged her evidential burden. Submissions by the respondent on the conditions Condition 4(2) – competence of the licence holder to recognise abnormal behaviour

67. Mr Jukes submitted that the reference to the peacock is a side issue. It does not form part of the decision to refuse the licence but is relevant to the surrounding circumstances.

68. He submitted that Ms Farinacci did not agree with the vet that the dogs were ‘likely in solitary confinement for 20+ hours a day’, but that in her view it was ‘not good enough’. Condition 5(4) – where appropriate for the species, a toileting area and opportunities for toileting must be provided/condition 5(9) – the animals must not be left unattended in any situation or for any period likely to cause them distress/condition 7.2 – opportunities to exercise/condition 7.3 – monitoring changes of behaviour/condition 7.5 – interaction and habituation for immature animals/ Condition 8(2) – isolation for no longer than necessary/Part B condition 6(6) – observed regularly during the day

69. Mr Jukes noted that there was no regular schedule for when the dogs were let out or checked on. The appellant had not provided evidence that the dogs were routinely let out. At the time of the unannounced visit in September 2024, the dogs had not yet been let out at 11am. During the inspection in December 2024 the dogs were shut in for the majority of the time for at least four hours and when they were let out seemed desperate to get out to toilet and drink water.

70. Mr Jukes submitted that the evidence on the ‘peep holes’ between the kennels changed in the hearing. He said that there was no clear evidence on the status of the kennels and that dogs shared kennels only if the appellant chose this. He submitted that the dogs were isolated in the pens overnight and that the tribunal should place weight on the opinion of the vet that the young dogs were not adequately socialised. Condition 5(6) – safe transport

71. Mr Jukes submitted that this condition was not met at the December inspection nor at the visit in January. Mr Jukes accepted that a harness may now have been purchased. Condition 5(8) – resources provided in a way that minimises competitive behaviour and dominance/condition 6(5) constant access to fresh, clean drinking water

72. Mr Jukes submitted that there was not a water bowl in every pen and so this condition was not met in December or January. It was only after January that the appellant attempted to install a water bowl in each pen. He submitted that this was a ‘massively important’ minimum standard that was not being met. Condition 6(4) – cleaning feed and drinking receptacles

73. Mr Jukes said that the failure to wash in hot soapy water was an additional concern rather than the main concern but compounded the other issues. Condition 7(1) – active and effective enrichment

74. Mr Jukes noted that the appellant was still providing plastic bottles as toys. Even though these had never contained bleach he argued that they were unsafe because they were designed for domestic purposes and not designed to be chewed by dogs. He submitted that appellant continued to use these bottles despite being given advice on what is an appropriate toy and on appropriate alternatives. He submitted that plastic bottles are brittle and could cause injury if chewed or swallowed. Condition 9(4) – all reasonably precautions must be taken to prevent and control the spread among animals and people of infectious diseases and parasites/condition 9(7) – where necessary, animals must receive preventative treatment by an appropriately competent person.

75. Mr Jukes submits that it was necessary for the dogs to be given preventative treatment for fleas and ticks and that this is not being done. Condition 2.2 of the specific conditions – sufficient space

76. Mr Jukes submitted that on the inspection in December a bitch had given birth to a litter the night before in a kennel which did not meet the minimum size requirements set out in the Guidance for a bitch with a litter.

77. Mr Jukes submitted that Ms Farinacci’s evidence was that all the male stud dogs were being kept in the garage, which did not meet the minimum space requirements set out in the Guidance. Compliance

78. Mr Jukes submitted that the appellant had been given plenty of opportunity to comply. He accepted that there was delay in sending the decision to refuse the licence after the second visit. He submitted that it was a refusal to properly engage with the Council’s criticisms that led to the licence being refused despite Ms Farinacci’s earlier indications. Mr Jukes said that the appellant could have submitted further evidence and asked the Council to reconsider but noted that the Council openly offered the appellant a new inspection and the appellant refused this.

79. Mr Jukes submitted that there were 7 salient issues: a. Water access b. Toilet access c. Isolation/socialisation d. Cleanliness of bowls e. Toys and appropriate stimulation f. Vaccination and health g. Size of pens

80. Mr Jukes argued, looked at in the round, that the tribunal cannot be satisfied that the Council’s decision was wrong. He submitted that the Council applied the Guidance and the minimum conditions were not met. He accepted that the appellant could have produced evidence to persuade the tribunal that she had now taken steps to ensure that the conditions would be met but argued that she had not done so. Oral submissions of the appellant

81. The appellant said that all the points in the licence refusal are covered in their protocols and procedures, and that they had covered everything by the time the licence was refused. She said that the procedure followed by the Council was wrong and relied on her written submissions. Discussion and conclusions

82. It is in my view unfortunate that this matter has had to come before the tribunal. It is clear from the testimonials in the bundle that, in the past, the appellant has bred many puppies that are well loved by their new owners and appear to be well adjusted. In my view there has been a lack of cooperation on both sides and some miscommunication by the Council.

83. On the part of the Council, Ms Farinacci had initially informed the appellant by email dated 20 December 2024 that ‘You will definitely get a breeding licence, but there will be things that you will need to work on before we issue it - we can work together on this.’ In the light of that indication, it is not perhaps altogether surprising that the appellant has formed the impression that she was awarded a licence by Ms Farinacci who was later somehow prevented from issuing that licence. The Council’s communications in the visit of January and thereafter could have been much clearer as to what the appellant now needed to do to address their concerns.

84. Further, also on the part of the Council, there was no reply to the appellant’s emails sent following the visit in January in which she set out the steps that she was taking and showed a clear willingness to work on areas in which she fell short. Given that some of the Council’s major concerns had only been highlighted to the appellant in the visit in January, the appellant had not yet had the opportunity to take steps to rectify some matters or to discuss what evidence might be needed to counter concerns about isolation/socialisation including, for example, the schedules suggested in the letter of 28 May 2025.

85. Finally, I observe that the vet’s opinion appears to be overstated or may have been reached without full knowledge of the appellant’s set up. In the light of the information before me, it is unclear how the vet could have reached the conclusion that the dogs are ‘likely in solitary confinement for 20+ hours a day’. This is not supported by the evidence before me and Ms Farinacci said in evidence that this was not her opinion based on her visits and discussions with the appellant. This statement is likely to have contributed to the appellant’s loss of confidence in the vet, the process and the Council.

86. On the part of the appellant, she did not take up the offer of a visit given in the letter of 28 May 2025, nor has she taken the advice given in that letter about the type of evidence that would be needed to show that the minimum standards have or would be met. Further, the appellant has shown some intransigence and a failure to act promptly in areas where the Council has made clear that action is needed, for example the lack of water bowls in each kennel and the use of empty bleach bottles as toys. It is clear that the appellant’s failure to have taken action to correct important issues between the inspection and the visit in January contributed to Ms Farinacci’s change of opinion and her ultimate conclusion that the appellant was unlikely to correct all the outstanding issues.

87. It remains my view that the Council and the appellant should be able to work together to ensure that the Council is satisfied that the appellant is able to meet the minimum standards. I appreciate that the appellant has lost confidence, to some extent, in the Council, but I understand that she still respects Ms Farinacci’s experience and expertise. Accordingly, I hope that it will be possible for the parties to put aside this dispute and for the Council to work with the appellant to ensure that she is correctly licenced.

88. I have considered carefully whether I am satisfied that the appellant has now taken sufficient steps to meet the minimum standards, such that I can overturn the decision of the Council. As I set out below, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that some of the conditions will be met.

89. However, in relation to some of the conditions there is insufficient evidence for me to be satisfied that they will be met. It is very unfortunate that the appellant did not take up the offer of a re-inspection in the letter of 28 May 2025 because the outcome of that re-assessment would have been very useful evidence of which conditions have now been met. It is very difficult for me to conclude that conditions have now been met in the absence of a report from a re-inspection. It is also very unfortunate that the appellant has not produced for the tribunal any of the evidence that the Council highlighted in that letter of 28 May, including for example, log sheets/schedules/check lists.

90. It appears from the appellant’s written submissions that much of her efforts in preparing for the appeal have been focussed on attempting to establish that certain documents were forged, that the refusal was ‘falsified’, that the appellant has been ‘targeted’ by the Council and that Ms Farinacci was ‘prevented’ from issuing the licence rather than focussing on producing evidence on how she will comply with minimum standards.

91. Without that evidence I am not persuaded that all the minimum standards will be met for the reasons set out below. I would, however, encourage the appellant to consider submitting a further application for a licence and to re-open communications with the Council, so that they can work together to give the appellant the best possible chance of demonstrating that she will comply with the minimum standards. Access to water – conditions 5(8) and 6(5) and safe transport – condition 5(6)

92. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities on the basis of the appellant’s oral evidence that she has now placed water bowls in each individual pen and that she has purchased a harness for use in the car. For the purposes of any future licence application the Council can check this at an inspection. Use of plastic bottles as toys – condition 7(1)

93. I am not satisfied that empty plastic bottles, even if they have not previously contained bleach, are ‘appropriate’ toys in accordance with the Guidance. They are not designed to be chewed by dogs, and therefore their safety, in terms of the type of plastic and the way in which it is likely to break, will not have been assessed for those purposes. If the appellant wishes to obtain a breeding licence, she should heed the advice of the Council and provide ‘appropriate’ toys or chews i.e. those that are designed for dogs. Preventative treatment – condition 9(4) and 9(7)

94. I find that the vaccination issue has now been resolved.

95. In relation to flea/tick treatment, the conditions state as follows: 9(4) All reasonable precautions must be taken to prevent and control the spread among animals and people of infectious diseases and parasites. 9(7) where necessary, animals must receive preventative treatment by an appropriately competent person.

96. The Guidance states that: ‘Routine and documented treatment must be in place for internal and external parasites (adult dogs and puppies must be wormed and given flea and tick treatment as appropriate).’ That is not currently the appellant’s practice, who does not treat routinely for fleas or ticks.

97. Routine treatment is easily available. In the light of the Guidance I am not satisfied that the appellant’s practice of ‘keeping a sharp eye out’ for fleas satisfies the requirement to take ‘all reasonable precautions’ to prevent and control the spread of parasites. Cleaning of bowls – schedule 6 - condition 6(4)

98. The condition itself provides that feed and drinking receptacles must be capable of being cleaned and disinfected. I am satisfied that this condition is met. The Guidance provides that receptacles must be cleaned daily and disinfected at least once a week. There is no specific requirement that the bowls must be disinfected by washing in soapy water, albeit that this may be best practice. I do not have before me details of the ‘natural spray’ that the appellant uses on the bowls, so it is not clear to me whether or not the use of this spray would satisfy the requirement in the Guidance to ‘disinfect’ the bowls. If the appellant applies for another licence this can be discussed with the Council. Sufficient space – schedule 6 – condition 2(2)

99. Although at the time of the inspection the Council had legitimate concerns on this issue in relation to the size of the garage, I am satisfied that, going forwards, the appellant will comply with this requirement. Whether or not any stud dogs were being kept in the garage at the time of the inspection, I accept the appellant’s evidence that it will not, going forward, be used for dogs that are used for breeding.

100. In relation to the whelping pen, this condition was not met at the time of the inspection. For the purposes of today’s appeal, I accept on the balance of probabilities that the appellant has introduced a new whelping area of an appropriate size. However, there was limited evidence before me on the new whelping area and if the appellant applies for a new licence, this will no doubt need to be inspected so that the Council can ensure that it does meet the minimum size requirements. Condition 4(2) – competence of the licence holder to recognise abnormal behaviour

101. I do not place any reliance on the condition of the peacock. I have dealt with the condition of socialisation/isolation below. I do not have any other concerns about the appellant’s ability to meet this condition. Conditions 5(4) and (9), 7(2), (3) and (5), 8(2) and Part B 6(6): isolation/regular opportunities for toileting/socialisation/leaving unattended/exercise etc

102. The appellant had not prepared a witness statement. Although she confirmed that the factual matters set out in the grounds of appeal and her various written submissions were true, the written submissions focussed largely on her allegations of fabricated documents and her allegations of inappropriate conduct by Council officials. There was very little evidence from the appellant focussing on the routines that are followed to ensure that the dogs are let out regularly (with the opportunity to toilet and socialise with other dogs), and the dogs and puppies are observed and interacted with regularly.

103. The respondent offered in its letter of 28 May 2025 to conduct a re-inspection to assess the appellant’s assertions that she complied with these conditions. Unfortunately the appellant did not take up the respondent’s offer of a re-inspection, so I do not have the benefit of an up-to-date report focussing on this issue.

104. In its letter of 28 May 2025, the respondent also explicitly highlighted to the appellant the type of evidence that could be provided to demonstrate that these conditions would be complied with. In particular the letter highlighted the following: a. A policy as to how to address nervous dogs which could be assessed at a re-inspection. b. A log sheet/schedule detailing times when dogs are let out of the kennels. c. A log sheet detailing when checks on the dogs are being undertaken. d. A check list detailing interactions with puppies to provide evidence that puppies had at least 4 opportunities a day to engage in play and human interaction. e. A procedure/check list detailing interactions with puppies to provide evidence that they were being observed regularly during the day. f. A procedure/check list detailing interactions with puppies and the environments, noises, activities they have been exposed to.

105. None of this has evidence been produced for the tribunal hearing.

106. The dogs are housed in individual kennels or ‘boxes’ as the appellant calls them. In between each kennel and the one next door is a hole (a ‘pop hole’) which is covered by a barbecue grill, that the dogs can see through. Although it is possible for dogs to ‘share’, by removing the grill between two boxes, it is apparent from the appellant’s evidence that sharing has not worked well and so each dog is in an individual box. I find that, in practice, the grills are always in place and there is limited opportunity for interaction when the dogs are in their boxes.

107. The appellant’s evidence was that the ‘boxes’ were, in effect, the dog’s beds. She said that they (her and her husband) did not really like kennels, but that they were required to provide kennels of a certain size and so they had built ‘partitions’ and they put the dogs in their boxes when they go to bed. Her evidence was that they were not shut into the boxes for hours a day. Her evidence was also that she was a poor sleeper and was often with the dogs during the night as well. She stated that the dogs were let out when ‘we’ (she or her husband) were awake.

108. I asked the appellant whether this meant that all the dogs were out all the time, and she said no, but that they ‘swing them around’ and ensure they have at least 8 hours a day out each. The documentation in the bundle and the extra documents submitted by the appellant show that the dogs are let out or exercised in 4 discrete groups.

109. The appellant’s ‘procedures and protocols’ document that was submitted with the licence application provides some more broad information on how often the dogs are let out. It states: Functioning as multi generational family groups they enjoy free access within reason to our whole domestic area where they like to accompany us at our work and daily chores. Even on the wettest days they enjoy being released for several short bursts. Many ins and outs all day is fun! We try to provide enough activity that they’re always keen to go indoors at teatime, where they have a break, before another out before bed, anything from 20 minutes if it is raining - to several hours stargazing, while I potter about! We’re presently running out four groups; Beau and the young boys, Skippy’s group of 5, Bonzo and 3 girls and the main nucleus group which is always all girls. They love going out onto the land but are equally very content to sit about watching us or entertaining each other with toys or playing chase. They’re bred to be calm, clever, kind and patient and we allow them freedom to develop their individual personalities, so they’re allowed to do their own things. Only barking, being unkind and stealing behaviours are not allowed, and they know this. Favorite activities include chewing, paddling, digging, rolling around and toys. Walks in the valley and woodlands, helping to mend fences, picking blackberries… and eating them! Monitoring all goat, pony and duck activities. Just contemplating the day. Playing tag and always in for a cuddle at first chance!

110. In relation to the puppies, the appellant’s oral evidence was that they would go in and socialise with the puppies ’10 times a day between us’, but that when the puppies were ‘up and running’ they had a space that was nearly half the barn (the puppy run), so at that stage they were ‘kind of in our space anyway’.

111. The appellant’s ‘procedures and protocols’ document contains the following information about interactions with the puppies: The puppies’ dam cares for them solely until they scramble out from the whelping box to explore, with waggy tails, at around 4 weeks. At this stage they’re very responsive to our voices, and although they can’t see us so well they do like chewing our fingers! Once they can get out of the whelping bed they’re usually ready to start trying puppy food, and drinking water is provided in a shallow bowl. At this time Mum likes a puppy free area. Within 2 more weeks they’re eating well, using mum’s sawdust toilet area properly and Mom’s milk is receding. Their sharp claws may need clipping now to protect her from damage. Small toys are given to help the puppies with teething and play. When they can focus beyond the puppy pen -and each other, they’re let out to explore further. … Puppies can be visited by new owners anytime from 7 weeks onwards, once their individual traits are clearly visible for a good match. With observation and discussion only, and no touching, the best match = energy level of puppy, is invariably chosen. All puppies are ready to leave from 9 weeks old. They come with full instructions, {given before the first visit} and there’s a full refund policy if they don’t pass their ‘within 48’ hours vet check. They have all passed with flying colours so far.

112. For the following reasons, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the appellant has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the dogs and puppies are being let out or socialised regularly enough to satisfy the relevant conditions.

113. First, when the Council carried out the unannounced visit on 5 September 2024, they arrived at 11am. At that time the dogs were all shut in their boxes. The appellant was still in bed but her husband was up. The appellant explained in evidence that she had been up with the dogs in the night. However this does not explain why her husband had not opened up the boxes and let out a group of dogs when he woke up. This evidence casts doubt on the appellant’s assertion that the dogs are let out when she or her husband is awake.

114. Second, when the dogs were let out at 11.20am on the day of the unannounced visit, I find, on the basis of Ms Farinacci’s evidence, that they rushed out to toilet. Whilst I accept that this is not conclusive evidence that they had not been let out recently, it is at least consistent with the dogs having been shut in their boxes for a long period of time.

115. Third, when the Council conducted the inspection in December, the majority of the dogs remained in their boxes throughout the visit, which lasted at least 4 hours.

116. Fourth, Miss Farinacci observed nervous behaviour in 2 young dogs. I accept her evidence that the 2 young dogs appeared very nervous and scared of her and Lisa Stevens at the unannounced visit. I accept that these dogs still appeared very nervous at the follow up visit. Further, I accept that at the inspection Miss Farinacci observed that one of the younger puppies was very nervous.

117. The appellant has produced many testimonials showing that owners of puppies she has bred in the past are very happy with the temperament of the dogs. The kennels or boxes are a new system adopted by the appellant and her husband. The appellant has not yet had a licence to use that system for breeding and selling puppies. It seems likely that the testimonials relate to puppies that were reared and sold before the kennels were built and at the appellant’s previous property, when there may have been greater opportunities for socialisation and interaction. The testimonials are not therefore persuasive evidence in relation to how the minimum standards will be met under the current system.

118. However those testimonials, along with the appellant’s broad approach as outlined in her ‘procedures and protocols’ document, do give me confidence that with guidance from the Council, the appellant will, on re-applying for a licence, be able to address the Council’s concerns, providing that she fully engages with the process, accepts and makes any necessary changes and produces the type of evidence suggested by the Council.

119. The appellant’s evidence was that these particular dogs were ‘thinkers’ and liked to sit back and watch and that they were not nervous. That may be right. However, Miss Farinacci’s observations at least raise a concern that there may not be adequate opportunities for interaction/socialisation.

120. In my view, those four issues do at least raise doubts as to whether the puppies and dogs are being let out (as appropriate), observed, checked on and interacted with regularly enough to satisfy the minimum standards listed in the heading to this section. These doubts could have been addressed by evidence provided by the appellant and by a re-inspection. However, the appellant has not provided a witness statement setting out her processes. The written submissions that she has adopted as a witness statement do not deal in detail with this issue. The appellant’s written ‘procedures and protocols’ only contain broad assertions about how often the dogs (and puppies as appropriate) are let out and interacted with. The appellant has not produced any of the log sheets, schedules, check lists or procedures that were suggested by the respondent. The appellant refused the offer of a re-inspection so that her assertions could be verified.

121. In the absence of the appellant producing that evidence and without a re-inspection, taking account of light of all the matters set out above, I am not persuaded, on the basis of the evidence before me today, that the appellant has shown that she will satisfy the following minimum standards: conditions 5(4) and (9), 7(2), (3) and (5), 8(2) and Part B 6(6).

122. For that reason the appeal must be dismissed. Signed Date: Sophie Buckley 3 November 2025 Amended 4 December 2025