Financial Ombudsman Service decision
HSBC UK Bank Plc · DRN-5941256
The verbatim text of this Financial Ombudsman Service decision. Sourced directly from the FOS published decisions register. Consumer names are reduced to initials by FOS at point of publication. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original decision.
Full decision
The complaint Mr W complains that HSBC UK Bank Plc held him responsible for payments made from his account. The background to this complaint is well known to both parties. So, if there’s a submission I’ve not addressed; it isn’t because I’ve ignored the point. It’s simply because my findings focus on what I consider to be the central issues in this complaint – that being whether HSBC was responsible for Mr W’s losses here. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I agree with the conclusions reached by our Investigator, and for largely the same reasons. Where the evidence is incomplete, inconclusive, or contradictory (as it is here), I have to make my decision on the balance of probabilities – that is, what I consider is more likely than not to have happened in the light of the available evidence and the wider surrounding circumstances. A consumer should only be responsible for transactions made from their account that they’ve authorised themselves. Mr W has said he didn’t give any permission for the transactions in dispute to be made but HSBC believes he did. My role then is to give a view on whether I think Mr W more likely than not authorised the transactions, based on the evidence I have available. Mr W says that on the evening of 25 May 2025 and into the early hours of the next day he was potentially drugged while at a bar and was taken to an ATM machine where he was forced to withdraw cash. He then lost consciousness and woke up at around 8am without his wallet and mobile phone. Mr W says that he then discovered disputed transactions of around £4,000 taken from his account. HSBC said that the genuine card and PIN were used for some of the transactions with the genuine card via contactless for the others. I note that the last time Mr W used his chip and PIN was five days before the disputed payments here. So, shoulder surfing of his PIN in a bar is extremely unlikely here. Mr W told HSBC a month after the fraud occurred that his passcode for his banking app and his phone were different with that testimony then changing when speaking with our Investigator where Mr W confirmed they were the same. However, I think the more accurate testimony is the one Mr W provided to HSBC a month after the fraud took place because it’s closer in proximity to when the disputed payments took place. I note there was fraud on some of Mr W’s other accounts at the same time. And Mr W has confirmed that he thinks he was taken to an ATM and forced to provide his PIN number so that the money could be taken out. The above persuades me that what is most likely to have happened here – on balance – is that Mr W has provided his PIN number and details to the
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third parties who took him to the cash machine. As our investigator explained the rules also include the principle of apparent authority. Which I think is relevant in this case. And those rules do explain that if a consumer is coerced into making a payment (under threat of violence or force) the payments can still be considered as authorised and consented to. So, because I’m persuaded – on balance – that Mr W provided his security details to the third parties that he has consented to the payments under the relevant regulations. I note that HSBC did consider some of the later transactions as suspicious and eventually applied a block on the account. But because of the security details Mr W provided the third parties were able to answer the security questions HSBC asked via the text messages. HSBC tried to call Mr W but didn’t get an answer due to the circumstances Mr W has described and the block then remained on the account. As a result, HSBC did intervene reasonably and when it couldn’t speak to Mr W on the phone it maintained the block on the account stopping any further losses, which I think was reasonable in the circumstances. I am sorry to have to deliver this news to Mr W. I know this wasn’t the answer he was hoping for. I can’t imagine how difficult this has been for him in the circumstances, and he has my sympathy. However, from what I have seen, I don’t think it is fair to ask HSBC to refund these disputed transactions. As a result of the above, I don’t think I can reasonably say that HSBC treated Mr W unfairly here by not refunding him. My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr W to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Mark Dobson Ombudsman
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