Revolut Ltd · DRN-5841497

The complaint Mr U complains Revolut Ltd (“Revolut”) failed to protect him from financial harm when he fell victim to fraud. What happened The facts of this complaint are well known to both parties, so I won’t repeat them in detail here. In short, Mr U says he was contacted by someone on WhatsApp regarding a remote working job opportunity. He discussed the work involved and was given training on how to complete online tasks for commission. As part of the process, Mr U says he was asked to make deposits first which then gave him access to different packages of work to complete online for different merchants. Mr U says he was also introduced to other people completing the same work over WhatsApp, and he was given access to an online portal to track his deposits and commissions earnt. Mr U says he realised he was being scammed after he tried to withdraw some of his fund in the account but was asked to pay high withdrawal fees and other ancillary costs but never received any of the money he deposited or supposedly earnt. Mr U says Revolut should refund the money he lost to the scam as the transactions were out of character for the account, and Revolut ought to have intervened to try and protect him from such scams. Mr U says had it done this, it’s likely he would’ve realised he was being scammed. Revolut considered this complaint but decided not to uphold it. It questioned the jurisdiction we had over the cryptocurrency withdrawals. It also concluded that it wouldn’t be fair to have expected Revolut to have intervened when Mr U was exchanging fiat currency into cryptocurrency, as there was no way for it to have predicted that these funds would then be withdrawn and sent elsewhere. So, Revolut didn’t uphold Mr U’s complaint. Our investigator considered this complaint and felt that this complaint is one we could consider in relation to the money exchanges from Mr U’s fiat currency account to cryptocurrency. And having looked at these transactions, felt that Revolut ought to have intervened at Payment 13 by way of a human intervention. He then concluded that had it done this, it’s likely the scam would’ve been uncovered and his loss prevented from this point onwards. Revolut didn’t agree, so the complaint has been passed to me for a final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having considered everything, I agree that the outcome reached by the investigator is fair in the circumstances. I’ll explain why. Jurisdiction

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Our service can consider a wide variety of complaints about financial services, but we can’t consider all the matters referred to us. The Dispute Resolution Rules (DISP) set out the complaints that fall within our remit and are found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) handbook. Mr U’s complaint arises from her customer relationship with a UK based firm, which is regulated by the FCA. But there are other factors which affect whether our service can consider a complaint – and DISP includes limits on the activities we can review. According to the rules, we can consider a complaint under our Compulsory Jurisdiction if it relates to an act or omission by a firm in carrying on one or more of the activities listed under DISP 2.3. Having reviewed those activities, I’ve decided we can’t look into the part of Mr U’s complaint which relates to the transfer or withdrawal of cryptocurrency from the Revolut platform. Mr U hasn’t responded to dispute this, so I will not discuss this further. However, our service can look into complaints about activities that are ancillary to the ones covered by us (those listed under DISP 2.3). The steps leading up to the transfer/withdrawal of cryptocurrency also includes both the acceptance of funds into Mr U’s account and then a subsequent request for Revolut to exchange fiat money into cryptocurrency. I am satisfied that these earlier steps amount to payment services, and in the case of the exchanges, at the very least an activity which is ancillary to payment services. Given the broad nature of this complaint, I’m satisfied that the exchange to cryptocurrency is an activity our service can consider. Authorisation I’m satisfied Mr U ‘authorised’ the payments for the purposes of the of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (‘the Regulations’), in force at the time. So, although he didn’t intend the money to go to scammers, under the Regulations, and under the terms and conditions of his bank account, he is presumed liable for the loss in the first instance. There’s no dispute that this was a scam, but although Mr U didn’t intend his money to go to scammers, he did authorise the disputed payments. Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, but where the customer has been the victim of a scam, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse them even though they authorised the payment. Should Revolut have intervened? As outlined above, our Service can look at the exchanges made from Mr U’s fiat account to a cryptocurrency and so these are the transactions I am referring to here from the investigator’s table. As the investigator outlined, the initial 12 transactions Mr U made were relatively low in value and are unlikely to have raised any red flags with Revolut. I do note that these were all made in relatively quick succession, however, as the value of each of them is still in total under (or just above) £1,000 a day I don’t think it would be fair to say Revolut ought to have intervened here. However, Payment 13 was for over £3,000, and was made on the same day as Payment 12 for £1,343.80, which would’ve meant a total of £5,018.57 in exchanges over an approximate 4-hour period. So, I think this ought to have been flagged by Revolut as unusual and out of character for Mr U’s account. And as these transactions were cryptocurrency exchanges, I think it would be fair to say Revolut should have been on notice of the increased risk of a scam here and should have intervened by way of human intervention.

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So, I must now turn to causation. Put simply, I need to consider whether Revolut’s failure to intervene caused Mr U’s losses. To do this, I need to reflect on whether such an intervention (described above) would have likely made any difference. As I’ve said above, Revolut ought to have reached out to Mr U at this point via a call or chat to talk about the circumstances around the currency exchange. I think it is reasonable to have expected Revolut to have asked about the reason Mr U was making this exchange, any forward plans with the cryptocurrency and whether someone has asked him to make this exchange. These are all fair questions which we would expect to be explored in such circumstances. And from the evidence I’ve seen I think it’s likely Mr U would’ve told Revolut about the situation he was in as I’ve not seen any evidence that he was coached by the scammers to lie, or that he had been trying to deceive Revolut about the true purpose of these activities. I’ve seen that at the time of Payment 13, 30 May 2025, Mr U started to have some concerns about the work and his ability to withdraw the money he was having to deposit to continue the work. I think it’s likely that he would’ve been honest had he been asked, and this would’ve led Revolut to have realised that this was likely to be a scam and would’ve warned Mr U appropriately. And as Mr U was starting to have some concerns around this time and had not been successful in withdrawing any money yet – I think this would’ve resonated with Mr U and I don’t think he would’ve made this, or any further payments. So, I think it’s fair to say that Revolut’s failure to intervene here led to Mr U suffering further loss. Contributory negligence I have considered whether Mr U had contributed to his negligence here, as argued by Revolut. And I think he has for the same reasons outlined by the investigator. Mr U hasn’t disputed the investigators findings on this, so I don’t need to discuss this further. Putting things right For all the reasons outlined above, I am upholding this complaint in part and Revolut Ltd should be held liable for 50% of all the payments Mr U made to this scam from Payment 13 onwards. In order to calculate this Revolut should: • calculate 50% of all the payments Mr U made to this scam from Payment 13, • deduct the amount Mr U already received back from the scam, • calculate the GBP value of each cryptocurrency withdrawal based on the GBP/USDC exchange rate on the date of each withdrawal, • add 8% simple interest per annum to this amount from the date of the payment to the date of settlement. My final decision For all the reasons outlined above, I am upholding this complaint in part. Revolut Ltd should put things right as outlined above. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr U to accept or reject my decision before 24 April 2026. Sienna Mahboobani Ombudsman

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