Barclays Bank UK Plc · DRN-6169213

The complaint Mr J complains that Barclays Bank UK Plc did not reimburse transactions he says he does not recognise. What happened Between 30 June and 18 August 2025, 78 payments totalling £4,213 debited Mr J’s Barclays account and went to a cryptocurrency wallet I’ll refer to as ‘K’. Mr J says he does not recognise these payments and did not carry them out himself. Mr J raised a disputed transactions claim with Barclays and they issued a final response letter explaining the transfers were made from Mr J’s genuine device and there was no evidence someone else had gained unauthorised access to the device. Mr J’s device had a PIN and no malware was detected. In addition, the IP address used for the transfers had been associated with Mr J’s account since May 2025 so they felt the evidence suggested Mr J carried out the transactions himself. They did, however, accept they caused some confusion when reviewing his complaint. Mr J did not agree with the outcome and referred the complaint to our service for a review. Our Investigator looked into it and saw that the payments in question were made via Open Banking and that the device used to authorise the payments was most likely Mr J’s own device. As Mr J had confirmed his device remained in his possession and there was no clear point of compromise, the investigator felt it was reasonable that Barclays had not reimbursed Mr J in the circumstances. They also felt it was unusual that £1,200 had been credited back into Mr J’s Barclays account from K around a month after the transactions ended, and that this did not follow usual fraud patterns. Mr J disagreed with the findings and highlighted that his previous employers who he was taking to a tribunal had access to his building, and that they had hacked into his e-mail account. He therefore felt they had something to do with the disputed payments. As an informal agreement could not be reached, the complaint has been passed to me for a final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I have come to the same outcome as the Investigator for largely the same reasons, and there is not much more I can reasonably add to what has already been said. Generally, Barclays is able to hold Mr J liable for the disputed transactions if the evidence suggests it’s more likely than not that he made or otherwise authorised them himself. This position is confirmed in the Payment Service Regulations 2017 (PSRs) and the terms and conditions of his account. From the evidence that has been provided by Barclays, the payments were made using Open Banking, and these were authorised following a log-in on Mr J’s mobile banking app. While this is important, it isn’t enough on its own to say Mr J is liable for the transactions.

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Barclays also has to show it’s more likely than not that Mr J himself made or otherwise authorised them. Barclays has provided the log-in history for Mr J’s online-banking and Open Banking. These show that one device was used to authorise all of the transactions to K. The same device was registered to Mr J’s Barclays account in January 2025 and has been used for other, genuine payments which Mr J has not queried. With this in mind, I am satisfied this is most likely Mr J’s genuine device. Mr J has said that his device is locked by a PIN, and that no-one else has knowledge of this. He has also said that no one else has access to his device. He has told our service that he lives in shared accommodation, however I can see that he raised a claim with a different bank for similar payments made in July 2025 and when asked he told them that he lives alone. Mr J has also said that no one knows the log-in information to his Barclays mobile banking app. With this in mind, there is no clear explanation as to how a third party could have gained possession of his mobile phone device on a number of occasions, bypassed his PIN to gain access to the device and then bypassed the security detailed on his Barclays mobile banking app to authorise payments to a cryptocurrency wallet, which normally have to be registered under the same name that the crediting account is in, in this case Mr J’s Barclays account. All of this leads me to think it is more likely Mr J carried out the transactions himself. Mr J has said that the police are currently looking into his previously employers, as they have bullied him and gained access to his e-mail account, meaning they could also have carried out these transactions. However, I have seen no evidence to confirm what Mr J has said such as any documentation from the police or the tribunal service. In addition, Barclays did not identify any malware or screen-sharing software that was in use on the device that made the payments. Finally, even if someone did gain access to Mr J’s e-mail account, it does not follow that they could also gain access to his mobile banking app as there are several additional layers of security that would need to be breached, but there is no evidence that happened. Having carefully considered all the evidence available to me, I think Barclays have acted fairly in declining Mr J’s claim for the disputed transactions, on the basis I think it’s more likely he authorised for the payments to be made. I appreciate that Mr J is also unhappy with the way Barclays have handled his disputed transactions claim, and they have admitted they called him when he asked them not to, when he was at work. But on balance I don’t think any misinformation that was provided by Barclays warrants any compensation in this particular case for the distress or inconvenience caused. I therefore don’t think Barclays needs to take any additional steps to remedy this complaint. My final decision I do not uphold Mr J’s complaint against Barclays Bank UK Plc. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr J to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Rebecca Norris Ombudsman

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