Sharon Evans & Anor v The Charity Commission for England and Wales

The appeals against the varied Disqualification Orders imposed on the Appellants, and each of them, by the Respondent dated 16 August 2024 to disqualify them each from being a trustee of a charity for a period of 4.5 years, in the case of Sharon Evans and 3.5 years in the case of Neil Evans, pursuant to section 181 A of the Charities Act 2022 (‘ the Act ’) are refused. The Decisions of the Respondent, in each case, are confirmed. The period of disqualification commences on 12 December 2025. The Appellants, and each of them, are also disqualified from holding office or employment in a charity with senior management functions from the same date, an automatic additional disqualification, the Tribunal declining to exempt the Appellants, and each of them, from that additional disqualification, from same date, for the same respective periods, pursuant to Section 181 B of the Act . REASONS Introduction

1. The Appellants, and each of them, appealed against an Order of the Respondent, made on Review, dated 16 August 2024, against each of them, pursuant to s.181 A of the Charities Act 2011 (‘ the Act ’) (‘the Disqualification Orders’), disqualifying the Appellants, and each of them, from being trustees of Dot Com Children’s Foundation (‘the Charity’) or any charity, and consequently, from holding office or employment, paid or unpaid, in a charity that involved the exercise of senior management functions, for a period of 4.5 years in the case of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, and 3.5 years in the case of the Appellant, Neil Evans.

2. Power is vested in the Tribunal to determine these appeals pursuant to s.319(4) (b) and Schedule 6 to the Act . The Tribunal, in determining the appeal, considered afresh the Respondent’s decision to make the Disqualification Orders and, if upheld, the duration of same, made its own determination on the issues raised on the evidence before it.

3. The appeals were heard, and determined, on a composite basis, following a remote oral hearing, held by CVP, on 13-15 October 2025. An agreed Hearing Bundle (‘HB’), Authorities Bundle (‘AB’) and Witness Bundle (‘WB’) was provided. Further documentary evidence was submitted by both parties at the hearing, and admitted into evidence with the permission of the Tribunal, namely, a further case law authority (submitted by the Appellant, Sharon Evans on 13 October 2025, entitled In the Matter of Keeping Kids Company and In the Matter of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 – Official Receiver v. Atkinson and Others [2021] EWHC ] EWHC 175 (Ch), and a second Witness Statement dated 7 October 2024, with an attachment, namely, a print-out from the Appellants’ current website, Dot Com Digital I 2Simple – 2Simple.com, submitted by the Respondent from one of its witnesses, Dan Holliday, who had carried out a Review of the Respondent’s original decisions, the Review Decisions being the Decisions under appeal.

4. These appeals were somewhat unusual in that the Disqualification Orders were made against the Appellants at a time when neither of them, either at all, in the case of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, or not at a relevant time, in the case of the Appellant, Neil Evans, were trustees of the Charity. However, the Tribunal finds that both Appellants were, on balance, de facto trustees of the Charity, at all relevant times, pursuant to section 177 of the Act , as they had, in practical terms, general control and management of the administration of the Charity. The Disqualification Orders were made on the basis, firstly, of past or continuing conduct of the Appellants, and each of them, that was damaging, or likely to be damaging, to public trust and confidence in charities in general and/or that the Appellants, and each of them, as officers or agents of the Charity, where there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the Charity for which either or both were responsible, or, knowing of such misconduct or mismanagement, failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it, or that such conduct contributed to or facilitated the said misconduct or mismanagement; secondly, that the Appellants, and each of them, were unfit to be a trustee of a charity and, finally, that the Disqualification Orders were desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities.

5. The Respondent opened an ‘assessment case’ into the Charity in August 2021 that, ultimately led to the making of the Disqualification Orders on 19 August 2024.

6. There was a complex factual background to these appeals, as, at various times, there were two charities, a Community Interest Company (‘CIC’) and two private companies set up, controlled or owned by the Appellants.

7. Helpful written Skeleton Arguments were submitted on behalf of both parties. The Appeal

8. The Appellants, in their respective appeals, in written evidence and submissions, supplemented by their oral evidence and of two of their witnesses and in their Skeleton Argument and oral submissions of their representative, sought to have the Disqualification Orders quashed on a number of grounds, namely, that the statutory criteria to make the Disqualification Orders set out in section 181 A(6) of the Act , with specific reference to Conditions D and F set out in section 181 A(7) of the Act were not satisfied; that the Appellants were not unfit to be charity trustees; that the Disqualification Orders were not desirable in the public interest and that the periods of disqualification were excessive.

9. The Notices of Appeal submitted by both Appellants, and a composite Reply to the Respondent’s Response, were, essentially, mirror images of each other. Their oral evidence, under cross-examination and re-examination and that of their two witnesses under cross-examination did not depart to any significant degree, if at all, from their written evidence.

10. Significantly, both Appellants, in their respective Notices of Appeal, expressly stated that they were each, in fact, unfit to be a trustee of a charity (albeit they stated this in a context of maintaining they did not have the necessary skills set to be a trustee of a charity – something that is different to the said statutory criteria governing ‘unfitness’ pursuant to the Act ) and undertook never to be a trustee of a charity. If this assertion was intended to be a reason to allow these appeals and not impose Disqualification Orders, that was not persuasive in any way, save, perhaps, to mitigate the duration of the Disqualification Orders. However, the Respondent in its Decision, made upon review, on 16 August 2024, the decisions actually under appeal, had significantly reduced the original periods of disqualification. However, in a somewhat contradictory submission, both Appellants maintained that it was unclear how the Respondent concluded that each of them was unfit to be a charity trustee; that the Respondent, they both submitted, placed undue weight on a letter it had received from a Mr. Nick Wood Dow, a former Chairperson of the trustees of the Charity, the contents of which were disputed by the only remaining trustee, Reverend Henley, one of the Appellants’ witnesses, who gave oral evidence; that Condition F in section 181 A(7) of the Act (that related to any past or continuing conduct by [the Appellants, and each of them], whether or not in relation to a charity, is damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities in general …) was not satisfied and that there was no failure by them to manage possible conflicts of interest. They each went on, in their respective Notices of Appeal, to criticise the Respondent’s conduct of its case assessment process [an assertion that cannot be taken into account in the determination of these appeals by the Tribunal on the grounds of jurisdiction]; that they were given inadequate notice to make representations concerning the original Disqualification Order made against them [Orders that were not the subject of these appeals, having been varied in their favour of each of them upon review]; that the Respondent took too long to conduct its Review [again a matter that was not for determination, or of relevance, in these appeals]; that they (or perhaps more correctly, the Appellants’ private business, Values Verses Violence Limited (‘VVV’)) owned the intellectual property right in ‘Dot Com’, a cartoon character, the use of which they granted to the Charity and other entities, as was their right; that the two Appellants relied heavily on professional advice [that the Tribunal found, on balance, to be a reference to professional advice provided to the Appellants on behalf of the Charity, rather than the Charity obtaining its own independent advice, or, vice versa, in the alternative], but accepted that they – the Appellants - did not always make the right decisions on governance issues (that the Tribunal found to be a reference to the Appellants making decisions on governance issues made by the Charity) and that they were ‘naive’ to have accepted the titles ‘CEO’ and ‘COO’, respectively, stated to have been bestowed on them by Mr. Paul Wright, the then Chairperson of the trustees of the Charity. However, the Tribunal found that both Appellants were, in fact, acting in acting in the capacity of an officer of the Charity and that this was clear evidence of each of the Appellants having general control and management of the administration of the Charity, ….despite the Appellants maintaining in their written and oral evidence that they merely followed the decisions of the Chairperson of the trustees of the Charity. However, the Appellants’ evidence was that it was they who sought professional advice ‘to ensure the charity was set up properly’ and that they ‘worked to find people with knowledge of accounting and charity law’, rather than this being done by the trustees themselves. The Tribunal found this to be further evidence of the intimate and overarching influence the Appellants had over the administration of the Charity. Further, the evidence of the Appellants was that the trustees of the Charity, of which the Appellants were ‘the Founders’, at a meeting held on 12 December 2013, decided that the Appellants’ private business, VVV, would be the ‘main supplier’ of the Charity also fixing a unit price of £5.70 to be paid for ‘the product’, a journal, at £5.70 by the Charity to VVV.

11. While the Appellant, Sharon Evans, stated that she was never a trustee of a previous charity, ‘Missdorothy.Com Charitable Foundation (later re-named ‘Kids Taskforce Foundation’), an incorporated charitable company, she and the other Appellant, Neil Evans, registered that charity at its foundation and both were trustees and directors of that incorporated charitable company. Accordingly, Calum Stewart, who was Chairperson of the trustees of that charity and who wrote to the Respondent, and upon whose statement the Appellants relied, was also wrong in that regard.

12. The Appellants went on in their evidence to attempt to minimise, or cast aspersions on, the credibility of one Mr. Craig Durham, not least that he, allegedly had a conflict of interest and that the Appellant, Sharon Evans, made a Serious Incident Report (‘SIR’) of her own to the Respondent concerning him whom, she stated, was never a trustee of the Charity, who had made a Serious Incident Report (‘SIR’) to the Respondent as a trustee and Chairperson of the trustees of the Charity, including an assertion that the Appellant, Neil Evans, had asked him, Craig Durham, to resign. This does not fit with the said assertion of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, that Mr. Durham was never a trustee. The Tribunal found that Mr. Durham was a trustee.

13. However, these appeals are solely concerned with the Disqualification Orders made against the two Appellants. The Tribunal, in determining these appeals has no role in deciding whether regulatory action should have been or could have been or was taken by the Respondent against any other person if that was what was being suggested by the Appellants.

14. The Appellants strongly maintained in their evidence that the trustees of the Charity were satisfied that there was nothing wrong in the relationship between the Charity and VVV. However, that was a matter of law to be determined by the Tribunal in deciding this appeal.

15. Significantly, the Appellants maintained that their company, VVV, not the Charity, bore the costs of ‘setting up the company’ (that the Tribunal understood to be the incorporated charitable company, Missdorothy.Com Charitable Foundation, later re-named to Kids Taskforce Foundation) and obtaining advice from Shoosmiths, Solicitors ‘on the application for charitable status’. The Issue and Statutory Context

16. The sole issue before the Tribunal for determination by it was whether it was appropriate to disqualify the Appellants, and either or each of them from being trustees of a charity and, if so, the duration of those disqualifications.

17. There are three grounds for making a Disqualification Order set out in section 181 A of the Act against any person, disqualifying them from being a trustee of a charity, whether or not they are, or have ever been, a trustee of a charity, all of which must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, namely – 1) that there had been conduct by the person(s) concerned [the Appellants here and each of them]), that was damaging or likely to be damaging to public trust and confidence in charities generally, pursuant to section 181 A(7) – Conditions D and/or F of the Act being the relevant conditions in these appeals; 2) that they were unfit to be charity trustees ( section 181 A(6)(b) of the Act ) and, 3) that, in summary, making a Disqualification Order was desirable in the public interest to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally ( section 181 A(6)(c) of the Act ).

18. All of these criteria must be satisfied. Even where they are all satisfied, the power to disqualify is a discretionary power in the case of these appeals - the circumstances set out in sections 178 -179 of the Act that provide for automatic disqualification not arising in these appeals.

19. Importantly, in respect of these appeals, Condition D expressly refers to the power to disqualify a person from being a trustee of a charity if that person was, inter alia , an officer or agent of a charity at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity and that person was responsible for that misconduct or mismanagement or who knew of the misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it or their conduct contributed to, or facilitated, such misconduct or mismanagement.

20. The terms ‘misconduct’ or ‘mismanagement’ are not defined in the Act . However, in Guidance issued by the Respondent, endorsed in previous caselaw, ‘misconduct’ is taken to include any act or failure to act in the administration of the Charity which the Appellants knew or ought to have known was criminal, unlawful or improper while ‘mismanagement’ is taken to include any act or failure to act in the administration of the Charity that may result in significant charitable resources being misused or the people who benefit from the Charity being put at risk.

21. There was no dispute between the parties as to the questions that fell to be considered in deciding that particular matter, the burden of proof, on the balance of probabilities, falling upon the Appellants in that regard to show why they should not be disqualified from being trustees of a charity or, if they should be disqualified, the appropriate duration of that disqualification.

22. In determining these appeals, the Tribunal was required to have regard to the Respondent’s statutory objectives as set out in section 14 of the Act , in summary, the ‘Public Confidence’ objective; the ‘Compliance Objective’; the Charitable Resources Objective’ and the ‘Accountability Objective’.

23. The Tribunal, on hearing an appeal, ‘standing in the shoes’ of the Respondent, makes a de novo decision ( section 319(4) (b) of the Act ) based on the evidence and submissions before it, but giving appropriate weight to the Respondent’s decisions, as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions. The Tribunal in deciding an appeal before it may not exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the Respondent’s decision-making processes, nor the reasonableness of such decision-making. This leaves a wide jurisdiction open to the Tribunal to reach its own conclusions about the conduct of the Appellants and each of them and, in this caser, decide whether disqualification is justified and, if so, for what period(s). Factual Background

24. The Appellant, Sharon Evans was never a trustee of the Charity (but had been a charity trustee and director in the past, along with the other Appellant, Neil Evans, of Missdorothy.Com Charitable Foundation, a charitable company, later re-named ‘Kids Taskforce Foundation’ until they resigned as trustees and directors in 2004, before the charitable company changed its name and converted from a private limited company to a Community Interest Company (‘CIC’). This charitable company provided educational material to schools.

25. The Appellant, Sharon Evans, created the ‘Dorothy Dot Com’ character and, therefore, owned the Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs’) to that character. She was, therefore, entitled to ask for payment of a licence fee to her by the Charity to permit the Charity to use that character.

26. The two Appellants registered a private limited company in May 2002, ‘Miss Dorothy.Com Publishing Company Limited’, of which both Appellants were shareholders and directors. This private limited company provided printing services to the charitable company for the four-year period between 2006-2010.

27. The original charity was dissolved in 2010 and removed from the Respondent’s Register of Charities.

28. The said CIC went into voluntary liquidation in November 2012 with a financial deficit of £157,000 with many debts remaining outstanding.

29. Between 2012 – 2014, the Appellants’ private business, VVV, sold the said educational materials, journals, directly to schools.

30. The Charity, concerned in these appeals, ‘Dot Com Children’s Foundation’, was registered by the Appellants on 12 December 2013. One of the trustees was the Appellant, Neil Evans. The Appellant, Sharon Even was, at no time, a trustee of the Charity. However, both she and the other Appellant, Neil Evans, were stated in the Minutes of the first meeting of the trustees, to expect to earn a living from an arrangement between the Charity and the Appellants’ private business, VVV; that the Charity would buy journals from VVV, and would ‘chase’ schools for journal orders; that the Appellant, Sharon Evans, would train the trustees how to sell the journals; that she was the Chief Executive Officer of the Charity and Neil Evans the Chief Operating Officer, respectively, of the Charity. The Appellants were assigned to be the signatories to the Charity’s bank account.

31. In July 2016, the Appellants produced a document entitled ‘New Beginning’ setting out the relationship between the Charity, the Appellants’ private business, VVV, and the two Appellants. This was significant in a number of ways for the purposes of these appeals because it stated the following: - VVV would prepare and print journals that would be purchased by the Charity from VVV for £5.70 per journal (where the cost to VVV was £1.00 per journal) and sell them to schools for £4.20 per journal – an immediate loss; - all sales proceeds received from schools would be remitted to VVV - not to the Charity; - the Appellants, as a stated matter of priority for the Charity, expected salaries of £40,000 per annum to be paid to them from the Charity; - VVV would arrange fundraising events on behalf of the Charity and pay an event company £10,000; - fundraising donations would be used to pay the difference between £5.70 per journal and £4.20 per journal and any balance used by the Charity to buy more journals from VVV.

32. For the years 2013-2015, inclusive, VVV made a net profit of £148,979 from its provision of printing services to the Charity.

33. This document was specifically created as the basis of a business model to be used by the Charity to generate income for the Appellants personally.

34. An unsigned agreement between the same three parties appeared in October 2016 that essentially dealt with the question of salaries from the Charity to the two Appellants, but, significantly, purporting to restrict the Charity to only buying journals from VVV.

35. There was a considerable turnover of trustees of the Charity, the only constant being the involvement of the two Appellants, including an attempt by them to increase monies received by them, through VVV, or otherwise, from the Charity.

36. On 3 October 208, a limited company, Dot Com Digital Limited, the successor to VVV, was incorporated with the Appellant, Sharon Evans, being the sole director and shareholder.

37. At a meeting of the trustees of the Charity on 22 January 2019, the two Appellants asked the trustees to sign a confidentiality agreement and the trustees agreed.

38. VVV was dissolved by voluntary strike-off on 16 July 2019. The Tribunal’s Findings

39. While the Appellants attacked the credibility and motivation of Mr. Wood-Dow, the Tribunal attached significant weight to his written evidence as it bore out, in stark terms, the concerns that existed concerning the activities of the Appellants, and each of them, in their dealings with the Charity, not least, that both Appellants exercised a controlling influence over the Charity. The Tribunal found that the Appellants, and each of them, had general control and management of the Charity and, therefore, were de facto trustees of the Charity, pursuant to section 177 of the Act , despite, particularly in the case of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, her not actually being a trustee.

40. The Tribunal found as a fact that the grounds of misconduct and/or mismanagement by the Appellants, and each of them, in the administration of the Charity, set out in paragraph 54 of the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument, were correct and supported by the evidence.

41. The Tribunal was satisfied, on the evidence, on the balance of probabilities, that Condition D and Condition F of section 181(7) of the Act were satisfied. Accordingly, the Appellants, and each of them, pursuant to charity law, are unfit to be charity trustees and, that it is in the public interest that the Disqualification Orders are made.

42. The Respondent obtained accountancy reports to examine the Charity’s accounts in October 2021and April 2022.These revealed alarming facts concerning the nature of payments by the Charity to the two Appellants and/or their private business.

43. In closing oral submissions from the Appellants’ representative, heavy reliance on the live oral evidence of Reverend Henly, the only remaining trustee of the Charity, in particular, his evidence that the Appellants exerted no control over the trustees and that, when payment of the Appellants was being considered, and then approved, by the trustees, the Appellants left the meeting in advance. It was submitted that this evidence corroborated the oral evidence of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, that the Appellants had no ‘ultimate’ decision-making power or control over the Charity. It was further submitted that this, too, was corroborated by the oral evidence of Mr. Burbeck, even though he was not afraid to contradict the Appellants’ evidence and the Appellant, Sharon Evans, indeed, contradicted him. (Significantly, Mr. Burbeck suggested converting the Charity b converted to a CIC due to concerns that public b9dies were, in effect, putting money into a private business). The Tribunal, on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the entirety of the evidence did not consider that these submissions dislodged its finding that the Appellants were de facto trustees of the Charity and had general control and management of the Charity.

44. The Appellants’ representative further submitted that there was no duty to avoid a conflict of interest where the Appellants, or either of them, at the relevant time, were not trustees of the Charity. This may be arguable but was not persuasive considering the Tribunal’s findings of fact that the Charity was, in essence, and in fact, generally controlled and managed by the Appellants in their personal interest and/or in the interests of their private business(-es).

45. There can be no doubt that record-keeping by the actual trustees of the Charity (including attendees at meetings, topics discussed and decisions taken), whose identity changed regularly over time, left a lot to be desired. However, the Appellants cannot, in the public interest, and the protection of the reputation of charities, rely on such a failing.

46. The Appellants’ representative strongly submitted that, in accordance with the written and oral evidence of the Appellants, the Appellants acted only within their delegated authority from the trustees of the Charity and professional advice, that, it was submitted entitled the Appellants to rely upon such advice, particularly in respect of Condition F set out in section 181 A of the Act . Again, however, for the reasons outlined in preceding paragraphs and having regard to the entirety of the written and oral evidence and submissions, the Tribunal did not find that this excused, adequately, or at all, the Appellants from responsibility for the misconduct and mismanagement found in the affairs of the Charity in favour of their personal benefit and/or the benefit of their private business(-es). The Appellants’’ representative also relied on these particular submissions to argue, in the alternative that the period of disqualification in the revised Disqualification Orders should be further reduced. However, the Tribunal considered that the reduced periods of disqualification were appropriate and should remain, even though the motivation of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, in particular, to get the journals distributed widely to schools for safeguarding purposes was most commendable.

47. In closing submissions, the Respondent summarised the various facts that led to its decision and the making of the Disqualification Orders, later revised to significantly reduce the duration of the disqualification periods. The Tribunal reached, essentially, the same conclusions as to the facts.

48. The Tribunal found that it was desirable, in the public interest, to make the Orders, in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities. There is, inevitably, a heavy burden that must be discharged by anyone in the position of the Appellants, and each of them, whether they were trustees of the Charity or not, having regard to their role that amounted to their being officers or agents of the Charity and de facto trustees. Conclusions and Reasons

49. The Tribunal concluded, on the evidence, on the balance of probabilities, in making its own decision afresh, having regard to its findings of fact, that the Respondent was correct and justified in taking action that resulted in the making of the Disqualification Orders against the Appellants, and each of them, including the periods of disqualification.

50. The Tribunal further concluded, on the evidence, that the Appellants, and each of them, having regard to its findings of fact, were the persons primarily responsible for the proven mismanagement in the administration of the Charity, due to a lack of understanding on their part on the proper management of charities, by reference to the guidance on the meaning of those terms set out in the Respondent’s Operational Guidance document and the guidance set out in the Explanatory Statement on the discretionary nature of the power to make Disqualification Orders.

51. The power to disqualify a person from being a trustee of a charity, or acting in such capacity, as envisaged in section 177 of the Act , is vital to protect charities.

52. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Appellants, and each of them, were not fit persons to be a trustee of any charity.

53. The Tribunal concluded that the most significant issue leading to its finding of mismanagement was the relationship between the Charity and the Appellants. Essentially, there had been a complete disregard for the inappropriate relationship between the two Appellants and the Charity over a period of years. This inappropriate relationship was something that should have been resolved before the intervention of the Respondent at a much earlier point, a matter in respect of which, responsibility particularly fell to the Appellants. This lack of operational separation, exemplified by there being, putative at least, arrangements for re-charge of services between the two Appellants and their private businesses and the Charity, was clear misconduct.

54. The Tribunal decided that, as a basic premise, the Appellants, and each of them, showed a worrying disregard, or, at the very least, naivety, of the law relating to charities: it would appear, indeed, that the Appellants, and each of them, and, as a result, the Charity, were not particularly well-served by professional advisers upon whom too great a reliance was placed by the Appellants where the Charity itself did not, apparently, obtain its own independent professional advice.

55. There was a distinct lack of appreciation shown by the Appellants, and each of them, of the issues raised, involving them, concerning the proper management of the Charity: while the Appellant, Sharon Evans, was never a trustee of the Charity and the Appellant, Neil Evans, only for a relatively short time, both, in particular, the Appellant, Sharon Evans, were, essentially, undoubtedly agents and officers of the Charity with overarching influence and control with an aim of the relationship with the Charity being to a very great extent, to provide them with a living in the form of salaries.

56. This is not to say, or take away from, the extremely valuable work with schools in safeguarding children, being the motivation of the Appellants, not least the Appellant, Sharon Evans.

57. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that the Appellants, by their conduct, placed the Charity in significant reputational risk; that the Appellants were unfit to discharge the duties of a trustee of any charity or to hold a senior management position in any charity and that, by their conduct, the Appellants inevitably damaged public trust and confidence in charities generally. Consequently, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was desirable in the public interest to make the Orders.

58. The Tribunal was particularly concerned that the Appellants, and each of them, showed no appreciation of the importance of a declaration, or a need to declare, any conflict of interest when acting in their roles and involvement with the Charity. This was a very basic failing on their part in that context. It was not acceptable, but understandable at a certain level, that they should seek to rely on not being properly advised in respect of such matters.

59. The Appellants, and each of them, should have known, particularly since they each had such a pivotal role in the affairs of the Charity, and where the Charity undoubtedly relied on the Appellants’ pivotal role, sets the Appellants apart, to a great degree, from the trustees of the Charity in practical terms.

60. The Tribunal was satisfied that the statutory criteria for making the Disqualification Orders were, and are, satisfied. The Tribunal was obliged, however, to also consider whether, as a matter of discretion, it was appropriate for the Orders to be made in the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal concluded that it was appropriate to make to make the Orders: the conduct of the Appellants was serious and amounted to harm being caused to the reputation of the Charity for which they, and each of them were primarily responsible and there was a risk of further harm arising from further mismanagement if the Disqualification Orders were not made. Further, the evidence before the Tribunal established a specific link between the Appellants, and each of them, and the misconduct and mismanagement found by the Tribunal to have occurred.

61. The Tribunal also considered whether it was proportionate to make the Disqualification Orders, including the question of the duration of the Disqualification Orders. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Tribunal was satisfied that to make the Orders for a period of 4.5 years in the case of the Appellant, Sharon Evans, and 3.5 years, in the case of the Appellant, Neil Evans, was proportionate. In considering the question of proportionality, the key issue is the need to increase public trust and confidence in charities and to promote compliance by charities with their legal obligations in the proper administration of charities. The Tribunal considered that any lesser period of disqualification, in either case, would only serve to pose an unacceptable level of risk to the charity sector by the Appellants and each of them. Bearing in mind the seriousness of the mismanagement of the Charity over a period of time by the Appellants, and each of them, it is proportionate, and appropriate, that the disqualification should apply to charities generally.

62. These appeals against the Disqualification Orders are unanimously refused. For the avoidance of doubt, the Appellants, and each of them, are disqualified from being trustees of a charity and holding office, or employment, paid or unpaid, in a charity that involves the exercise of senior management functions, as defined in section 181 A(4) of the Act .